Item Code: IDJ441
by Amal K. HarhHardcover (Edition: 2001)
New Bharatiya Book Corporation
Size: 8.6 X" 5.5"
Price: $22.50 Shipping Free
The present work is devoted to an important factor of Indian Epistemology. Just as a positive one negative fact is also a 'fact' as it is enumerated as a category. A negative fact is a Prameya which is known through some Pramana. Some philosophers think that it is known through perception or inference. But the Advaitins and Mimamsakas have accepted Anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowing. An effort has been made to criticize the views of the Naiyayikas and Buddhists and to substantiate the Advaita and Mimamsa position with some independent arguments.
About the Author
Dr. Amal Kumar Harh has been teaching philosophy for more than twelve years in Coochbehar College affiliated to the University of North Bengal, West Bengal. He has done his Ph. D. work in 1995 under the supervision of Dr. Raghunath Ghosh Dr. Harh has attended and presented papers in various national and international seminars, Refreshers' Courses arranged Dy. ICDR and Allahabad. University. Dr. Harh's interest is mainly on various aspects of Indian Philosophy and Western Logic on which he has published a few research papers in professional journals.
The present tract entitled: Knowing a negative fact: Anupalabdhi's is the result of an intensive and critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian Philosophy. Regarding the menas of knowing a negative state of affairs there is difference of opinion among the thinkers of diverse persuasions within Indian Philosophy. This is highlighted and it is followed by my own critical and evaluative remarks.
I have offered my views and findings in six chapters. The first set starts with introductory remarks about the concept of negative fact and the means of knowing it as held in different systems of Indian Philosophy. In this connection the metaphysical presuppositions of a particular system in advocating their respective theories as to the means of knowing a negative state of affairs have been taken into consideration. A distinction between a positive and a negative fact is also made. The justification for describing the negation as a 'fact' is also adduced in the context.
The second chapter deals with the concepts of Prama and Pramana. That the knowledge of a negative fact is Prama and that the means of knowing it is a Pramana cannot be apprehended unless we had fair idea about these notions.
In the third and fourth chapters the Advaita Vedantins and the Bhatta Mimamsakas views regarding the theory of Anupalabdhi as a Pramana have been put forward respectively. It may be noted that none but these two schools uphold anupalabdhi as a distinct type of Pramana.
The Siddhantapaksa or Uttarapaksa set forth in the third and the fourth chapters is questioned by other systems not espousing Anupalabdhi as a Pramana. These Purvapaksins reason it as a separate Pramana and incorporate it with perception and inference. The arguments forwarded by the Purvapaksins are explicated in the fifth chapter. The philosophical methodology the Uttarapaksa is not taken to have been without having refuted the view of the Purvapaksins. Hence, in the concluding chapter the views of the Purvapaksins. are both critically evaluated and logically refuted. An effort has been made in this chapter to substantiate Anupalabdhi as a distinct form of Pramana by refuting the opponent's view. Mostly I have tried to establish the Advaitin's and Bhatta. Mimamsaka's position through my independent and possible arguments. I have tried to over a couple of supplementary arguments in favour of Anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowing a negative fact from my own standpoint, for what they are of worth. My arguments, I believe, are logically counseling. An acknowledgement of this fact should be gratifying to me. No philosophical theory is final. Criticizability of my theory need not take away the viability of my views. I do believe that realisation of truth is possible only in encountering others on logical grounds ('vada vade jayate tattvabodhah')
I should be failing in my duties if I do not put on record my debts to those who have been of immense help tome in completing my project. I express my gratitude and indebtend-ness to my supervisor of studies Dr. Raghunath Ghosh, NBU who spent time unbelievably enough in teaching me the original Sanskrit texts notwithstanding his heavy academic preoccupations. I am also deeply greatful to Dr. Pabitrakumar Roy, NBU who had gone through my manuscript and made stylistic changes sparing liberally his valuable time. I am no less indebted to my friend, Mr. Brindaban Karmakar for is various acts of kindness. I am beholden to Mr. Subhash Jian, Proprietor, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi for taking up the publication of the book and offering it to a larger audience.
Last but not the least my thanks are due to my wife, Nabedita for emotional support, and my son, Koustabh, who allowed me to work on my thesis charitably foregoing a lot of his happy playtime with me.
|II||The Concepts Prama (Valid Cognition) And Prama (Source of Valid Cognition in Indian Philosophy)||7|
|III||The Advaita Theory of Anupalabdhi||31|
|IV||The Theory of Anupalabdhi in Bhatta School of Purvamimamsa||53|
|V||Logic Behind Non-Acceptance of Anupalabdhi as a Pramana by the Naiyayikas and Others||74|
|VI||Some Critical And Conclusive Remarks||104|