Nyayabindu-Purvapaksa-Samksipta (The Prime Facie Arguments Against The Nyayabindu In A Nutshell)

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To bring the intellectual treasure of ancient India to light has been the sacred duty of the Ideological scholars all over the world. To this end, editing the ancient texts from the manuscripts, re-editing the printed texts, exposing the ideas, retranslating the lost texts into Sanskrit, reconstructing a hypothetical text on the basis of available commentary, etc. have been regarded the chief activities for them. With the long-reared intention to associate myself with these, I engaged myself in the retranslation or reconstruction work of this lost Sanskrit logical work. In this my chief inspiration was Pandit Rahula Sankrityayan. I became acquainted with Tibetan language and proceeded to utilize the printed Peking Tanjur in the Asiatic Society. From there I selected Nyãyabindu-pürvapaksa-samksipta of Kamalsila. Though there are other Tibetan editions of the text, I thought it no less important to work even with a single edition for the time being with a strong hope that other scholars will come forward to further improve it in future. Anyway, after hard labour for more than two years obviously with simultaneous engagement in other works I completed editing of the present text in 1996. And now it is being presented in printed form before the learned scholars. I hope the work will fairly expose the views of the papacies of the Nyãyabindu, facilitating the understanding of the ideas therein in a better way. Before concluding I would like to pay homage to my teachers from whom I have learnt the Indian philosophy from the original texts. I thank Sadesh who has agreed, with a smiling face, to print it for his publishing house.

The Nyayabindu-puwapakca-sainksipta is a small text on Buddhist logic written by Kamalasila (700-750 A.D. according to Nakamura; 740-795 A. D., according to FrauwalIner) who is well-known through his magnificent commentary Pañjikã on antaraksita’s Tattvasamgraha. We know that the Pañjikã exposed a large part of the unknown history of the philosophical conflict in ancient India. The Nyayabindu-purvapaksa-samksipta or Samksipta hereinafter used for easy communication, is also an important text brought forth from the pen of the writer of Pañjikã. Unfortunately, the Samkcipta appears to be lost in Sanskrit original. But there xists a Tibetan translation of it in the great collection Tanjur and it covers 10 folios extending from 113a1 to 122b6 of the Gtan-tshigs rig-pa Zhe volume of its Peking edition. The translation was executed jointly by the Indian pundit Viuddhasirnha and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-sloñ Dpal-rtsegs raksita of Zhu-chen, in the 9th century A.D.

The Nydyabindu-puwapakca-samsipta, as the very title of the work indicates, contains only the main prima facie arguments against the views of the Nyayabindu, a text on Buddhist logic by the great Dharmakirti (600-660 A. D., according to Frauwallner). The style maintained in the work concerned is that the purvapaka views along with their possible identification have been noted first and then the sãtra of the Nydyabindu refuting those is mentioned. We may add, in this connection, that it is a general characteristic of treating the subject-matter in the Indian ãstras that the final sãtras or views are given after recording the contradictory sãtras or views if thought to be important in those connections. This tradition is very ancient and it has been considered by the Indian sastrakãras, to be most fruitful to understand the subject- matter with the reference to the historical background. The Sanksipta gives importance to that very Indian tradition in an indirect way. The Nyãyabindu is an ideal manual on Buddhist logic. On it, Vinitadeva (700 A.D.), Santabhadra (700 A.D.), Dharmottara (1st quarter of the 8th century A.D.), Mallavãdin (700-750 A.D.) and Durvekamisra (10-11th century A.D.) wrote commentaries or sub-commentaries. One Tatparyanibandha of an anonymous commentator is also available. We have lost Santabadra’s commentary, except a few stray fragments of this work. The Tippaza of Mallavadin most probably is yet to be published or thoroughly studied. All the above works have mentioned a number of purvapaka views. In the Nyãyabindutika of Vinitadeva (reconstructed text) we find more or less 25 views of the different purvapakins, whereas in Dharmottara’s Tikã the number of purvapakas is very few. However, the references to different matters are comparatively greater in number in the Dharmottarapradipa.

Anyway, the Sarnksipta records 77 diverse views of different purvapakins. There are 14 views of the Naiyayikas, 10 of the Vaiesikas, 11 of the Sarnkhyas, 13 of the Mimarnsakas, 4 of the Digambaras, 3 of the Grammarians, 2 of the Barhaspatyas, 1 of Caraka, 1 of Aviddhakarna, 1 of Patrasvamin, 2 of Vasubandhu, 1 of the Vatsiputriyas, 1 of the Vaibhãsikas, 4 of the rival Buddhists and lastly, 9 of some unidentified opponent philosophers. Among the above views, some are very common in our philosophical works, such as one pramana of the Barhaspatyas, three pramanas of the Sarnkhyas, four pramanas and five inference-components of the Naiyayikas, the inference with the help of seven specific varieties of relation of the Sãrnkhyas, and so on. But the most important matters on which trudy lies the value of the Sainksipta are being noted below:

(1) The Saiyikcipta stands as a source of identification of a definition of subject (pakca) quoted in the Nyãyavãrltika of Uddyotakara (under the Nyãyasütra 1.1.33). The definition of the subject runs as vicãraZthyarn iaz arthah pakash, i.e. the subject is that which is desired in the course of an enquiry.

Uddyotakara, according to his own inherent nature of being silent about the source except one or two rare cases, did not say anything about whose definition it was. Vãcaspati Mira who in course of commenting upon the Nyãyavarttika identified a number of purvapakas, also remained silent in this regard. But the Samksipta (fol. 1 19b1) clearly says that the definition “rnam par dpyad par ‘dod pa’i don phyogs yin” which must be converted to the above-mentioned definition, vicara?eãyam etc. is of Slob-dpon dbyig-gnen i.e. Acarya Vasubandhu.

(2) Uddyotakara in his Nydya-varttika under NS. 1.1.5 refutes a definition of the inference. The definition is nãntarIyakdrthadarsanam tadvido’numanam, i.e. The inference is the perception of the thing which is invariably concomitant, for one who has known the said concomitance. He does not mention whose definition it is. Vacaspati also does not identify the opponent here. It is found in the. Saznkcipta (fol. 115b7) that the definition is of Vasubandhu.

(3) The Sai.nkcipta (fol. 113b3-5) narrates a view of Aviddhakarna (Rna-ma-phug) according to which Aviddhakarna did not admit the mental perception as a pratyakapramaia (i.e. a source of valid perceptual knowledge). He argued, “The object previously perceived (through outer sense-organs) is not different at the time of mental perception and as it grasps the same object which has already been grasped before, it cannot be a pramana. If the object of the mental perception is different from the object of the previous perception by the sense-organs like eyes etc., the object of the mental perception would be admitted as one which is present without any prior dependence and it would also be admitted that the mental perception could grasp everything without any prior operation of the external sense-organs. But the blind cannot have any object of perception.”

The purvapaksa view mentioned above regarding the invalidity of the mental perception to be a pramaa, has been very precisely noted in Dharmottara’s commentary (vide Dharmottarapradipa, p. 61), but there is no identification of the purvapakin. Durvekamira, however, explains the commentary but does not pronounce a word about whose view it is. We find that the principle of grhitagrahitva is the criterion for a pramaza’s invalidity, for the Mimamsakas and it is the same also to the purvapakin mentioned above. So we may identify the parvapakin here as the Mimãrnsaka. But Kamalasila specifically mentions Aviddhakarna to be the paruapakin here holding the same view which the Mimarnsaka also holds. It is to be mentioned in this connection that the above particular view of Aviddhakarna is not mentioned by Kamalasila in his Pañjikã though a number of views of Aviddhakarna are found to have been recorded there.

The mention of Aviddhakarna and his view in the Samskripta is a very significant matter in the Indian philosophy. It has led us to solve some controversial points in a successful way. Mahendra Kumar cited Jam authority for Aviddhakarna’s view that it is impossible to define the linga (= hetu) and that, since a valid instrument must, give us information we do not already have, inference, which depends on memory, is not a valid instrument. And depending on this sceptical attitude towards the hetu, he assumed the existence of a second Aviddhakarna different from the commentator of the Nyãyabhacya because it appeared to him very unlikely that Aviddhakaria being a commentator of the Nyãyabhaya could actually forward such a view. So according to Mahendra Kumar, there were two Aviddhakarnas, one the Naiyayika who flourished between 620 and 700, the other a Carvaka who lived in the 8th century. (Vide Encyclopaedia of the Indian Philosophies (II), pp. 338-40).

The scholars like A. L. Thakur, Umesh Misra and Obermiller rejected the existence of two Aviddhakarnas and on the evidence of the Sanksipta it is found that their opinion is correct. The fundamental argument to reject the mental perception, in the Samksipta is similar to that in the case of the hetu, injaina sources. Again, there is no possibility of being two Aviddhakarnas in the Pañjikã and Saik.ipta, both by the same author Kamalasila. So it can safely be said that Aviddhakaraia in the Jam sources is not different from that in the Buddhist sources. Now as the Sajikcipta places Aviddhakarna as a purvapakin of Dharmakirti, the possibility of being a second Aviddhakarna who is supposed to be a Carvãka of the 8th century, disappears. Moreover, the argument of grhitagrahitua cannot prove a philosopher to be a Cãrväka. Kumarila being a great orthodox philosopher, also extended this. kind of argument. Anyway, until we get some other definite proof in this regard it cannot be justified to call Aviddhakartra a Cãrvãka. Aviddhakarna is one, he is the writer of Tattvatikd, a commentary on the Nyayabhaya and is pre-Dharmakirti or at best senior contemporary with him. .

(4) From the Sankcipta (fol. 115a6), we come to kno that Pãtrasvãmin (Snod kyi rje) was the parvapakin of Dharmakirti. We find his view in the Tattvasarngraha and Pañjikã. The view recorded in the Sanksipta is the same as in those texts. But the reference in the Samksipta informs us of more definite date of Pãtrasvãmiri, as being pre-Dharmakirti or at best senior contemporary with Dharmakrti.

(5) Now we come to the next important matter. We have already seen how the Samksipta has helped us solve some undecided questions. But in a matter to be discussed below, the Samksipta has made us land into a problem rather than solving it.

In the Tatparyatika on the Nydyasütra 1.11.9, Vacaspati says, yat punah bhadantena kdlatitasya vyakhyanai krtam etc. What is the interpretation given by the Buddhist? If there is the violation of the sequence of mentioning the probans, then the so-called probans is a Kãlatita pseudo-probans. But from the text of the Samksipta (fol. 120b8) it is found that the above- mentioned interpretation is of the Naiyayikas. Now who is right Karnalaila or Vacaspati? Moreover, it is important to note that though Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara clearly refuted the explanation, Kamalaila being posterior to them, yet recorded the same as of the Naiyayikas. Further, in the Nyãyabhüsaa of Bhãsarvajña (p. 310), we find, the Kãlãtita hetvãbhasa occurs when the sequence of inference-components is violated, i.e. the time to .give probans after paka is violated; If the probans is not placed at the proper time it is Kalatita. So it is that very interpretation which is already condemned by the Naiyayikas like Vatsyayana and others. It is very doubtful whether Bhasarvajfla accepted a Buddhist explanation for his text. The explanation was most probably current among the Naiyayikas like Aviddhakarna or others.

Again, Vacaspati identifies the interpretation as of the Buddhist philosopher (Bhadanta). But as the interpretation is already refuted by Vatsyayana, we may look for who that preVatsyayana Bhadanta is, if Vacaspati’s statement is crucial.

So, in this situation, we are inclined to suggest that the interpretation condemned by Vatsyayana (and also by Uddyotakara) was primarily given by some pre-Vatsyayana ekadesins i.e. a section of the pre-Vatsyayana Naiyayikas. Later this interpretation was generally current among the Buddhists and also those ekadesins. Vãcaspati simply imposed the responsibility upon the Buddhists for such an interpretation.

(6) In the Pañjikã under Tattvasarngraha Karika No. 1441, Kamalasila identifies kecit as Kumarila and others. They admit two kinds of inference, viesatodrsta and samanyatodrsta. The Samksipta (fol. 117a3) also mentions the pUrvapaksins having the view of two kinds of inference, one vi.sesatodryta and the other samanyatodrsta, but here those purvapaksins are not Kumarila and others, but the Sarnkhyas. Nowhere among the purvapaksins of Dharmakirti the name of Kumarila is found. So it may be an indicition that Kumarila was junior contemporary with Dharmakirti.

To conclude, it may simply be mentioned that the Samksipta must enrich the understanding of the Nyãyabindu with the knowledge of the historical background. If the present edition is helpful to reach that end the. study of the Buddhist Logic will no doubt, advance a step further with it.