Subscribe for Newsletters and Discounts
Be the first to receive our thoughtfully written
religious articles and product discounts.
By registering, you may receive account related information, our email newsletters and product updates, no more than twice a month. Please read our Privacy Policy for details.
.
Share
Share our website with your friends.
Email this page to a friend
By subscribing, you will receive our email newsletters and product updates, no more than twice a month. All emails will be sent by Exotic India using the email address info@exoticindia.com.

Please read our Privacy Policy for details.
|6
Your Cart (0)
Books > Buddhist > The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the School of Dignaga
Displaying 1148 of 1581         Previous  |  NextSubscribe to our newsletter and discounts
The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the  
School of Dignaga
The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the School of Dignaga
Description
From the Jacket

The philosophy of the Medieval school of Buddhism was ushered into existence by Dignaga and Dharmakirti and later on systematized and developed by Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and others of repute. The metaphysical and epistemological sides of this school spread far and wide, even in remote days, for they influenced not only the Brahmanical thought but also the non-Brahmanical speculations in Indian philosophical systems from the third century A.D. to 1000 A.D.

But a systematic presentation of the philosophy of this school had not been attempted so far. The present book is designed to fulfil this long-felt need. It presents a clear exposition of the philosophy of critical Realism as expounded by Dignaga and his school.

The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters. Part I discusses the Nature of Existence, Logical Difficulties, Theory of Causation, Universals, Doctrine of Apoha, Theory of Soul and Problem of After-Life. Part II deals with the Organic and Inorganic Perception, Inference and Negative Judgement. The two parts bound in one Volume deal also with many other subsidiary topics.

Dr. Satkari Mookerjee was one of the renowned contemporary scholars of the country. He joined the Calcutta University as a Lecturer, later rose to professorship and occupied the prestigious Ashutosh Chair.

In 1955, he joined the Nava Nalanda Maha Vihara as its Director. Some of his papers are collectively published in the Nava Nalanda Maha Vihara Research Publications Vol. I & II. His other important works are Non-absolutism, and Exposition of Pramanavarttika.

Preface

The present work is substantially based upon my thesis which was approved for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy by the University of Calcutta in 1932. It has since been revised in many places and fresh matter introduced, the last chapter being entirely new.

Buddhist philosophy is a vast subject with a large number of ramifications. It is not possible to do full justice to the whole subject within so short a compass. I have here dealt with only a particular school. The previous writings on the subject are rather sectional and fragmentary and a systematic presentation of Dignaga's school was a desideratum.

I take this opportunity to offer my grateful thanks to Syamaprasad Mookerjee, Esq., M.A., B.L., Bar. –at-Law, Bharati, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, for the constant encouragement I received from him in connection with my researches and for the provision he kindly made for the publication of my book by the University of Calcutta.

My sincere thanks are due to my pupil, Mr. Satindrakumar Mukherjee, M.A., for his ungrudging help in looking through the proofs and for his valuable suggestions. Mr. Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, M.A., Research Fellow, Calcutta University, who is carrying on researches under my guidance, also deserves my best thanks for the preparation of the Index. I must express my heart-felt thanks to my pupils, Mr. Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., P.R.S., Lecturer, Bethune College, and Mr. Makhanlal Mookerjee, M.A., Research Scholar of the University, attached to me, for their valuable help in the preparation of the Table of Contents. To Mr. Atulchandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent of the University Press, Mr. Bhupendralal Banerjee, Printer, Mr. Kalipada Das, B.A., and the other members of the staff of the University Press, I offer my grateful thanks for the special care and interest they have taken in my work. The publication of this book within such an incredibly short time is entirely due to their hearty co-operation.

Introduction

The present work is an humble attempt to give a critical exposition of the philosophy of the Medieval school of Buddhism that was ushered into existence by Dignaga and Dharmakirti and later on systematized and developed by Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and other authors of repute. Of this philosophy, again, the purely idealistic side has been left untouched in the present work. The interest and character of this work are purely philosophical and critical and note historical. There have already appeared in the field several brilliant expositions and accounts of Buddhist philosophy and religion, which have dealt with the historical side with varying degrees of fullness. The monumental works of Prof. Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Prof. S.N. Dasgupta have provided an important place for Buddhist philosophy, and though, from the very nature and scope of these works, the treatment might appear not to be exhaustive, the account and exposition constitute a substantial contribution to Buddhist scholarship. The writings of Prof. Louis de La Valle Poussin, Prof. Stcherbatsky, Prof. Guieseppe Tucci, Prof B. M. Thomas and other scholars have already provided the learned account of the growth and development of Buddhist philosophy and religion. And attempt in that line would necessarily involve a repetition or reduplication of much the same thing, though it is not denied that there is room for expansion and elaboration even in that direction.

The present work has, however, steered clear of the historical side and is chiefly preoccupied with the dry metaphysical and epistemological sides of the Sautrantika philosophy. What particularly impressed the present writer is the fact that the whole course of philosophical speculations in Indian systems of thought, Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical alike, from the third century A.D. down to 1000 A.D., which may be described as the adolescent and fruitful period of Indian philosophy, bears unmistakable evidence of Buddhist influence. Even Vatsyayana and Sabarasvamin are not immune from it. Of course, they have borrowed little or nothing from the Buddhists and their chief interest in Buddhist philosophy is only negative, all their energies being directed to a refutation of the Buddhist position. But this adverse criticism does not minimize their debt; on the other hand, it is proof positive of their obligation. It has been very aptly observed by a modern philosopher that "Every writer on philosophical subjects in indebted, beyond all possibility of adequate acknowledgment, to the great thinkers of the past…..But the debt is one which he makes for himself, or at least incalculably increases, by free and honest criticism, If the labours of those whom he criticizes have rendered his criticism possible, it is only by criticizing that he is brought to the intelligent appreciation of their work." The real development of the Nyaya philosophy may be legitimately believed to commence with Uddyotakara, who, on his own avowal, derived his incentive to write his commentary from the hostile critics, whose sophistical (according to Uddyotakara) arguments went a long way to bring discredit on the Nyaya Philosophy. Uddyotakara's taciturnity in regard to names is notorious. Vacaspati Misra has supplied the lacuna and tells us that it was he adverse criticism of Dignaga and men of his ilk that gave he much-needed fillip to Uddyotakara for writing his masterpiece. In fact, the sole justification for this attempt lay in the necessity of a refutation of Dignaga's animadversions which created a perilous situation for Nyaya.

The subsequent career of Nyaya philosophy and of Post-Dignaga Philosophy, for the matter of that, is but a progressive Dignaga Philosophy, for the matter of that, is but a progressive record of the daring and desperate fights between these two schools, which were fought on a hundred and one battle-fields. The fight was keen and vigorous and continued with unabated enthusiasm down to the days of Vacaspati, Jayanta, Udayana and Sridhara, on the one hand, and Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and their followers, on the other. But we have omitted to mention another philosopher, a towering personality and a hero of a thousand and one battle-fields, I mean, Kumarila Bhatta. Kumarila came after Uddyotakara and he was, to all intents and purposes, a greater fighter, who fought clean and hard. Uddyotakara's polemics smacked of rankling jealousy and were rather full of transparent sophistry and claptrap. So the Buddhists did not find it very hard to expose his fallacies. In Kumarila, However, they found a veritable Tartar. It is not seldom that the Buddhists were compelled to revise their old theories and to re-formulate them in the light of Kumarila's criticism. In fact, a more formidable critics, could hardly be imagined. Kumarila's sledge-hammer blows were telling in their effect and the replies of Santaraksita, Dharmottara, Ratnakirti and subsequent writers indirectly acknowledged the justice of his criticism in more places than one, inasmuch as they had to re-shape their theories in fundamental aspects.

What is, however, particularly refreshing in this tense atmosphere of fighting is the fact of the earnestness of the fighters. Though all cannot be regarded as equally honest or honourable in their methods, their earnestness and sincerity are beyond doubt or cavil. The fighting has all the freshness of life and reality. There is no air of unreality about it. In fact, they fought for what they believed to be a question of life and death. Philosophy was not a matter of academic interest in India. Change of philosophy meant the change of entire outlook and orientation in life. Victory in a philosophical debate, therefore, was essential to the preservation of one's religion and mode of life, and defeat spelt inglorious death or apostacy from the accepted faith. There was, in fact, no line of demarcation between philosophy and religion in India. A religion without a philosophical backing was unthinkable.

The cleavage between philosophy and religion is pronounced where religion is held to be a matter of unquestioning faith irrespective of a philosophic sanction. But in India the two were identical. So even the atheists had their own religion, because philosophy and religion were one. Belief had to submit to the test of logic, and a faith that were not warranted by philosophic conviction, was rightly regarded as perverse dogmatism which has no right to the allegiance of a man of sound education and culture. It is this fact of intellectual honesty and spiritual earnestness that account for the intensity and desperate character of this fighting for opinions among ancient philosophers of India. As has been aptly observed by Prof. Dasgupta with his characteristic insight, "The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. Ignorance of this peculiarity of the Indian mind has been responsible for the so-called charge of scholasticism that has been laid at the door of Indian philosophy. Philosophy was not the fad of intellectual circles that indulged in these metaphysical gymnastics for mere intellectual satisfaction or for the purpose of whiling away their idle hours. It was, on the contrary, the earnest quest of truth and life's purpose and nothing short of truth could give its votaries peace or satisfy their ardent minds. And the intensity of this craving was not appeased except by a thoroughgoing and meticulous application of the truth to every detail of life. Accordingly no fictitious barrier between religion and philosophy was tolerated.

If religion was not sanctioned and inspired by philosophy, it was regarded as a useless superstition. If philosophy was not lived in actual religion, it was rightly held to be a mere waste of time and a dereliction from life's true purpose and mission. As Prof. Sir S. Radhakrishnan observes with his inimitable felicity of expression, "In many other countries reflection on the nature of existence is a luxury of life. The serious moments are given to action, while the pursuit of philosophy comes up as a parenthesis. In ancient India philosophy was not an auxiliary to any other science or art, but always held a prominent position of independence. The true criterion of philosophy and scholasticism therefore should be sought not in the identity of the interests of religion and philosophy, which, to my mind, far from being an occasion of halting apology, constitutes the very apex and perfection of both of them. The criterion, in my humble judgment, should be the crucial test as to whether or not the pursuit of philosophy is inspired by an unremitting and unhesitating enquiry after truth and whether it is only an after-thought, a metaphysical eyewash, or a claver subterfuge to bolster up a pet dogma. If this criterion is accepted and applied, Indian philosophy will, we believe, come out in triumphant glory. Unquestioning, blind faith may be shameful superstition, but the studious endeavour to keep religion apart from philosophy is a perversity of mind, of which we should be equally ashamed. To keep up philosophy again in a water-tight compartment and to prevent it deliberately from finding its fulfillment in religion constitutes an unpardonable case of moral cowardice, insincerity of purpose and shallow dilettantism. There might be a semblance of justification or excuse for the charge of scholasticism against the course of philosophic thought in some Brahmanical schools (which, we believe, we have succeeded in proving to be without foundation); but this indictment cannot be brought against Buddhist philosophy with any show of plausibility. From the very beginning Buddhism has been critical in its spirit. Lord Buddha was an intellectual giant and a rationalist above anything else. He exhorted his disciples to accept nothing on trust. "Just as people test the purity of gold by burning it in fire, by cutting it and by examining it on a touchstone, so exactly you should, Oye monks! Accept my words after subjecting them to a critical test and not out of reverence for me." These words of the Buddha furnish the key to the true spirit of Buddhist philosophy throughout its career. And this freedom of thought encouraged by Buddha was responsible for the schism in the Buddhist church and for division of Buddhist philosophy into so many divergent schools. This should not be regarded as a matter of regret; on the contrary, we should read in it the signs of pulsating life. Dead level monotony and formal uniformity in a religion may have a practical value in that it may conduce to the solidarity and cohesiveness of the body of its followers. But this uniformity and solidarity may have been parehased at the cost of intellectual expansion. So the bargain is not profitable, as it may appear at first sight. Honest difference of opinion, on the other hand, need not necessarily mean faction and feud. It is undoubtedly the sign of intellectual growth. Uniformity, absolute and unqualified, can be secured only if all the members of a community reach the same level of progress or if all intellectual growth is rendered impossible. Deny the privilege of education and men will not put awkward questions. Os difference of opinion and birth of diverse philosophies should not be banned, as this would prove fatal to the intellectual growth and progress of mankind. We have therefore no reason to mourn the lack of uniformity in the philosophical speculations of ancient India. They furnish the evidence of real life. Liberty of thought and difference of opinion are not incompatible with the harmonious growth or solidarity of a nation. After all, if exclusive emphasis is not laid upon the points of difference we can never fail to find out fundamental unity and a common platform in our social, political and economic relations. The differences, on the other hand, may really be a source of inspiration for philosophic thought and thus be a real factor in the development of a nation. History contains numerous and brilliant proofs of this truth. The sharp differences of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of thought did not lead to any calamity; rather they stimulated and enriched philosophical thought in India. In one sense divergence of thought is the very condition of growth and development of real philosophy. A critical and sympathetic study of the history of Indian philosophies will bear out the position we have put forward.

It may be hoped that the importance and utility of the study of Indian philosophy in all its varieties and branches will not be denied by any serious student of human thought. It has all the strength and weakness of human life, and we are inclined to believe that the life of philosophy in ancient and medieval India was never languid or at a low ebb. There is a prevalent superstition that too much interest in philosophy brought about the political downfall of India. It is said that Indians were more interested in the problems of the next world than in the stern realities of present life. Things of the earth were looked upon with contempt. Like the proverbial star-gazer of old their eyes were fixed upon heaven and the result was a deterioration of physical and economic prosperity. It enervated the people and paved the way for foreign invasion. This charge against India philosophy has the apparent sanction of history, and the present degradation and misery of India lend an easy justification for same. But here also we beg to differ. The downfall of India is not the result of vigorous pursuit of philosophy in the past. The vulgar mind easily detects a family relationship between culture and indolence and outward appearance yields an easy support to this facile condemnation. But this very accusation carries with itself its own condemnation and a lesson for the necessity of close thinking, which refuses to be led away by appearances and dares penetrate deep below the surface. The average mind will put a premium on physical and tangible results and will ignore or slur over the hidden springs of activity. But all grand achievements of mankind have a prolonged preparation behind them. They are but the outward expression and efflorescence of a long-drawn-out intellectual discipline. Ultimately it is the brain that works and moves the body, though its activity is not apparent to the superficial observer. In point of fact all great political upheavals came after a long course of philosophical discipline. Though the causal relation is not easily discoverable, the coincidence is significant. Alexander came after Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Candragupta and Asoka came after the Buddha. These may be regarded as chance coincidences, pure and simple. But look at the life of the Buddhist monks, who are believed to be apostles of peace and exponents of a negative philosophy. The extra-worldly interests of the Buddhists are too well-known to need emphasis. But were they a lot of idlers? The answer is an emphatic 'No., These peace-loving Buddhists crossed the Himalayas and the seas, at considerable personal risk and in the face of deterring privations and discomforts, to preach the gospel of the impermanence of the world and the message of peace. The great protagonist of Vedanta, I mean Sankaracarya, whose philosophy is believed to have weaned away the Indian masses from their worldly interests and thus hastened the political downfall of India was, however, one of the most indefatigable workers that the world knows. Were these philosophers then false to their own teaching? The truth lies rather in the contrary supposition. There is no antagonism between a vigorous philosophy and a vigorous life. It is only when the living inspiration dies and people fall out of tune with true philosophy that they sink down to idleness. It is lack of intellectual vigour and mental lassitude that are at the root of national despair and degeneration. The vulgar mind, which will not and cannot probe deep into the bottom and through sheer inertia take the surface-appearance for the reality, causally connects the two events, though the distance of time and presence of other factors will prove the hollowness of the conclusion to the discerning student. Philosophy stirs up the intellect and disciplines the will and prepares a man for great sacrifice, without which nothing great has ever been achieved in the world. We must therefore learn to pay no heed to the croakers and Philistines who find nothing but waste of time and energy in the pursuit of philosophy. They look for direct practical results. But philosophy is slow in its results direct or indirect. Then, again, its results are more often than not apt to be affiliated to the immediate causes preceding them. Only a penetrating insight and a sturdy intellect, that can look long and far. Deep and sure, can appraise them at their true worth and find out the truth. Whatever may be the case, the truth can be proclaimed from house-tops that philosophy, which trains the intellect and makes it active and alert, can never encourage idleness. It is a libel against philosophy which seems to have acquired plausibility by sheer reiteration. It will be a calamity if men are not found who will pursue the enquiry after truth irrespective of the opinion of the masses and consideration of material advantages. The present degradation of India is the result not of pursuit of philosophy but rather of the want of it. It is the result of the death of philosophy, of the unreasoning and unquestioning acquiescence in the inevitable, which all philosophy in India condemns in unqualified and unequivocal language.

We now propose to turn our attention to the special claims of Buddhist philosophy on our thought. Buddhist philosophy, particularly of the Mahayana schools, came as a challenge and as a surprise to the happy-go-lucky and self-complacent attitude of contemporary philosophers. It gave a tremendous shock to the naïve, common-sense realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools. By its bold denial of a permanent ego-principle it invited and called forth the indignant protests of the entire philosophical world. The self-complacent realism of the Vaibhasikas was unceremoniously brushed aside and covered with ridicule and contempt equally with the Brahmanical and Jaina schools of thought. The Yogacara school by advocating an extreme form of subjective idealism, with its consequent denial of the objective world, came in for vigorous attacks from the realistic and absolutistic schools alike. The climax was reached when Nagarjuna and his followers propounded their philosophy of absolute negativism with its undisguised distrust of the empirical testimony of our sense and intellect. The result was an all-round panic and confusion. It provoked vigorous thought and spirited criticism. Whatever might be the merits of these philosophies, one thing is certain and undeniable that they produced the expected result; they broke the placid contentment of the contemporary philosophic thought in India. They created a sense of alarm and thus gave the fillip to vigorous thinking in all schools to look out for the ways and means to protect their vested interests. But, however formidable might have been these Buddhist philosophies, the most upsetting were the dialectics of Dignaga and Dharmakirti and their redoubtable successors. This is evidenced by the vitriolic attacks of the Brahmanical and Jaina philosophical writings of the period.

The present work concerns itself with this school of Buddhist philosophy and logic. It is the result of long years of study and thought. The present writer has endeavoured to present the philosophy of Dignaga's school with all its strength and purity. The plan and arrangement are entirely original and a critical student of Buddhist philosophy will, it is hoped, not fail to detect in this book the working of a modern and critical mind. The subtle dialectic of the Buddhist philosophers is difficult in the extreme and demands the utmost critical thought and minutest attention from the student It will be too much to expect that these difficulties have been minimized by the present attempt. But the present writer hopes that his exposition is at least easier than that in the original works. Nowhere has there been an attempt, conscious or deliberate, to avoid the difficulties. The present writer has boldly faced the difficulties and has tries his level best to present them to the modern mind in an intelligible form. Fidelity to the original has been the watch-word and motto with his humble self and, though the thoughts and arguments have been presented in the language of a modern thinker, there has not been the slightest departure from the original. The idea has all along been to let the philosophers speak for themselves and where linguistic and verbal fidelity threatened obscurity, he has not hesitated to give a free rendering of their ideas and thoughts without regard to the peculiarities of Sanskrit idiom. Nevertheless, there are places where the technicalities of Indian philosophy and dialectic have been presented in their original form and this has been done deliberately with a view to acquainting the student with the methodology of ancient thinkers.

In conclusion the attention of the reader is particularly invited to the chapters 'The objections from the point of view of causation' and 'A critical estimate of the Sautrantika theory of Causation,' 'Universal,' 'The doctrine of Apoha,' and 'Nirvana' in the first part and to 'Universal Concomitance' in the second part. Although the main character of this work is expository and the author has had to play the role of an advocate for the most part, it will be found that on some fundamental points he has not hesitated to criticize the Buddhist position where he has not been able to see eye to eye with them. in short, an attempt has been made to give a critical and dispassionate presentation of the Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux and, in this, particular care has been taken to steer clear of a partisan spirit.

A word of explanation seems to be necessary for my designating the philosophy of Dignaga's school, in so far as it is presented in this book, as the philosophy of Critical Realism. The word 'critical' was adopted by Kant as the special appellation of his philosophy. This has not stood in the way of a school of American Realists from describing their system of philosophy as 'critical.' For similar reasons I too have not hesitated to adopt this expressive term in my designation of the realistic philosophy of Dignaga's school. I felt that to put the same label on this philosophy and on that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school would be inappropriate and rather misleading. In fact, the philosophy of Dignaga's school, in so far as it is realistic, will be found to have greater affinities with Kant's philosophy than with the commonsense naïve Realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools. like Kant the Buddhist Realist thinks the categories of thought and reality as a priori subjective concepts and the difference lies in the latter's insistence on the evidentiary value of sensation, in which the thing in-itself (svalaksana) is believed to be presented in its pure and unsullied character. Kant, however, thinks that the things-in-themselves are never revealed to the mind and as such, they are bound to remain unknown and unknowable. In spite of this fundamental divergence the two schools are found to agree in the proposition that all determinate knowledge, which is knowledge in the real sense of the term, is the result of a synthesis of an a priori and an a posteriori element. In view of this agreement with Kant and of its fundamental difference in outlook and attitude from the other Realistic philosophies of India and Europe, the designation of 'Critical Realism' may not be looked upon as an unwarrantable misappropriation of a respectable term.

CONTENTS

Introductionxxxv-xlvii
Part I
CHAPTER I

The Nature Of Existence
That which is constitutionally perishable must be momentary 1-19
CHAPTER II
Logical Difficulties Explained
Section I
The challenge to the fundamental principle of the doctrine of flux, viz., that co-existence of two contradictory qualities is impossible in one and the same substratum 20
The challenge accepted and the concept of contradiction elucidated 21
Section II. 24-38
CHAPTER III
Objections From The Point Of View Of Causation Explained
39-53
CHAPTER IV
A Critical Estimate Of The Sautrantika Theory Of Causation
54-58
CHAPTER V
Objections On Psychological And Metaphysical Grounds Discussed
60-85
CHAPTER VI
A Buddhist Estimate Of Universals
86-105
CHAPTER VII
The Doctrine Of Apoha Or The Import Of Words
107-139
CHAPTER VIII
The Soul-Theory of The Nyaya-Vaisesika School
140-151
CHAPTER IX
The Mimamsa Theory Of Soul
154-172
CHAPTER X
The Soul Theory of The Digambara Jainas
173-179
CHAPTER XI
The Sankhya Theory Of Soul
180-181
CHAPTER XII
The Soul Theory Of The Vatsiputriyas
185-192
CHAPTER XIII
The Theory of Soul Based On The Upanisads
193-201
CHAPTER XV
The Problem of After-Life or Immortality Of Consciousness-Continuum
202-209
CHAPTER XVI
Nirvana
237-272
Part II
CHAPTER XVII

Perception in Dignaga's School of Philosophy
273-281
Section B
Kalpana-What is its meaning?

282-299
CHAPTER XVIII Prapyakaritvavada Or Relation Of The Sense-Organ With The Object
300-310
CHAPTER XIX
Manovijnana Or Mental Perception
311-318
CHAPTER XX
Self-Cognition (Svasamvedanam)
319-336
CHAPTER XXI
The Theory Of Perception As Propounded By Dharmakirti And Dharmottara
337-345
CHAPTER XXII
Inference
346-355
CHAPTER XXIII
Members Of A Syllogism (Avayava)
356-365
CHAPTER XXIV
Universal Concomitance (Vyapti)
366-400
CHAPTER XXV
Prasanganumana
401-408
CHAPTER XXVI
Negative Judgment
409-437
The summary of the results438
Index442

The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the School of Dignaga

Item Code:
IDC142
Cover:
Hardcover
Edition:
2006
Publisher:
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
ISBN:
8120807375
Size:
8.8" X 5.8"
Pages:
495
Other Details:
Weight of the Book:744 gms
Price:
$45.00
Discounted:
$33.75   Shipping Free
You Save:
$11.25 (25%)
Add to Wishlist
Send as e-card
Send as free online greeting card
The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: An Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as Expounded by the  
School of Dignaga

Verify the characters on the left

From:
Edit     
You will be informed as and when your card is viewed. Please note that your card will be active in the system for 30 days.

Viewed 10629 times since 1st Sep, 2010
From the Jacket

The philosophy of the Medieval school of Buddhism was ushered into existence by Dignaga and Dharmakirti and later on systematized and developed by Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and others of repute. The metaphysical and epistemological sides of this school spread far and wide, even in remote days, for they influenced not only the Brahmanical thought but also the non-Brahmanical speculations in Indian philosophical systems from the third century A.D. to 1000 A.D.

But a systematic presentation of the philosophy of this school had not been attempted so far. The present book is designed to fulfil this long-felt need. It presents a clear exposition of the philosophy of critical Realism as expounded by Dignaga and his school.

The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters. Part I discusses the Nature of Existence, Logical Difficulties, Theory of Causation, Universals, Doctrine of Apoha, Theory of Soul and Problem of After-Life. Part II deals with the Organic and Inorganic Perception, Inference and Negative Judgement. The two parts bound in one Volume deal also with many other subsidiary topics.

Dr. Satkari Mookerjee was one of the renowned contemporary scholars of the country. He joined the Calcutta University as a Lecturer, later rose to professorship and occupied the prestigious Ashutosh Chair.

In 1955, he joined the Nava Nalanda Maha Vihara as its Director. Some of his papers are collectively published in the Nava Nalanda Maha Vihara Research Publications Vol. I & II. His other important works are Non-absolutism, and Exposition of Pramanavarttika.

Preface

The present work is substantially based upon my thesis which was approved for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy by the University of Calcutta in 1932. It has since been revised in many places and fresh matter introduced, the last chapter being entirely new.

Buddhist philosophy is a vast subject with a large number of ramifications. It is not possible to do full justice to the whole subject within so short a compass. I have here dealt with only a particular school. The previous writings on the subject are rather sectional and fragmentary and a systematic presentation of Dignaga's school was a desideratum.

I take this opportunity to offer my grateful thanks to Syamaprasad Mookerjee, Esq., M.A., B.L., Bar. –at-Law, Bharati, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, for the constant encouragement I received from him in connection with my researches and for the provision he kindly made for the publication of my book by the University of Calcutta.

My sincere thanks are due to my pupil, Mr. Satindrakumar Mukherjee, M.A., for his ungrudging help in looking through the proofs and for his valuable suggestions. Mr. Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, M.A., Research Fellow, Calcutta University, who is carrying on researches under my guidance, also deserves my best thanks for the preparation of the Index. I must express my heart-felt thanks to my pupils, Mr. Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., P.R.S., Lecturer, Bethune College, and Mr. Makhanlal Mookerjee, M.A., Research Scholar of the University, attached to me, for their valuable help in the preparation of the Table of Contents. To Mr. Atulchandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent of the University Press, Mr. Bhupendralal Banerjee, Printer, Mr. Kalipada Das, B.A., and the other members of the staff of the University Press, I offer my grateful thanks for the special care and interest they have taken in my work. The publication of this book within such an incredibly short time is entirely due to their hearty co-operation.

Introduction

The present work is an humble attempt to give a critical exposition of the philosophy of the Medieval school of Buddhism that was ushered into existence by Dignaga and Dharmakirti and later on systematized and developed by Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and other authors of repute. Of this philosophy, again, the purely idealistic side has been left untouched in the present work. The interest and character of this work are purely philosophical and critical and note historical. There have already appeared in the field several brilliant expositions and accounts of Buddhist philosophy and religion, which have dealt with the historical side with varying degrees of fullness. The monumental works of Prof. Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Prof. S.N. Dasgupta have provided an important place for Buddhist philosophy, and though, from the very nature and scope of these works, the treatment might appear not to be exhaustive, the account and exposition constitute a substantial contribution to Buddhist scholarship. The writings of Prof. Louis de La Valle Poussin, Prof. Stcherbatsky, Prof. Guieseppe Tucci, Prof B. M. Thomas and other scholars have already provided the learned account of the growth and development of Buddhist philosophy and religion. And attempt in that line would necessarily involve a repetition or reduplication of much the same thing, though it is not denied that there is room for expansion and elaboration even in that direction.

The present work has, however, steered clear of the historical side and is chiefly preoccupied with the dry metaphysical and epistemological sides of the Sautrantika philosophy. What particularly impressed the present writer is the fact that the whole course of philosophical speculations in Indian systems of thought, Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical alike, from the third century A.D. down to 1000 A.D., which may be described as the adolescent and fruitful period of Indian philosophy, bears unmistakable evidence of Buddhist influence. Even Vatsyayana and Sabarasvamin are not immune from it. Of course, they have borrowed little or nothing from the Buddhists and their chief interest in Buddhist philosophy is only negative, all their energies being directed to a refutation of the Buddhist position. But this adverse criticism does not minimize their debt; on the other hand, it is proof positive of their obligation. It has been very aptly observed by a modern philosopher that "Every writer on philosophical subjects in indebted, beyond all possibility of adequate acknowledgment, to the great thinkers of the past…..But the debt is one which he makes for himself, or at least incalculably increases, by free and honest criticism, If the labours of those whom he criticizes have rendered his criticism possible, it is only by criticizing that he is brought to the intelligent appreciation of their work." The real development of the Nyaya philosophy may be legitimately believed to commence with Uddyotakara, who, on his own avowal, derived his incentive to write his commentary from the hostile critics, whose sophistical (according to Uddyotakara) arguments went a long way to bring discredit on the Nyaya Philosophy. Uddyotakara's taciturnity in regard to names is notorious. Vacaspati Misra has supplied the lacuna and tells us that it was he adverse criticism of Dignaga and men of his ilk that gave he much-needed fillip to Uddyotakara for writing his masterpiece. In fact, the sole justification for this attempt lay in the necessity of a refutation of Dignaga's animadversions which created a perilous situation for Nyaya.

The subsequent career of Nyaya philosophy and of Post-Dignaga Philosophy, for the matter of that, is but a progressive Dignaga Philosophy, for the matter of that, is but a progressive record of the daring and desperate fights between these two schools, which were fought on a hundred and one battle-fields. The fight was keen and vigorous and continued with unabated enthusiasm down to the days of Vacaspati, Jayanta, Udayana and Sridhara, on the one hand, and Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti and their followers, on the other. But we have omitted to mention another philosopher, a towering personality and a hero of a thousand and one battle-fields, I mean, Kumarila Bhatta. Kumarila came after Uddyotakara and he was, to all intents and purposes, a greater fighter, who fought clean and hard. Uddyotakara's polemics smacked of rankling jealousy and were rather full of transparent sophistry and claptrap. So the Buddhists did not find it very hard to expose his fallacies. In Kumarila, However, they found a veritable Tartar. It is not seldom that the Buddhists were compelled to revise their old theories and to re-formulate them in the light of Kumarila's criticism. In fact, a more formidable critics, could hardly be imagined. Kumarila's sledge-hammer blows were telling in their effect and the replies of Santaraksita, Dharmottara, Ratnakirti and subsequent writers indirectly acknowledged the justice of his criticism in more places than one, inasmuch as they had to re-shape their theories in fundamental aspects.

What is, however, particularly refreshing in this tense atmosphere of fighting is the fact of the earnestness of the fighters. Though all cannot be regarded as equally honest or honourable in their methods, their earnestness and sincerity are beyond doubt or cavil. The fighting has all the freshness of life and reality. There is no air of unreality about it. In fact, they fought for what they believed to be a question of life and death. Philosophy was not a matter of academic interest in India. Change of philosophy meant the change of entire outlook and orientation in life. Victory in a philosophical debate, therefore, was essential to the preservation of one's religion and mode of life, and defeat spelt inglorious death or apostacy from the accepted faith. There was, in fact, no line of demarcation between philosophy and religion in India. A religion without a philosophical backing was unthinkable.

The cleavage between philosophy and religion is pronounced where religion is held to be a matter of unquestioning faith irrespective of a philosophic sanction. But in India the two were identical. So even the atheists had their own religion, because philosophy and religion were one. Belief had to submit to the test of logic, and a faith that were not warranted by philosophic conviction, was rightly regarded as perverse dogmatism which has no right to the allegiance of a man of sound education and culture. It is this fact of intellectual honesty and spiritual earnestness that account for the intensity and desperate character of this fighting for opinions among ancient philosophers of India. As has been aptly observed by Prof. Dasgupta with his characteristic insight, "The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. Ignorance of this peculiarity of the Indian mind has been responsible for the so-called charge of scholasticism that has been laid at the door of Indian philosophy. Philosophy was not the fad of intellectual circles that indulged in these metaphysical gymnastics for mere intellectual satisfaction or for the purpose of whiling away their idle hours. It was, on the contrary, the earnest quest of truth and life's purpose and nothing short of truth could give its votaries peace or satisfy their ardent minds. And the intensity of this craving was not appeased except by a thoroughgoing and meticulous application of the truth to every detail of life. Accordingly no fictitious barrier between religion and philosophy was tolerated.

If religion was not sanctioned and inspired by philosophy, it was regarded as a useless superstition. If philosophy was not lived in actual religion, it was rightly held to be a mere waste of time and a dereliction from life's true purpose and mission. As Prof. Sir S. Radhakrishnan observes with his inimitable felicity of expression, "In many other countries reflection on the nature of existence is a luxury of life. The serious moments are given to action, while the pursuit of philosophy comes up as a parenthesis. In ancient India philosophy was not an auxiliary to any other science or art, but always held a prominent position of independence. The true criterion of philosophy and scholasticism therefore should be sought not in the identity of the interests of religion and philosophy, which, to my mind, far from being an occasion of halting apology, constitutes the very apex and perfection of both of them. The criterion, in my humble judgment, should be the crucial test as to whether or not the pursuit of philosophy is inspired by an unremitting and unhesitating enquiry after truth and whether it is only an after-thought, a metaphysical eyewash, or a claver subterfuge to bolster up a pet dogma. If this criterion is accepted and applied, Indian philosophy will, we believe, come out in triumphant glory. Unquestioning, blind faith may be shameful superstition, but the studious endeavour to keep religion apart from philosophy is a perversity of mind, of which we should be equally ashamed. To keep up philosophy again in a water-tight compartment and to prevent it deliberately from finding its fulfillment in religion constitutes an unpardonable case of moral cowardice, insincerity of purpose and shallow dilettantism. There might be a semblance of justification or excuse for the charge of scholasticism against the course of philosophic thought in some Brahmanical schools (which, we believe, we have succeeded in proving to be without foundation); but this indictment cannot be brought against Buddhist philosophy with any show of plausibility. From the very beginning Buddhism has been critical in its spirit. Lord Buddha was an intellectual giant and a rationalist above anything else. He exhorted his disciples to accept nothing on trust. "Just as people test the purity of gold by burning it in fire, by cutting it and by examining it on a touchstone, so exactly you should, Oye monks! Accept my words after subjecting them to a critical test and not out of reverence for me." These words of the Buddha furnish the key to the true spirit of Buddhist philosophy throughout its career. And this freedom of thought encouraged by Buddha was responsible for the schism in the Buddhist church and for division of Buddhist philosophy into so many divergent schools. This should not be regarded as a matter of regret; on the contrary, we should read in it the signs of pulsating life. Dead level monotony and formal uniformity in a religion may have a practical value in that it may conduce to the solidarity and cohesiveness of the body of its followers. But this uniformity and solidarity may have been parehased at the cost of intellectual expansion. So the bargain is not profitable, as it may appear at first sight. Honest difference of opinion, on the other hand, need not necessarily mean faction and feud. It is undoubtedly the sign of intellectual growth. Uniformity, absolute and unqualified, can be secured only if all the members of a community reach the same level of progress or if all intellectual growth is rendered impossible. Deny the privilege of education and men will not put awkward questions. Os difference of opinion and birth of diverse philosophies should not be banned, as this would prove fatal to the intellectual growth and progress of mankind. We have therefore no reason to mourn the lack of uniformity in the philosophical speculations of ancient India. They furnish the evidence of real life. Liberty of thought and difference of opinion are not incompatible with the harmonious growth or solidarity of a nation. After all, if exclusive emphasis is not laid upon the points of difference we can never fail to find out fundamental unity and a common platform in our social, political and economic relations. The differences, on the other hand, may really be a source of inspiration for philosophic thought and thus be a real factor in the development of a nation. History contains numerous and brilliant proofs of this truth. The sharp differences of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of thought did not lead to any calamity; rather they stimulated and enriched philosophical thought in India. In one sense divergence of thought is the very condition of growth and development of real philosophy. A critical and sympathetic study of the history of Indian philosophies will bear out the position we have put forward.

It may be hoped that the importance and utility of the study of Indian philosophy in all its varieties and branches will not be denied by any serious student of human thought. It has all the strength and weakness of human life, and we are inclined to believe that the life of philosophy in ancient and medieval India was never languid or at a low ebb. There is a prevalent superstition that too much interest in philosophy brought about the political downfall of India. It is said that Indians were more interested in the problems of the next world than in the stern realities of present life. Things of the earth were looked upon with contempt. Like the proverbial star-gazer of old their eyes were fixed upon heaven and the result was a deterioration of physical and economic prosperity. It enervated the people and paved the way for foreign invasion. This charge against India philosophy has the apparent sanction of history, and the present degradation and misery of India lend an easy justification for same. But here also we beg to differ. The downfall of India is not the result of vigorous pursuit of philosophy in the past. The vulgar mind easily detects a family relationship between culture and indolence and outward appearance yields an easy support to this facile condemnation. But this very accusation carries with itself its own condemnation and a lesson for the necessity of close thinking, which refuses to be led away by appearances and dares penetrate deep below the surface. The average mind will put a premium on physical and tangible results and will ignore or slur over the hidden springs of activity. But all grand achievements of mankind have a prolonged preparation behind them. They are but the outward expression and efflorescence of a long-drawn-out intellectual discipline. Ultimately it is the brain that works and moves the body, though its activity is not apparent to the superficial observer. In point of fact all great political upheavals came after a long course of philosophical discipline. Though the causal relation is not easily discoverable, the coincidence is significant. Alexander came after Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Candragupta and Asoka came after the Buddha. These may be regarded as chance coincidences, pure and simple. But look at the life of the Buddhist monks, who are believed to be apostles of peace and exponents of a negative philosophy. The extra-worldly interests of the Buddhists are too well-known to need emphasis. But were they a lot of idlers? The answer is an emphatic 'No., These peace-loving Buddhists crossed the Himalayas and the seas, at considerable personal risk and in the face of deterring privations and discomforts, to preach the gospel of the impermanence of the world and the message of peace. The great protagonist of Vedanta, I mean Sankaracarya, whose philosophy is believed to have weaned away the Indian masses from their worldly interests and thus hastened the political downfall of India was, however, one of the most indefatigable workers that the world knows. Were these philosophers then false to their own teaching? The truth lies rather in the contrary supposition. There is no antagonism between a vigorous philosophy and a vigorous life. It is only when the living inspiration dies and people fall out of tune with true philosophy that they sink down to idleness. It is lack of intellectual vigour and mental lassitude that are at the root of national despair and degeneration. The vulgar mind, which will not and cannot probe deep into the bottom and through sheer inertia take the surface-appearance for the reality, causally connects the two events, though the distance of time and presence of other factors will prove the hollowness of the conclusion to the discerning student. Philosophy stirs up the intellect and disciplines the will and prepares a man for great sacrifice, without which nothing great has ever been achieved in the world. We must therefore learn to pay no heed to the croakers and Philistines who find nothing but waste of time and energy in the pursuit of philosophy. They look for direct practical results. But philosophy is slow in its results direct or indirect. Then, again, its results are more often than not apt to be affiliated to the immediate causes preceding them. Only a penetrating insight and a sturdy intellect, that can look long and far. Deep and sure, can appraise them at their true worth and find out the truth. Whatever may be the case, the truth can be proclaimed from house-tops that philosophy, which trains the intellect and makes it active and alert, can never encourage idleness. It is a libel against philosophy which seems to have acquired plausibility by sheer reiteration. It will be a calamity if men are not found who will pursue the enquiry after truth irrespective of the opinion of the masses and consideration of material advantages. The present degradation of India is the result not of pursuit of philosophy but rather of the want of it. It is the result of the death of philosophy, of the unreasoning and unquestioning acquiescence in the inevitable, which all philosophy in India condemns in unqualified and unequivocal language.

We now propose to turn our attention to the special claims of Buddhist philosophy on our thought. Buddhist philosophy, particularly of the Mahayana schools, came as a challenge and as a surprise to the happy-go-lucky and self-complacent attitude of contemporary philosophers. It gave a tremendous shock to the naïve, common-sense realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools. By its bold denial of a permanent ego-principle it invited and called forth the indignant protests of the entire philosophical world. The self-complacent realism of the Vaibhasikas was unceremoniously brushed aside and covered with ridicule and contempt equally with the Brahmanical and Jaina schools of thought. The Yogacara school by advocating an extreme form of subjective idealism, with its consequent denial of the objective world, came in for vigorous attacks from the realistic and absolutistic schools alike. The climax was reached when Nagarjuna and his followers propounded their philosophy of absolute negativism with its undisguised distrust of the empirical testimony of our sense and intellect. The result was an all-round panic and confusion. It provoked vigorous thought and spirited criticism. Whatever might be the merits of these philosophies, one thing is certain and undeniable that they produced the expected result; they broke the placid contentment of the contemporary philosophic thought in India. They created a sense of alarm and thus gave the fillip to vigorous thinking in all schools to look out for the ways and means to protect their vested interests. But, however formidable might have been these Buddhist philosophies, the most upsetting were the dialectics of Dignaga and Dharmakirti and their redoubtable successors. This is evidenced by the vitriolic attacks of the Brahmanical and Jaina philosophical writings of the period.

The present work concerns itself with this school of Buddhist philosophy and logic. It is the result of long years of study and thought. The present writer has endeavoured to present the philosophy of Dignaga's school with all its strength and purity. The plan and arrangement are entirely original and a critical student of Buddhist philosophy will, it is hoped, not fail to detect in this book the working of a modern and critical mind. The subtle dialectic of the Buddhist philosophers is difficult in the extreme and demands the utmost critical thought and minutest attention from the student It will be too much to expect that these difficulties have been minimized by the present attempt. But the present writer hopes that his exposition is at least easier than that in the original works. Nowhere has there been an attempt, conscious or deliberate, to avoid the difficulties. The present writer has boldly faced the difficulties and has tries his level best to present them to the modern mind in an intelligible form. Fidelity to the original has been the watch-word and motto with his humble self and, though the thoughts and arguments have been presented in the language of a modern thinker, there has not been the slightest departure from the original. The idea has all along been to let the philosophers speak for themselves and where linguistic and verbal fidelity threatened obscurity, he has not hesitated to give a free rendering of their ideas and thoughts without regard to the peculiarities of Sanskrit idiom. Nevertheless, there are places where the technicalities of Indian philosophy and dialectic have been presented in their original form and this has been done deliberately with a view to acquainting the student with the methodology of ancient thinkers.

In conclusion the attention of the reader is particularly invited to the chapters 'The objections from the point of view of causation' and 'A critical estimate of the Sautrantika theory of Causation,' 'Universal,' 'The doctrine of Apoha,' and 'Nirvana' in the first part and to 'Universal Concomitance' in the second part. Although the main character of this work is expository and the author has had to play the role of an advocate for the most part, it will be found that on some fundamental points he has not hesitated to criticize the Buddhist position where he has not been able to see eye to eye with them. in short, an attempt has been made to give a critical and dispassionate presentation of the Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux and, in this, particular care has been taken to steer clear of a partisan spirit.

A word of explanation seems to be necessary for my designating the philosophy of Dignaga's school, in so far as it is presented in this book, as the philosophy of Critical Realism. The word 'critical' was adopted by Kant as the special appellation of his philosophy. This has not stood in the way of a school of American Realists from describing their system of philosophy as 'critical.' For similar reasons I too have not hesitated to adopt this expressive term in my designation of the realistic philosophy of Dignaga's school. I felt that to put the same label on this philosophy and on that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school would be inappropriate and rather misleading. In fact, the philosophy of Dignaga's school, in so far as it is realistic, will be found to have greater affinities with Kant's philosophy than with the commonsense naïve Realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools. like Kant the Buddhist Realist thinks the categories of thought and reality as a priori subjective concepts and the difference lies in the latter's insistence on the evidentiary value of sensation, in which the thing in-itself (svalaksana) is believed to be presented in its pure and unsullied character. Kant, however, thinks that the things-in-themselves are never revealed to the mind and as such, they are bound to remain unknown and unknowable. In spite of this fundamental divergence the two schools are found to agree in the proposition that all determinate knowledge, which is knowledge in the real sense of the term, is the result of a synthesis of an a priori and an a posteriori element. In view of this agreement with Kant and of its fundamental difference in outlook and attitude from the other Realistic philosophies of India and Europe, the designation of 'Critical Realism' may not be looked upon as an unwarrantable misappropriation of a respectable term.

CONTENTS

Introductionxxxv-xlvii
Part I
CHAPTER I

The Nature Of Existence
That which is constitutionally perishable must be momentary 1-19
CHAPTER II
Logical Difficulties Explained
Section I
The challenge to the fundamental principle of the doctrine of flux, viz., that co-existence of two contradictory qualities is impossible in one and the same substratum 20
The challenge accepted and the concept of contradiction elucidated 21
Section II. 24-38
CHAPTER III
Objections From The Point Of View Of Causation Explained
39-53
CHAPTER IV
A Critical Estimate Of The Sautrantika Theory Of Causation
54-58
CHAPTER V
Objections On Psychological And Metaphysical Grounds Discussed
60-85
CHAPTER VI
A Buddhist Estimate Of Universals
86-105
CHAPTER VII
The Doctrine Of Apoha Or The Import Of Words
107-139
CHAPTER VIII
The Soul-Theory of The Nyaya-Vaisesika School
140-151
CHAPTER IX
The Mimamsa Theory Of Soul
154-172
CHAPTER X
The Soul Theory of The Digambara Jainas
173-179
CHAPTER XI
The Sankhya Theory Of Soul
180-181
CHAPTER XII
The Soul Theory Of The Vatsiputriyas
185-192
CHAPTER XIII
The Theory of Soul Based On The Upanisads
193-201
CHAPTER XV
The Problem of After-Life or Immortality Of Consciousness-Continuum
202-209
CHAPTER XVI
Nirvana
237-272
Part II
CHAPTER XVII

Perception in Dignaga's School of Philosophy
273-281
Section B
Kalpana-What is its meaning?

282-299
CHAPTER XVIII Prapyakaritvavada Or Relation Of The Sense-Organ With The Object
300-310
CHAPTER XIX
Manovijnana Or Mental Perception
311-318
CHAPTER XX
Self-Cognition (Svasamvedanam)
319-336
CHAPTER XXI
The Theory Of Perception As Propounded By Dharmakirti And Dharmottara
337-345
CHAPTER XXII
Inference
346-355
CHAPTER XXIII
Members Of A Syllogism (Avayava)
356-365
CHAPTER XXIV
Universal Concomitance (Vyapti)
366-400
CHAPTER XXV
Prasanganumana
401-408
CHAPTER XXVI
Negative Judgment
409-437
The summary of the results438
Index442

Post a Comment
 
Post Review
Post a Query
For privacy concerns, please view our Privacy Policy

Testimonials

Thank you for allowing me to shop in India from my desk in the United States!! I love your website! Om Shanthi
Florence Ambika, USA
'My' Ganesha-pendant arrived ! Thank you a lot-it's really very lovely ! Greetings from Germany.
Birgit Kukmann
I got the parcel today, and I am very happy about it! a true Bible of Subhashitam! Thanks again a lot.
Eva, France
I have been your customer for many years and everything has always been A++++++++++++ quality.
Delia, USA
I am your customer for many years. I love your products. Thanks for sending high quality products.
Nata, USA
I have been a customer for many years due to the quality products and service.
Mr. Hartley, UK.
Got the package on 9th Nov. I have to say it was one of the excellent packaging I have seen, worth my money I paid. And the books where all in best new conditions as they can be.
Nabahat, Bikaner
Whatever we bought from Exotic India has been wonderful. Excellent transaction,very reasonable price excellent delivery. We bought so many huge statues, clothes, decorative items, jewels etc. Every item was packed with love.
Tom and Roma Florida USA
Namaste. I want to thank you as I have received the statue and I shall always remember the service provided to such good standards.
Dr. B. Saha, UK
I received my Green Tara statue today and it's absolutely lovely, much nicer than I'd hoped--thank you so much for arranging its manufacture for me!
Betsy, California
TRUSTe online privacy certification
Language:
Currency:
All rights reserved. Copyright 2016 © Exotic India