Item Code: IDF420
Oxford University Press
Size: 8.8" X 5.8"
Weight of the Book: 512 gms
A word has the power to stand for an object. And the capacity to understand words gives people the power to acquire knowledge. This relationship between a semantic and an epistemic power has been a core concern for Indian philosophers of language down the ages.
In this second volume in the foundations of philosophy in India series (the first was Cit: Consciousness by Bina Gupta), Jonardon Ganeri examines theories of meaning or artha. He discusses approaches in different schools of thought: Grammarian, Mimamsika, Buddhist, early Naiyayika, Navya Naiyayika, and Vedantin, highlighting the significant relationship between 'word' and 'meaning/ knowing/ knowledge'.
He focuses primarily on the Navya-Nyaya school, especially its two tenets: that the central function of a word is to stand for an object, and that a language is essentially a device for the reception of knowledge. This approach is in marked contrast to the position generally exhibited in western literature until recent times. Ganeri probes further the tension between these two tenets. He also elucidates on the important changes brought about by the introduction of modes of thought in the theory of meaning.
An important contribution to the philosophy of language, this volume demonstrates that classical Indian theory of language can inform and be informed by contemporary philosophy.
Students and scholars of philosophy and linguistics, history, sociology, and anthropology, as well as those working on philosophical and liturgical texts will find this book an enlightening and rewarding read.
About the Author:
Jonardon Ganeri is Reader in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, UK.
|List of Symbols||VIII|
|1. Artha: Meanings as Entities||9|
|1.1 The Realist Theory of Meaning|
|1.2 Meanings as Generalities (Jatisaktivada)|
|1.3 Meanings as Bare Particulars (Vyaktisaktivada)|
|1.4 Meanings as Qualitied Particulars (Visistasaktivada)|
|2. Sakti: Meaning as a Relation||34|
|2.1 A Meaning Theory for Philosophical Sanskrit|
|2.2 The 'Infinity' and 'Discrepancy' Arguments|
|2.3 Meanings as Grounds of Use|
|3. Karaka: Meanings in Composition||53|
|3.1 Semantic Role and Logical Form|
|3.2 Compounds and Complex Descriptions|
|4. Sabdabodha: Meaning and Structure of Understanding||73|
|4.1 Testimony Principles and Communication|
|4.2 Idiolect Meaning|
|4.3 Public Meaning and the Role of Mandates|
|5. Sabda-pamana: Meaning and Knowing||98|
|5.1 Knowing: A Linguistic Analysis|
|5.2 Towards a Theory of Testimony|
|5.3 Testimony and Semantic Structure|
|6. Pravrttinimitta: The Basis of Linguistic Practice||129|
|6.1 The Basis of Meaning|
|6.2 The Abverbial Modification of Thought|
|6.3 Nyaya Modes, Fregan Senses, and Discriminatory Capacities|
|7. Sakyatavacchedaka: Delimiting the Reach of Reference||159|
|7.1 On the Form of a Meaning Theory|
|7.2 Raghunatha's Ausetere Theory of Meaning|
|8. Paribhasiki; The Meaning of Names||179|
|8.1 Therotical Names|
|8.2 Proper Names and Direct Reference|
|8.3 Diagnostic Stipulations|
|8.4 Descriptivism: A Nyaya Theory Defended|
|9. Sarvanama; Indexicality and Pronominal Anaphora||205|
|9.1 Changing Reference, Constant Meaning|
|9.2 Pronouns, Anaphora, and Speakers' Thoughts|
|9.3 The Pragmatic Theory of Anaphora|
|9.4 Quotation and Reference|