This book is an annotated translation of one of the great Tibetan classics of Mahayana Buddhist thought, mKhas grub rje’s sTong thun chen mo. The text is a detailed critical exposition of the theory and practice of emptiness as expounded in the three major school of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy:
The Yogcara, Svatantrika, and Prasangika. Used as a supplement to the scholastic debating manuals in some of the greatest monasteries of ‘Tibet, the sTong thun chen mo is a veritable encyclopedia of Mahayana Buddhist philosophical, dealing with such topics as hermeneutics, the theory of non-duality, the linguistic interpretation of emptiness, the typology of ignorance, logic, the nature of time, and the perception of matter across world spheres. This book is an indispensable source for understanding the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school’s synthesis of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) and Epistemological (Pramanika) traditions of Indian Buddhism. In addition, it is an unprecedented source for the philosophical polemics of fifteenth century Tibet.
“It is encyclopedic and covers the most important ideas in the whole fabric of Indian Mahayana-Tibetan Buddhism. It brings to sharp relief the many debates, controversies, and variant interpretations of the key issues. Some of the elucidations are only found in these Tibetan sources and thus increases the value of this work.”
With these words the great Greek philosopher, Aristotle, begins his Metaphysics.’ Although history has been witness to a plethora of interpretations of these seven words. Ortega y Gasset’s must be one of the most interesting. In his Postscript to an essay in What Is Philosophy2 he states: “To know is to be not content with things as presented to us, but to seek beyond their appearance for their being. This ‘being’ of things is a strange condition:
It is not made clear in things; but on the contrary, it throbs hidden within them, beneath them, beyond them.’ There is a sense in Buddhism also in which we might say that it is natural for man or woman to know. Knowledge, and specifically knowledge of the true nature of things, of the “being” that lies throbbing within things, as Ortega y Gasset puts it, is our destiny as human beings. It is natural for human beings both to know and to want to know. Hence, it is not truth in and of itself that will set us free, but our appropriation of it, our knowledge of it.
Ortega y Gasset also recognizes, however, that the being of things “is not clear,” that it is “hidden.” Buddhists also believe that reality is not evident to us, that, while always present, it evades our attempts at apprehending it. The reason for this has to do with the condition of our own mind, with the fact that we have accustomed ourselves to constantly misperceiving the world. This continual misapprehension of ourselves, of others and the world around us is called ignorance, and it is said to be the cause of all of the pain and anguish in the cycle of rebirth, this world known as samsara. Hence, mKhas grub rje, the author of the text translated here, begins his polemical treatise on insight meditation called The Lamp for Eliminating the Darkness of Evil Paths3 with these words:
Apart from meditation on the correct view
There is no path that can destroy the root of samsara.
In Buddhism ignorance (skt. avidya; tib. ma rig pa) is said to be the most basic cause of suffering. In this context ignorance does not refer to a passive lack of factual knowledge but to an active misapprehension of the world. It is considered an innate, prelinguistic, psychological predisposition that, having found a niche in the minds of sentient beings, causes us to suffer. This ignorance, which is the active superimposition of a certain kind of ontological status onto entities that lack them, is believed to be at the very root of the trials and tribulations that affect not only human beings, but all sentient life forms that inhabit this universe of limited existence. Certainly, one of the most important of the Buddha’s insights was the fact that neither suffering nor its most fundamental cause, ignorance, is an adventitious thing. Instead, the tradition has consistently maintained that both suffering and its cause could be overcome through the application of an antidote.3 That antidote is called wisdom (ski. prajna; tib. sues rob), and it refers to the understanding of realty, the ultimate nature of all phenomena. Being the antidote to ignorance, it brings about the reversal of the normal misperception of the world to which living things are heir. The understanding of the true and final nature of our selves and of the world around us is said to be the force that brings an end to suffering, liberating the person to lead the life of an awakened one, a buddha. The object that wisdom perceives, the ultimate nature of phenomena, the reality that eludes sentient beings in their limited modes of thought, is (at least in Mahayana Buddhism’) called emptiness (skt. sunyata; tib. stong pa nyid). It is little wonder, therefore, that emptiness has been characterized as “the central philosophy of Buddhism.’
What follows is an annotated translation of one of the most important works on emptiness in the history of the scholastic tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the sTong thun chen mo (lit) of the fourteenth century scholar-saint, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. It is an encyclopedic work that aims at synthesizing into a coherent whole the most important strands of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy around one central theme, that of emptiness. The dGe lugs pa, or, as it was known in its early days, the dGe’ ldan pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, of which mKhas grub ne is the third patriarch, is both historically and intellectually the culmination of a long tradition of scholasticism that began in the early centuries of the common era in India with such figures as Asaga and Nagarjuna. Following in the steps of his master, the founder of the dGe Jugs pa school, the great Tsong kba pa bLo bzang grags pa (l357—l419), mKbas grub rje attempts a synthesis of the different schools of Mahayana Buddhist thought (the idealist school, known as the Yogacara or Cittamatra, and the nominalist, the Madhyamaka—itself divided into two sub- schools, the Svatantrika and Prasangika).
His approach is to create an interpretive scheme that at once validates these different schools as soteriologically useful while maintaining a gradation in philosophical accuracy (truth) that allows him ultimately to declare the “bright rays of the logical methods of the glorious Candra, that is, the Prasangika school of the Madhyamaka as elucidated in the works of Candrakirti (seventh century) and his successors, to be the ultimate and final expression of truth, the Buddha’s ultimate purport (dgongs pa mthar thug pa).” Based on a hermeneutical framework that seeks to interpret and reconcile the different (and oftentimes contradictory) scriptures upon which these schools were based, he sets forth the doctrine of emptiness in the Mahayana, contrasting it to the doctrines of the Buddhist “realists,” and throughout relying very heavily on the methodology of the school of Buddhist ‘logicians,” the Pramanika. Indeed, the particular synthesis of Madhyamaka although and Dharmakirti’s pramana method is considered one of the striking (and most controversial) features of the dGe lugs pa approach to Mahayana.
The later dGe Tugs pa tradition goes to the extent of characterizing this synthesis of the Madhyamaka and pramanika traditions as ‘two lions hack to back” (dbu tshad seng ge rgyab sprod), implying that it is an invincible philosophical stance impervious to external attack.
Much of mKhas grub rje’s work therefore can be seen as the synthesis and reconciliation of the different scholastic traditions of India. However, synthesis is only half of mKhas grub rje’s task. This was to a great extent already accomplished in the works of his master, Tsong kha pa. Equally, if not more important to mKhas grub rje was the defense of the views of Tsong kha pa against the attacks, both real and imagined, of rival philosophical schools. Hence, the TIC is both a didactic text and a polemical text, something that is witnessed as much by the style as by the content of the work.
For those with a love of the scholastic mind set, alas an endangered species in this postmodern age, the scope and detail of the TTC will be found to be truly amazing. In a text of less than 500 folio sides mKhas grub rje manages to touch upon most of the major issues of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, from prophecy to hermeneutics to psychology and meditation. The table of contents of the work, an exquisite piece of scholastic precision in its own sight, is a veritable curriculum for an advanced course in Buddhist metaphysic a. However, the very ambitious nature of the enterprise oftentimes makes the work demanding on the part of readers. I have attempted to ease the reader’s burden by supplying the context of arguments. or expanding on them, in brief explanatory notes. In view of the length of the work, and the additional task of annotating the copious citations from scriptural and commentarial sources on which mKhas grub rje relies, I have tried to keep these to a bare minimum. Be dial as it may, I can assure the reader that perseverance in regard to these more difficult portions of the text will be well rewarded.
Acknowledgements | xv | |
Introduction | 1 | |
A Short Biography of mKhas grub rje | 13 | |
Translation: The Great Digest | ||
[Preamble] | ||
Hommage | 23 | |
Reason for the Composition of the Text | 23 | |
The Buddha’s Doctrine as the Ultimate Source of Salvation | 24 | |
The Prophecies of Nagarjuna’s Coming | 24 | |
[Introduction] | ||
The Reason Why It Is Correct to Seek Out REALITY | 27 | |
The Emptiness Taught in the Tantras | 28 | |
The Benefits of Trusting in the Profound [Doctrine of Emptiness] | 30 | |
The Vessel, That is, the Listener, to Whom This Doctrine Should be Explained | 32 | |
A Misconception Concerning Emptiness and Its Consequence | 32 | |
The Characteristics of the Proper Disciple | 33 | |
The Actual Doctrine to be Explained | 35 | |
Identifying Which Scriptures Are of Definitive Meaning (nges don) and Which of Provisional Meaning (drang don) | 35 | |
The Doctrines of the Yogacara School | ||
Yogacara Metaphysics and Hermeneutics | 39 | |
The Three Natures | 39 | |
The Reality of the Dependent and the Real, and the Yogacara Critique of the Madhyamaka | 43 | |
The Rationale Behind the Prajnaparamita’s Claims That Things “Do Not Arise” According to the Sutralamkara, a Yogacara Text | 45 | |
The Elucidation of Some Scriptural Passages Highlighting Unique Features of the Yogacara | 45 | |
The Yogacara Belief in Three Final Vehicles and a Foundation Consciousness (kun gzhi) as Another of Their Distinctive Features | 47 | |
Arguments Against the Advocates of “the Emptiness of What Is Other” (gzhan stong) | 48 | |
The Distinctively Yogacara Use of the Example of the Illusion and the Status of the Dependent | 49 | |
Tsong kha pa’s Unique Exposition of the Yogacara Theory of Emptiness | 52 | |
On Latent Potentialities | 61 | |
The Proof of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness | 63 | |
Nonduality as a Corollary of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness | 66 | |
The Explanation of the Three Natures | 67 | |
Similarity in Terminology Between the Yogacara and Prasangika Is Not a Reflection of an Underlying Similarity in Meaning | 69 | |
Cittamatra Hermeneutics | 69 | |
The Doctrines of the Madhyamaka School | ||
The Sources of the Madhyamaka School | ||
How the Father, the Arya Nagarjuna and His Son [Aryadeva], Following Such Sutras as the Aksayamatiairdesa, Set Forth the Doctrine of the Definitive and the Provisional | 77 | |
How, Step by Step, the Texts of Nagarjuna and the Commentaries on Their Purport (dgongs pa) Arose | 78 | |
The Explanation of the Way in Which the Scriptures of the Arya Were Written | 78 | |
The Explanation of How the Individual Commentaries on the Purport [of Nagarjuna’s Treatises] Arose | 81 | |
A General Introduction to the Madhyamaka | ||
On the Classification of Madhyamakas | 89 | |
The Meaning of the Claim That Prasangikas Accord with the World | 90 | |
Setting Forth Emptiness by Following Those [Madhyamaka Scriptures] | 92 | |
Identifying What Is to Be Refuted by the Reasoning Which Analyzes the Ultimate (don dam dpyad pa’i rtags) | 92 | |
Why It Is Necessary to Identify What Is to Be Refuted | 92 | |
Refuting the Scriptural Exegesis of Those Who [Proceed in the] Refutation without Identifying [the Object to Be Refuted] | 92 | |
Refuting the One Who Overextends (khyab ches ba) Himself or Herself in the Identification of What Is to Be Refuted | 92 | |
Stating What They Believe | 92 | |
Refuting Them | 96 | |
Demonstrating That They Have Refuted the Principal and Special Quality of the Prasangika Madhyamikas | 96 | |
Identifying That Chief Quality | 96 | |
How They Have Refuted That [Special Quality] by Their System [of Interpretation] | 98 | |
Demonstrating Those Reasons to Be Faulty | 100 | |
Demonstrating That Their Analysis into the Four Possibilities, Existence, Nonexistence, and So Fourth, Is Faulty: [The Law of Excluded Middle and the Question of Whether the Madhyamaka Has a Viewpoint] | 102 | |
A Critique of Quietism | 112 | |
Demonstrating That Their Analysis of [What It Means for Something] to Be Established or Not Established by a Valid Cognition, and Their Subsequent Refutation, Is Faulty | 117 | |
Demonstrating That [Their] Examination of Whether Arising Can Be Determined to Exist in Any One of the Four Ways, Such as Arising from Self, Is Faulty | 120 | |
Demonstrating That It Is Incorrect to Urge on Us the Absurdity That What We Advocate Goes Against the Four RELIANCES | 122 | |
How We Refute the One Who Dose Not Go Far Enough (khyab cung ba) in the Identification of the Object of Refutation | 124 | |
The Explanation of What Our Own System [Considers] to Be the Extent of What Is to Be Refuted | 127 | |
Explaining in a General Way the Layout of What Is to Be Refuted | 127 | |
Innate and philosophical Misconceptions | 128 | |
The Doctrines of the Svatantrika School | ||
The Logic of the Svatantrika Critique | ||
The Explanation o f the Measure of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation | 139 | |
The Analysis of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation Based on the Example of the Illusion | 139 | |
The Analysis of the Svatantrikas’ Object or Refutation Based on Scriptural Sources | 141 | |
The Correct Identification of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation | 143 | |
The Reasoning of the One and the Many | 147 | |
How the Example of the Reflection in the Mirror Is Understood | 151 | |
The Diamond-Granule Reasoning and the Question of the Qualification of the Object of Refutation | 153 | |
The Reasoning Refuting Arising via the Four Extremes | 156 | |
The Reasoning Refuting the Arising of the Existent and Nonexistent | 157 | |
The Doctrines of the Prasangika School | ||
A General Exposition of Prasangika Tenets | ||
Explaining the Extent (tshad) of the Prasangikas’ Object of Refutation (dgag bya) | 161 | |
Does Reality Truly Exist or Is It Too a Mere Label? | 163 | |
An Excursus on the Essence Body of the Buddha | 164 | |
The Argument Concerning Reality Continues | 165 | |
The Reasoning Used to Prove That One Phenomenon Is Empty Applies to All Phenomena, Including Emptiness | 166 | |
As It Does Not Truly Exist, Emptiness Is Only a Mental Label | 167 | |
The Meaning of “According with the World” in the Prasangika System | 168 | |
The Scriptural Basis for Nominalism | 169 | |
True Existence, the Opposite of Nominal Existence | 172 | |
Refuting Misconceptions in Regard to the [Distinction between Svatantrikas and Prasangikas] | 173 | |
On “Withstanding Logical Analysis” | 180 | |
An Explanation of the Implications of This | ||
An Explanation of the (1) the Two Kinds of Selflessness to be Refuted and (2) the selflessness that is the refutation | 185 | |
A Brief Mention of the Tenets Advocated by Other Systems | 185 | |
Identifying the Self that Is the Perceived Object (dmigs yul) of the Innate View of a Self as Accepted by Both Buddhists and Others | 185 | |
What Faults the Glorious Candra Finds in These [Views] | 187 | |
How the Other Buddhist Schools Posit the Self That Is the Direct Object of the Two Views of the self [the Person and Phenomena] and How That Self, Which Is Something to Be Refuted, Is Posited as Nonexistent | 192 | |
The Hinayana’s Views on Liberation and Buddhahood | 195 | |
How the Glorious Candra’s Critique Is to Be Expounded | 196 | |
The Exposition of the System of the Prasangikas as a Distinct [System in Its Own Right] | 196 | |
A Brief Explanation of the Differences between the Selflessness of the Person and Phenomena] | 199 | |
Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Understand Reality | ||
The Explanation of Whether Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Understand the Selflessness of Phenomena | 201 | |
How the Glorious Candra Goes About Explaining This | 201 | |
The Refutation of the Misconception that Believes that [Exposition] to Be Incorrect | 207 | |
The Response to the Preceding Criticism | 208 | |
The Exposition of the Valid Scriptural Evidence Explaining that Sravaka and Pratyekabuddhas Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena | ||
The Exposition of the System of the Son of the Conqueror, Santideva | 217 | |
The Explanations of This Point According to the Abhisamayalamkara, the Uttaratantra, and Their Commentaries | 221 | |
How the Abhisamayalamkara and Its Commentaries Explain this Point | 221 | |
The Explanation of the Meaning of the Uttaratantra and Its Commentary | 226 | |
An Extensive Explanation of Scripture and Logical Reasoning Proving that It is correct [to Claim That] Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena | 230 | |
The Exposition of the Logical Reasoning | 230 | |
Bringing Scriptural Exegesis to Bear [on the Problem] | 234 | |
On the Hinayana and Mahayana Understanding of Nirvana | 239 | |
The Explanation of the Two [Kinds of] Obscurations (sgrib pa) and the Paths on Which They Are Abandoned | 245 | |
How the Obscurations Are Eliminated on the Various Paths | 253 | |
The Status of Inference in the Madhyamaka | ||
As Regards the Refutation of That [Object of Refutation], the Explanation of the Differences between the Prasangikas and the Svatantrikas | 257 | |
Refuting What Others Believe. [Do the Madhyamikas Have Philosophical Positions] | 257 | |
Setting Forth Our own Position | ||
The Explanation of the Meaning of Svatantra and Prasanga | 272 | |
The Explanation of the Reasons Why the Svatantra Is Not Accepted | 277 | |
Bringing the Prasannapada to Bear on This [Question] and Explaining [Its Meaning] | 279 | |
Madhyamaka Logical Strategies and Related Polemics | ||
The Explanation of the Reasoning That Refutes the Object of the Refutation | 287 | |
The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning that refutes the object of the refutation | 287 | |
The Reasoning that Refutes the Self of the Person | 287 | |
The Explanation of the Refutation of the Self of Phenomena | 290 | |
The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning that Refutes the Self of Phenomena | 290 | |
The Refutation of Arising from Another | 302 | |
The Refutation of the Arising Causelessly and Conclusion | 305 | |
Other Unique Tenets of the Prasangika School | ||
Explaining Other Facets [of the Prasangika Tenets] That Are Not in Common with the Cittamatrins and Others | 307 | |
The Explanation of the Uncommon Exposition of the Three Times | 307 | |
The General Explanation of the Three Times | 307 | |
The Explanation of the Proof of Why the Past and Future Are Entities | 311 | |
The Explanations of [Two Other Factors] Differentiating [the Prasangikas from Other School], Namely, the Rejection of the Foundation Consciousness (kun gzhi) and the Acceptance of External Objects (phyi don) | 314 | |
The Explanation of How, Even Though We Do Not Accept the Foundation Consciousness, the Relationship between Karma and Effects Is Still Possible | 314 | |
Refuting the Fact That the Arya [Nagarjuna] and so on Accept [the Foundation Consciousness] | 316 | |
The Reason Why They Do Not Accept [the Foundation Consciousness] | 316 | |
The Refutation of the Belief That [the Prasangika Madhyamikas] Accept it | 318 | |
The Explanation of How External Objects Are Posited Nominally | 324 | |
The Prasangika Interpretation of the Cittamatra Sutras | 327 | |
Sense Perception Across World Spheres: The Case of Water | 334 | |
The Explanation of Why We Do Not Accept Auto cognition (rang rig) | 345 | |
The Explanation of How We Refute the Position That Does Accept It | 345 | |
The Explanation of the Opponent’s Position | 345 | |
The Explanation of How to Refute It | 347 | |
The Refutation of the [Logical] Proof | 347 | |
The Refutation of the Belief | 348 | |
The Explanation of How We Posit Our Own System, Which Does Not Accept [Auto cognition] | 349 | |
The Two Truths and Their Cognition | ||
The Explanation of the Two Truths, Which Is the Basis Set Forth by Reasoning | 357 | |
The Basis for the Division [into Two Truths] | 357 | |
The Meaning of the Words [Ultimate and Conventional] | 360 | |
Considering Whether They Are the Same or Different | 363 | |
The Nature of Each [of the Two Truths] Individually | 365 | |
The Definitions | 365 | |
The Divisions | 365 | |
The Divisions of the Ultimate Truth | 365 | |
The Divisions of the Conventional | 366 | |
The Prasangika Interpretation of the Three Nature Theory of the Yogacaras | 370 | |
The Explanation of the Valid Cognition that Ascertains the Two Truths, [That Is, All Phenomena] | 371 | |
The Definition | 371 | |
The Divisions | 372 | |
Conclusion | ||
Having Set Forth Emptiness, How to Meditate on It | 381 | |
The Exposition of the Result That Is the Culmination of Meditation | 381 | |
Concluding Verses | 386 | |
Colophon | 388 | |
Appendix: 1 The Verses to Rong ston | 389 | |
Appendix: 2 The Eighteen Great Contradictions | 391 | |
Notes | 393 | |
Glossary | 523 | |
Abbreviations | 555 | |
Bibliography Western Scholarly and Sanskrit Sources | 559 | |
Tibetan Sources | 573 | |
Indices | 577 |
This book is an annotated translation of one of the great Tibetan classics of Mahayana Buddhist thought, mKhas grub rje’s sTong thun chen mo. The text is a detailed critical exposition of the theory and practice of emptiness as expounded in the three major school of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy:
The Yogcara, Svatantrika, and Prasangika. Used as a supplement to the scholastic debating manuals in some of the greatest monasteries of ‘Tibet, the sTong thun chen mo is a veritable encyclopedia of Mahayana Buddhist philosophical, dealing with such topics as hermeneutics, the theory of non-duality, the linguistic interpretation of emptiness, the typology of ignorance, logic, the nature of time, and the perception of matter across world spheres. This book is an indispensable source for understanding the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school’s synthesis of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) and Epistemological (Pramanika) traditions of Indian Buddhism. In addition, it is an unprecedented source for the philosophical polemics of fifteenth century Tibet.
“It is encyclopedic and covers the most important ideas in the whole fabric of Indian Mahayana-Tibetan Buddhism. It brings to sharp relief the many debates, controversies, and variant interpretations of the key issues. Some of the elucidations are only found in these Tibetan sources and thus increases the value of this work.”
With these words the great Greek philosopher, Aristotle, begins his Metaphysics.’ Although history has been witness to a plethora of interpretations of these seven words. Ortega y Gasset’s must be one of the most interesting. In his Postscript to an essay in What Is Philosophy2 he states: “To know is to be not content with things as presented to us, but to seek beyond their appearance for their being. This ‘being’ of things is a strange condition:
It is not made clear in things; but on the contrary, it throbs hidden within them, beneath them, beyond them.’ There is a sense in Buddhism also in which we might say that it is natural for man or woman to know. Knowledge, and specifically knowledge of the true nature of things, of the “being” that lies throbbing within things, as Ortega y Gasset puts it, is our destiny as human beings. It is natural for human beings both to know and to want to know. Hence, it is not truth in and of itself that will set us free, but our appropriation of it, our knowledge of it.
Ortega y Gasset also recognizes, however, that the being of things “is not clear,” that it is “hidden.” Buddhists also believe that reality is not evident to us, that, while always present, it evades our attempts at apprehending it. The reason for this has to do with the condition of our own mind, with the fact that we have accustomed ourselves to constantly misperceiving the world. This continual misapprehension of ourselves, of others and the world around us is called ignorance, and it is said to be the cause of all of the pain and anguish in the cycle of rebirth, this world known as samsara. Hence, mKhas grub rje, the author of the text translated here, begins his polemical treatise on insight meditation called The Lamp for Eliminating the Darkness of Evil Paths3 with these words:
Apart from meditation on the correct view
There is no path that can destroy the root of samsara.
In Buddhism ignorance (skt. avidya; tib. ma rig pa) is said to be the most basic cause of suffering. In this context ignorance does not refer to a passive lack of factual knowledge but to an active misapprehension of the world. It is considered an innate, prelinguistic, psychological predisposition that, having found a niche in the minds of sentient beings, causes us to suffer. This ignorance, which is the active superimposition of a certain kind of ontological status onto entities that lack them, is believed to be at the very root of the trials and tribulations that affect not only human beings, but all sentient life forms that inhabit this universe of limited existence. Certainly, one of the most important of the Buddha’s insights was the fact that neither suffering nor its most fundamental cause, ignorance, is an adventitious thing. Instead, the tradition has consistently maintained that both suffering and its cause could be overcome through the application of an antidote.3 That antidote is called wisdom (ski. prajna; tib. sues rob), and it refers to the understanding of realty, the ultimate nature of all phenomena. Being the antidote to ignorance, it brings about the reversal of the normal misperception of the world to which living things are heir. The understanding of the true and final nature of our selves and of the world around us is said to be the force that brings an end to suffering, liberating the person to lead the life of an awakened one, a buddha. The object that wisdom perceives, the ultimate nature of phenomena, the reality that eludes sentient beings in their limited modes of thought, is (at least in Mahayana Buddhism’) called emptiness (skt. sunyata; tib. stong pa nyid). It is little wonder, therefore, that emptiness has been characterized as “the central philosophy of Buddhism.’
What follows is an annotated translation of one of the most important works on emptiness in the history of the scholastic tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the sTong thun chen mo (lit) of the fourteenth century scholar-saint, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. It is an encyclopedic work that aims at synthesizing into a coherent whole the most important strands of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy around one central theme, that of emptiness. The dGe lugs pa, or, as it was known in its early days, the dGe’ ldan pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, of which mKhas grub ne is the third patriarch, is both historically and intellectually the culmination of a long tradition of scholasticism that began in the early centuries of the common era in India with such figures as Asaga and Nagarjuna. Following in the steps of his master, the founder of the dGe Jugs pa school, the great Tsong kba pa bLo bzang grags pa (l357—l419), mKbas grub rje attempts a synthesis of the different schools of Mahayana Buddhist thought (the idealist school, known as the Yogacara or Cittamatra, and the nominalist, the Madhyamaka—itself divided into two sub- schools, the Svatantrika and Prasangika).
His approach is to create an interpretive scheme that at once validates these different schools as soteriologically useful while maintaining a gradation in philosophical accuracy (truth) that allows him ultimately to declare the “bright rays of the logical methods of the glorious Candra, that is, the Prasangika school of the Madhyamaka as elucidated in the works of Candrakirti (seventh century) and his successors, to be the ultimate and final expression of truth, the Buddha’s ultimate purport (dgongs pa mthar thug pa).” Based on a hermeneutical framework that seeks to interpret and reconcile the different (and oftentimes contradictory) scriptures upon which these schools were based, he sets forth the doctrine of emptiness in the Mahayana, contrasting it to the doctrines of the Buddhist “realists,” and throughout relying very heavily on the methodology of the school of Buddhist ‘logicians,” the Pramanika. Indeed, the particular synthesis of Madhyamaka although and Dharmakirti’s pramana method is considered one of the striking (and most controversial) features of the dGe lugs pa approach to Mahayana.
The later dGe Tugs pa tradition goes to the extent of characterizing this synthesis of the Madhyamaka and pramanika traditions as ‘two lions hack to back” (dbu tshad seng ge rgyab sprod), implying that it is an invincible philosophical stance impervious to external attack.
Much of mKhas grub rje’s work therefore can be seen as the synthesis and reconciliation of the different scholastic traditions of India. However, synthesis is only half of mKhas grub rje’s task. This was to a great extent already accomplished in the works of his master, Tsong kha pa. Equally, if not more important to mKhas grub rje was the defense of the views of Tsong kha pa against the attacks, both real and imagined, of rival philosophical schools. Hence, the TIC is both a didactic text and a polemical text, something that is witnessed as much by the style as by the content of the work.
For those with a love of the scholastic mind set, alas an endangered species in this postmodern age, the scope and detail of the TTC will be found to be truly amazing. In a text of less than 500 folio sides mKhas grub rje manages to touch upon most of the major issues of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, from prophecy to hermeneutics to psychology and meditation. The table of contents of the work, an exquisite piece of scholastic precision in its own sight, is a veritable curriculum for an advanced course in Buddhist metaphysic a. However, the very ambitious nature of the enterprise oftentimes makes the work demanding on the part of readers. I have attempted to ease the reader’s burden by supplying the context of arguments. or expanding on them, in brief explanatory notes. In view of the length of the work, and the additional task of annotating the copious citations from scriptural and commentarial sources on which mKhas grub rje relies, I have tried to keep these to a bare minimum. Be dial as it may, I can assure the reader that perseverance in regard to these more difficult portions of the text will be well rewarded.
Acknowledgements | xv | |
Introduction | 1 | |
A Short Biography of mKhas grub rje | 13 | |
Translation: The Great Digest | ||
[Preamble] | ||
Hommage | 23 | |
Reason for the Composition of the Text | 23 | |
The Buddha’s Doctrine as the Ultimate Source of Salvation | 24 | |
The Prophecies of Nagarjuna’s Coming | 24 | |
[Introduction] | ||
The Reason Why It Is Correct to Seek Out REALITY | 27 | |
The Emptiness Taught in the Tantras | 28 | |
The Benefits of Trusting in the Profound [Doctrine of Emptiness] | 30 | |
The Vessel, That is, the Listener, to Whom This Doctrine Should be Explained | 32 | |
A Misconception Concerning Emptiness and Its Consequence | 32 | |
The Characteristics of the Proper Disciple | 33 | |
The Actual Doctrine to be Explained | 35 | |
Identifying Which Scriptures Are of Definitive Meaning (nges don) and Which of Provisional Meaning (drang don) | 35 | |
The Doctrines of the Yogacara School | ||
Yogacara Metaphysics and Hermeneutics | 39 | |
The Three Natures | 39 | |
The Reality of the Dependent and the Real, and the Yogacara Critique of the Madhyamaka | 43 | |
The Rationale Behind the Prajnaparamita’s Claims That Things “Do Not Arise” According to the Sutralamkara, a Yogacara Text | 45 | |
The Elucidation of Some Scriptural Passages Highlighting Unique Features of the Yogacara | 45 | |
The Yogacara Belief in Three Final Vehicles and a Foundation Consciousness (kun gzhi) as Another of Their Distinctive Features | 47 | |
Arguments Against the Advocates of “the Emptiness of What Is Other” (gzhan stong) | 48 | |
The Distinctively Yogacara Use of the Example of the Illusion and the Status of the Dependent | 49 | |
Tsong kha pa’s Unique Exposition of the Yogacara Theory of Emptiness | 52 | |
On Latent Potentialities | 61 | |
The Proof of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness | 63 | |
Nonduality as a Corollary of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness | 66 | |
The Explanation of the Three Natures | 67 | |
Similarity in Terminology Between the Yogacara and Prasangika Is Not a Reflection of an Underlying Similarity in Meaning | 69 | |
Cittamatra Hermeneutics | 69 | |
The Doctrines of the Madhyamaka School | ||
The Sources of the Madhyamaka School | ||
How the Father, the Arya Nagarjuna and His Son [Aryadeva], Following Such Sutras as the Aksayamatiairdesa, Set Forth the Doctrine of the Definitive and the Provisional | 77 | |
How, Step by Step, the Texts of Nagarjuna and the Commentaries on Their Purport (dgongs pa) Arose | 78 | |
The Explanation of the Way in Which the Scriptures of the Arya Were Written | 78 | |
The Explanation of How the Individual Commentaries on the Purport [of Nagarjuna’s Treatises] Arose | 81 | |
A General Introduction to the Madhyamaka | ||
On the Classification of Madhyamakas | 89 | |
The Meaning of the Claim That Prasangikas Accord with the World | 90 | |
Setting Forth Emptiness by Following Those [Madhyamaka Scriptures] | 92 | |
Identifying What Is to Be Refuted by the Reasoning Which Analyzes the Ultimate (don dam dpyad pa’i rtags) | 92 | |
Why It Is Necessary to Identify What Is to Be Refuted | 92 | |
Refuting the Scriptural Exegesis of Those Who [Proceed in the] Refutation without Identifying [the Object to Be Refuted] | 92 | |
Refuting the One Who Overextends (khyab ches ba) Himself or Herself in the Identification of What Is to Be Refuted | 92 | |
Stating What They Believe | 92 | |
Refuting Them | 96 | |
Demonstrating That They Have Refuted the Principal and Special Quality of the Prasangika Madhyamikas | 96 | |
Identifying That Chief Quality | 96 | |
How They Have Refuted That [Special Quality] by Their System [of Interpretation] | 98 | |
Demonstrating Those Reasons to Be Faulty | 100 | |
Demonstrating That Their Analysis into the Four Possibilities, Existence, Nonexistence, and So Fourth, Is Faulty: [The Law of Excluded Middle and the Question of Whether the Madhyamaka Has a Viewpoint] | 102 | |
A Critique of Quietism | 112 | |
Demonstrating That Their Analysis of [What It Means for Something] to Be Established or Not Established by a Valid Cognition, and Their Subsequent Refutation, Is Faulty | 117 | |
Demonstrating That [Their] Examination of Whether Arising Can Be Determined to Exist in Any One of the Four Ways, Such as Arising from Self, Is Faulty | 120 | |
Demonstrating That It Is Incorrect to Urge on Us the Absurdity That What We Advocate Goes Against the Four RELIANCES | 122 | |
How We Refute the One Who Dose Not Go Far Enough (khyab cung ba) in the Identification of the Object of Refutation | 124 | |
The Explanation of What Our Own System [Considers] to Be the Extent of What Is to Be Refuted | 127 | |
Explaining in a General Way the Layout of What Is to Be Refuted | 127 | |
Innate and philosophical Misconceptions | 128 | |
The Doctrines of the Svatantrika School | ||
The Logic of the Svatantrika Critique | ||
The Explanation o f the Measure of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation | 139 | |
The Analysis of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation Based on the Example of the Illusion | 139 | |
The Analysis of the Svatantrikas’ Object or Refutation Based on Scriptural Sources | 141 | |
The Correct Identification of the Svatantrikas’ Object of Refutation | 143 | |
The Reasoning of the One and the Many | 147 | |
How the Example of the Reflection in the Mirror Is Understood | 151 | |
The Diamond-Granule Reasoning and the Question of the Qualification of the Object of Refutation | 153 | |
The Reasoning Refuting Arising via the Four Extremes | 156 | |
The Reasoning Refuting the Arising of the Existent and Nonexistent | 157 | |
The Doctrines of the Prasangika School | ||
A General Exposition of Prasangika Tenets | ||
Explaining the Extent (tshad) of the Prasangikas’ Object of Refutation (dgag bya) | 161 | |
Does Reality Truly Exist or Is It Too a Mere Label? | 163 | |
An Excursus on the Essence Body of the Buddha | 164 | |
The Argument Concerning Reality Continues | 165 | |
The Reasoning Used to Prove That One Phenomenon Is Empty Applies to All Phenomena, Including Emptiness | 166 | |
As It Does Not Truly Exist, Emptiness Is Only a Mental Label | 167 | |
The Meaning of “According with the World” in the Prasangika System | 168 | |
The Scriptural Basis for Nominalism | 169 | |
True Existence, the Opposite of Nominal Existence | 172 | |
Refuting Misconceptions in Regard to the [Distinction between Svatantrikas and Prasangikas] | 173 | |
On “Withstanding Logical Analysis” | 180 | |
An Explanation of the Implications of This | ||
An Explanation of the (1) the Two Kinds of Selflessness to be Refuted and (2) the selflessness that is the refutation | 185 | |
A Brief Mention of the Tenets Advocated by Other Systems | 185 | |
Identifying the Self that Is the Perceived Object (dmigs yul) of the Innate View of a Self as Accepted by Both Buddhists and Others | 185 | |
What Faults the Glorious Candra Finds in These [Views] | 187 | |
How the Other Buddhist Schools Posit the Self That Is the Direct Object of the Two Views of the self [the Person and Phenomena] and How That Self, Which Is Something to Be Refuted, Is Posited as Nonexistent | 192 | |
The Hinayana’s Views on Liberation and Buddhahood | 195 | |
How the Glorious Candra’s Critique Is to Be Expounded | 196 | |
The Exposition of the System of the Prasangikas as a Distinct [System in Its Own Right] | 196 | |
A Brief Explanation of the Differences between the Selflessness of the Person and Phenomena] | 199 | |
Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Understand Reality | ||
The Explanation of Whether Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Understand the Selflessness of Phenomena | 201 | |
How the Glorious Candra Goes About Explaining This | 201 | |
The Refutation of the Misconception that Believes that [Exposition] to Be Incorrect | 207 | |
The Response to the Preceding Criticism | 208 | |
The Exposition of the Valid Scriptural Evidence Explaining that Sravaka and Pratyekabuddhas Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena | ||
The Exposition of the System of the Son of the Conqueror, Santideva | 217 | |
The Explanations of This Point According to the Abhisamayalamkara, the Uttaratantra, and Their Commentaries | 221 | |
How the Abhisamayalamkara and Its Commentaries Explain this Point | 221 | |
The Explanation of the Meaning of the Uttaratantra and Its Commentary | 226 | |
An Extensive Explanation of Scripture and Logical Reasoning Proving that It is correct [to Claim That] Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena | 230 | |
The Exposition of the Logical Reasoning | 230 | |
Bringing Scriptural Exegesis to Bear [on the Problem] | 234 | |
On the Hinayana and Mahayana Understanding of Nirvana | 239 | |
The Explanation of the Two [Kinds of] Obscurations (sgrib pa) and the Paths on Which They Are Abandoned | 245 | |
How the Obscurations Are Eliminated on the Various Paths | 253 | |
The Status of Inference in the Madhyamaka | ||
As Regards the Refutation of That [Object of Refutation], the Explanation of the Differences between the Prasangikas and the Svatantrikas | 257 | |
Refuting What Others Believe. [Do the Madhyamikas Have Philosophical Positions] | 257 | |
Setting Forth Our own Position | ||
The Explanation of the Meaning of Svatantra and Prasanga | 272 | |
The Explanation of the Reasons Why the Svatantra Is Not Accepted | 277 | |
Bringing the Prasannapada to Bear on This [Question] and Explaining [Its Meaning] | 279 | |
Madhyamaka Logical Strategies and Related Polemics | ||
The Explanation of the Reasoning That Refutes the Object of the Refutation | 287 | |
The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning that refutes the object of the refutation | 287 | |
The Reasoning that Refutes the Self of the Person | 287 | |
The Explanation of the Refutation of the Self of Phenomena | 290 | |
The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning that Refutes the Self of Phenomena | 290 | |
The Refutation of Arising from Another | 302 | |
The Refutation of the Arising Causelessly and Conclusion | 305 | |
Other Unique Tenets of the Prasangika School | ||
Explaining Other Facets [of the Prasangika Tenets] That Are Not in Common with the Cittamatrins and Others | 307 | |
The Explanation of the Uncommon Exposition of the Three Times | 307 | |
The General Explanation of the Three Times | 307 | |
The Explanation of the Proof of Why the Past and Future Are Entities | 311 | |
The Explanations of [Two Other Factors] Differentiating [the Prasangikas from Other School], Namely, the Rejection of the Foundation Consciousness (kun gzhi) and the Acceptance of External Objects (phyi don) | 314 | |
The Explanation of How, Even Though We Do Not Accept the Foundation Consciousness, the Relationship between Karma and Effects Is Still Possible | 314 | |
Refuting the Fact That the Arya [Nagarjuna] and so on Accept [the Foundation Consciousness] | 316 | |
The Reason Why They Do Not Accept [the Foundation Consciousness] | 316 | |
The Refutation of the Belief That [the Prasangika Madhyamikas] Accept it | 318 | |
The Explanation of How External Objects Are Posited Nominally | 324 | |
The Prasangika Interpretation of the Cittamatra Sutras | 327 | |
Sense Perception Across World Spheres: The Case of Water | 334 | |
The Explanation of Why We Do Not Accept Auto cognition (rang rig) | 345 | |
The Explanation of How We Refute the Position That Does Accept It | 345 | |
The Explanation of the Opponent’s Position | 345 | |
The Explanation of How to Refute It | 347 | |
The Refutation of the [Logical] Proof | 347 | |
The Refutation of the Belief | 348 | |
The Explanation of How We Posit Our Own System, Which Does Not Accept [Auto cognition] | 349 | |
The Two Truths and Their Cognition | ||
The Explanation of the Two Truths, Which Is the Basis Set Forth by Reasoning | 357 | |
The Basis for the Division [into Two Truths] | 357 | |
The Meaning of the Words [Ultimate and Conventional] | 360 | |
Considering Whether They Are the Same or Different | 363 | |
The Nature of Each [of the Two Truths] Individually | 365 | |
The Definitions | 365 | |
The Divisions | 365 | |
The Divisions of the Ultimate Truth | 365 | |
The Divisions of the Conventional | 366 | |
The Prasangika Interpretation of the Three Nature Theory of the Yogacaras | 370 | |
The Explanation of the Valid Cognition that Ascertains the Two Truths, [That Is, All Phenomena] | 371 | |
The Definition | 371 | |
The Divisions | 372 | |
Conclusion | ||
Having Set Forth Emptiness, How to Meditate on It | 381 | |
The Exposition of the Result That Is the Culmination of Meditation | 381 | |
Concluding Verses | 386 | |
Colophon | 388 | |
Appendix: 1 The Verses to Rong ston | 389 | |
Appendix: 2 The Eighteen Great Contradictions | 391 | |
Notes | 393 | |
Glossary | 523 | |
Abbreviations | 555 | |
Bibliography Western Scholarly and Sanskrit Sources | 559 | |
Tibetan Sources | 573 | |
Indices | 577 |