Slokavarttika (Kumarila Bhatta) (An old and Rare Book)

Slokavarttika (Kumarila Bhatta) (An old and Rare Book)

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Item Code: IDJ457
Author: Ganganatha Jha
Edition: 1985
Pages: 568
Cover: Hardcover
Other Details: 9.3" X 6.3"
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Prefatory Note

The English translation of the Mimamsaslokavarttika, the magnumopus of Kumarilabhatta was prepared by Dr. Ganganath Jha and published by the Asiatic Society during 1900-1908. The work was long out of print. But the demand for the same persisted. The Society in its bicentenary year decided to issue a reprint of the same as a mark of respect to the learned translator who utilised both the Kasika of Sucaritamisra and the Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathimisra, which ascertain the view of Kumarila. I am happy that the book is available again to our scholars and researches.



The word Mimasa more properly Purva Mimansa is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are Pureakanda Karma Mimansa, Karmakanda, Yajnavidya, Adhvaramimansa, Dharmamimansa and so forth some people evern speak of it as the Dvadacalackshmi.

Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of Dharma it is commonly spoken of as Dharmanimansa of the Veda there are three sections or kandas. The Karmakanda the Upasanakanda and the juanankanda and it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the purva mimansa and for this reason it is spoken of as purvukanda purvamimansa or karmamimansa. Though the karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as sacrifice only. And for this reason people speak of this as yajnamimansa or Adhvara mimansa.

This consideration of dharma is found to consist of twelve parts and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhyayas and hence the system has come to be known by the name of Dvadacalaskshani.

For a detailed explanation of the subject matter of each Adhyaya and adhikaransa the render is referred to the Appendix.

While Chiefly dealing with these subjects Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the Veda beginningless and authorless were found mentioned here and there at random many sacrifices offerings &c. and hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices &c: Consequently at the time of the performance of a sacrifice at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has once for all been set aside by Jamini by means of the sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of karmakanda became easy.

At the very outset Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds. The mantra and the Brahmana the former is now known as the Sauhita Rgveda samhita &c. there are many Brahmanas that we known as Upanishat the Brhadaranyaka and the ohandogya. Then again he proceeds to sub divide these two kinds into other sorts the Rk the sama and the yaju.

The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the sutras II -i-32 and 33 wherein it is said that which at the time of the performance of a sacrifice points out certain details in connection with it is called Mantra and the rest are called Brahmana. But the earlier author have distinctly declared that this definition of Mantra is only a tentative one as there are many Mantras that do not fulfill the conditions herein laid down and are yet called Mantras. The mantras in reality take the place of aphorisms dealing with sacrificial details and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them in fact they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya.

Rk Yajush and Sama are the three sub divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Brahmanas that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into feet is calle a Rk (Sutra II-i-35) the other names of which are Rca, Cloka, Mnatra the sentence that are capable of being sung are known as Sama (II-i-36) the rest are called yajush )II-i-37).

The text of the Mimansa philosophy is the most extensive of all the Sutras have twelve Adhyayas divided into sixty padas containing about 1,000 Sutras, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.

The word Adhikarana really means discussion Consideration Inquiry Investigation. In the Mimansa we find that each discussion is made up of five parts viz: (1) Vishaya the subject matter under consideration (2) vipaya or suncaya the doubt arising of the opponent and the arguments in support thereof (4) Uttara or Siddhanta the demonstrated conclusion (5) Sanguti Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some author explain uttara as the arguments against the view of the opponent and instead of Sangati they have Nirmaya which then explain as siddhanta. This system of discussion is adopted more or less in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.

The sutras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the Sutras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussions ends and another begins. For all these as also for a proper understanding of the Sutras themselves we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the sutras.

Of these commentaries and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the sutras that is available now is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the bibliothen Indica) though we find this bhashya referring to other commentaries chief among which is the Vrtti of the revered Upavarsha. On the Bhashya we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta generally spoken of as Bhatta. This work is divided into three parts known under three different names (1) Clokavartika treating of the first the Tarka (polemical) Pada of the first adhyaya (published in the caukhambha sanskirt series Benares). (2) the Tantravartika dealing with the last three Padas of Adhyaya 1 and the whole of Adhyayas II and III (published in the Benares Sasnkrit series and being translated into English by the present translator) and (3) the Tuptika dealing with Adhyayas IV-XII (Published in the Benares Sanskrit Series ). On the first of these we know of two commentaries (1) the Kavika by sucarita Micra and (2) the Nyayaratnakara of parthasarathi Miera (published in the Caukhambha Sanskrit series Benares) extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work and (3) the Nyayasudha of Someovara Bhatta. On the second the only commentary we know of is the Nyayasudha generally known as Banaka by somevara Bhatta (in course of publication in the Caukhambha Sanskrit Series Benares) and on the third we have only one vartikabharana by Venkata dikshita the other the tantraratna cannot be spoken of as a commentary in the proper sense of the word as it is a semi independent commentary on the sutras themselves though here and therer taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the Vartika. This closes the list of works indirectly dealing with the present work.




Sutra I.    
  Subject-matter of the Treatise 1-20
  Introduction (1) 1
  Purpose of the Mimansa ? Castra (11) 2
  Connection of the Castra (19) 3
  Various interpretations of the opening passage of the Bhashya (26) 4
  First Interpretation: Universal Explanation (28) 4
  Second Interpretation: Censure (33) 5
  Third Interpretation: Disavowal (37) 5
  Fourth Interpretation: Specification (46-47) 7
  Fifth Interpretation: Praise (59) 10
  Sixth Interpretation: Objection to the use of the word 'atha' (60) 10
  Meaning of the word 'atha' ? Sequence (61) 10
  What is implied by this Sequence: Study of the Veda (69-70) 11
  Other significations of the Sutra (78-82) 13
  Preclusion of Studies other than that of the Veda (82) 13
  Negation of the Bath before Investigation of Dharma (87-88) 14
  Signification of the Bath (100-101) 17
  Signification of the Bath word 'atah' (110) 18
  Meaning of the word 'Dharmajijnasa (115-17) 18
  The Usefulness of Investigation of Dharma (122) 19
Sutra II.    
  Definition of Dharma 21-66
  Authority or Means of knowing Dharma (1) 21
  Meaning of the word 'Codana' (3) 21
  Duplicate implication of the Sutra (3) 22
  Authoritativeness of Word (5) 22
  'Codana' = Word (7) 22
  Significations of the word 'lakshana' (9-10) 22
  The Character of Dharma lies not in the Sacrifice itself, but in its capacity of bringing about auspicious results (13) 23
  Preclusion of all other Means of knowledge from the case of Dharma (16) 24
  Authority of the Veda questioned (21) 24
  Self-evident character of the Veda: Does authoritativeness lie in the conception itself, or is it extraneous? (33) 26
  The theory of the extraneous characters of authoritativeness (38) 27
  The theory refuted (47) 28
  Notion of un-authoritativeness due to extraneous influences (53) 29
  Three forms of un-authoritativeness (54) 29
  Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of un-authoritativeness (65-66) 31
  Absence of an Author safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68) 31
  Only human assertions dependent upon other Pramanas (71) 32
  The authoritativeness of Pramanas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (73) 32
  The falsity of a Conception explained (86) 33
  Inference not applicable to Veda (89) 34
  Undisputed authority of the Veda (95-96) 35
  Veda not due to human origin (97-98) 35
  Falsity due to non-productiveness of conception (101-102) 36
  'Pratyayita' explained (102-103) 36
  Force of the word 'Va' (109-10) 37
  No omniscient person (111) 38
  Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115) 38
  Veda not the work of an Omniscient Author (120) 39
  Scriptures composed by human beings not fully authoritative (122) 39
  No grounds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132) 41
  The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory an Omniscient Author (149) 43
  Absurdity incurred in denying the authority of the Veda (154) 43
  The sentence 'Nanvavidusham,' explained (155) 44
  The Buddhistic Scriptures false, because composed by human beings (169) 46
  The sentence 'Nanu samanyatodrshtam explained (174-75) 46
  The sentence 'Na, anyatwat' explained (175) 47
  The sentence 'Na hi anyasya, explained (181-82) 48
  Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184) 48
  'Pratyakshastu, explained (187) 49
  Full signification of the word 'Dharma' (190) 49
  Other meanings refuted (195-96) 50
  No Apurva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197) 51
  Objections based upon the significance of the word 'Codana' (201) 51
  Reply to these: Codana cannot be restricted to positive activity only (200) 53
  Codana refers to Injunctions as well as Prohibitions (215-16) 54
  Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22) 54
  Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-33) 57
  Result not always similar to the Action (235-36) 57
  Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43) 59
  Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47) 59
  Nor the 'Conscience' theory (247-48) 59
  Sacrificial Slaughter not sinful (259) 61
  'Cyena' sacrifice sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267) 62
  Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78) 64
Sutra III.    
  Declaration of the subject-matter 67
  Declaration of the subject-matter of the Treatise (1-2) 67
Sutra IV.    
  Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma 68-112
  The Sutra cannot be taken an embodying a definition of Sense-perception (1) 68
  Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a regular definition (13) 69
  Trae meaning of the Sutra (20) 70
  Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36) 73
  Necessity of the word 'sat' (36) 73
  The particle 'sam' (38-39) 74
  Functioning of the senses explained (44) 74
  The words' purusha' and 'indriya' (52) 76
  Buddhijanma,' (53-54) 76
  Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59) 77
  Self-recognition not the true result of Pramana (79) 80
  Inference, & preceded by Sense-perception (87) 82
  Inference not applicable to Dharma (99) 84
  Analogy not applicable to Dharma (100) 85
  Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102) 85
  Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108) 86
  Inference is based upon Sense-perception (111) 87
  Vedanta theory controverted (114-116) 87
  Abstract perception of an object (118-19) 88
  Abstract ? How made Concrete (120) 88
  Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138) 92
  Samavaya (148) 94
  Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159) 96
  The numbers of Senses only Five (169) 98
  Exclusive objects of the Senses-organs differentiated (170) 98
  Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verbal expressions (172) 98
  Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176) 99
  The class 'cow' not cognized always in the form of the word 'cow' (180) 100
  Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183) 100
  Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183) 101
  Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193) 102
  In the expression 'blue lotus,' there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197) 103
  Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words upon objects (200) 104
  Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203) 105
  Objects do not depend upon words (205) 105
  It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206) 105
  If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word 'hasta' would differ from that of the word 'kara' (203) 105
  The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testimony (213) 106
  The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215) 106
  The relationship between Words and Objects it eternal (219) 106
  In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224) 108
  Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226) 108
  Conventional restriction explained (228) 109
  The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31) 109
  Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37) 110
  Cognitions undefined only so long as words are not found (245-46) 111
  It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48) 111
  The name of 'Sense-perception' applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255) 112
Sutra V.    
  Authoritativeness of Injunction 113-408
  Section 1: Vartika proper on the Sutra 112-16
  Dharma not amenable to any other Means of Knowledge (2) 113
  Injunction, the only means of knowing it (8) 114
  Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14) 115
  Section 2: Introduction to the Vrtti on the Sutra 116-19
  Transposition of the words 'tat' and 'sat' in Sutra (4), makes it a definition of Sense-perception (19-20) 116
  Section 3: Nirdlambanavada 119-48
  Necessity of the Discussion (1-3) 119
  Reality of External Objects (4) 119
  'Samurti Reality' synonymous with 'falsity' (8-9) 120
  Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11) 120
  Diversity of opinion among various scions of the Bauddhas (14-16) 120
  Two kinds of Denial of External Objects (17-18) 121
  The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22) 121
  The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be inadequate (28-29) 123
  The Reply otherwise explained (30) 123
  Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32) 123
  Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet untenable (34) 124
  Impossibility of Inference, if objects not real (35) 124
  Denial of the reality of external objects is self-contradictory (53) 127
  Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60) 128
  Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance (63) 129
  If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amenable to Inferential Argumentation (65-66) 129
  Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &, would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73) 130
  Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74) 130
  If all Ideas are false, there is universal negation (74-75) 130
  Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80) 131
  Certain self-contradictions in the Idealistic theory (81-82) 132
  If idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally false (85-87) 133
  There could be no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89) 133
  No Yogic faculty can supply the necessary explanation (93-94) 132
  Another self-contradiction in the Idealistic theory (99-100) 135
  The Middle Term of the Idealistic Argument is one that is not recognised by the other party (101-102) 135
  The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incompatible (106-107) 136
  The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13) 137
  Only mistaken cognitions can be said to be devoid of real substratum (117-19) 138
  No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22) 138
  The Mention of such an Instance would involve a double negation, ie., an affirmation ? which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25) 139
  A reasoning to be effective must be acceptable to both parties (130-31) 140
  The Argument brought forward by the Idealist should contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143) 141
  That which is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156) 142
  No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159) 142
  The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly unreal (163) 143
  Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169) 143
  No specification of Vasana Possible (178-79) 144
  No proof for the existence of Vasana (180-81) 144
  Vasanas, even if extant, could never bring about effects in a serial order (192-93) 146
  It is only a permanent soul that can serve as the substratum of Vasanas (199-200) 147
  Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202) 148
  Section 4: Cunyavada 148-82
  Inferential Idealistic arguments expounded in detail (2-63)  
  No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6) 148
  It is only that which is Cognised that can have an existence (7) 148
  The Shape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9) 149
  The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13) 149
  The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever-continuing Vasanas that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17) 149
  Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21) 150
  Otherwise the Cognition could not appear prior to the comprehension of the Objects (25) 150
  Third Argument to show that the form belongs to Cognitions (32) 151
  The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed upon the Cognition (35) 151
  The form cannot be held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition with the Object (42) 152
  Any such Contact not possible in the case (43) 152
  The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55) 153
  Refutation of the above arguments (64-263)  
  Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64) 154
  The case of Self is different ? It can be both ? This fact explained (67) 155
  There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising Idea (79) 156
  The comprehension of the Object alone, or of te Idea alone, cannot be explained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95) 158
  The difference between Object and Idea not one of Time and Form only (100) 159
  Predicability and Knowability explained (103) 159
  No absolute difference between any two objects (105) 160
  Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions is due to a diversity among objects (116) 161
  A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehended (120) 161
  Duality of Existence ? Comprehender and Comprehended ? fully established (129) 163
  No Apoha possible (136) 164
  Reasons against the assumption of Apoha (137) 164
  The character of Idea belongs to the Comprehender only (148-49) 165
  Ideas cannot have, among themselves, the relation of the Conceived and the Means of Conception (149-50) 165
  Peculiar causal relationship between the Object and the Idea (151-52) 166
  Their sequence does not constitute causality (154-55) 166
  Simultaneity of Cause and Effect not possible (156-57) 166
  The object comprehended by Memory (159-61) 167
  The Past can never be the object of Sensuous Perception (161-62) 167
  The Past Conception cannot be comprehended either as the Comprehended or the Comprehender (163-64) 167
  A Conception cannot have the duplicate character of the Comprehender and the Comprehended (168-89) 168
  Ideas appearing in the same series cannot have the relation of Canse and Effect, or that of impression and Impressed (171-72) 168
  The Comprehended must be different from the Com prehender (174-75) 168
  The Idea cannot comprehend itself (175-76) 168
  No duplicate capability in Conceptions (177-79) 169
  No Conception comprehended by itself (180-81) 169
  Existence of Objects not explicable without Ideas (182) 169
  An Idea always depends upon something else for its comprehension (184) 170
  The Element of Remembrance in Subsequent Cognitions is mistaken (192) 170
  Series of Cognitions explained (193) 171
  Remembrance could not belong to every one of the Cognitions in a series (195) 171
  Cognitions are not the objects of Conception (197) 171
  Proximity and Relativity do not belong to Conceptions (200) 172
  Cognitions appear even in the absence of Impressions and as such no causal efficiency belongs to these latter (203) 172
  Incorrect Cognitions explained (207) 173
  Forms ? dreamt of ? or otherwise ? cannot be attributed to Cognitions (209) 173
  Falsity of Dream ? Cognition Explained (210) 173
  Certain delusions explained (212-13) 173
  Different Ideas with regard to the same object explained (214) 174
  Comprehension of contradictory forms with regard to the same object explained (219) 175
  In ordinary experience an External object is never cognised in the form of the Internal (229) 176
  Reason for proving beforehand that the comprehension of the Object precedes that of the Idea (241) 178
  No recognition of the Idea apart from the forms of Objects (246-47) 179
  Specialities of Time and Place, & serve to explain all apparent discrepancies in comprehensions (253) 180
  No agency of Vasana possible (256-58) 180
  Absence of External Objects not proved by any of the recognised Pramanas (259-61) 181
  Atoms not being comprehensible by themselves, their aggregates must be admitted to be the real objects of comprehension (262) 181
  Section 5: Inference 182-207
  There can be no doubt as to the validity of Inference as a means of Knowledge (1) 182
  Definition of Inference explained (2) 182
  The cognizance of Invariable Concomitance (12-13) 183
  Grounds for the falsity of Ideas (18-19) 184
  The object of Inference is the Minor Term as qualified by the Major Term (27) 185
  The word 'asannikrshte' explained (55-56) 190
  Contradiction of Sense ? perception explained (59-60) 190
  Contradiction of Verbal Testimony (61-62) 190
  Contradiction of Analogy (65-66) 191
  Contradiction of Apparent Inconsistency (66-68) 191
  The expression 'perception of one member' (in the Bhashya) explained (75-76) 192
  Different forms of the contradiction of the Middle Term (79-80) 193
  Reason and Doubt precluded from the Definition (83-85) 193
  Canses of Doubt (83-85) 193
  Viruddhata ? Contradictory character of the Middle Term ? explained (96) 195
  Other Contradictions explained (101-102) 196
  Similarity and Dissimilarity of the Predicate (107-108) 197
  Discrepancies of the Instance (114-16) 198
  Necessity of the recognition of the negative relationship of the Middle Term with the negative of the Major Term 199
  Necessity of Negative Instances (131-32) 200
  Real significance of the expression "Sense-perceived relation" (140-42) 201
  Samanya as a Distinct Entity ? necessary for Inference (148-88) 203
  The character and cognition of the Middle Term (163) 204
  Any discrepancy in the perception of a 'samanya' destroys the cogency of all means of right notion (172) 205
  Presence of Samanya in the visible objects also (181) 206
  Section 6: On Words 207
  Necessity of defining Verbal Authority in general (1-9) 207
  Verbal Authority cannot be included in Inference (15) 209
  Difference between the two processes (22-23) 210
  Arguments in favour of the identity of both (35-37) 212
  Various refutations of these Arguments (38) 213
  Difference between ordinary human assertion and Scriptural declarations (47) 213
  The Self-validity of Verbal Authority (53) 214
  Verbal Authority not based on Inference (54-98)  
  Necessity of accepting 'word' as an independent means of knowledge 214
  Section 7 : Analogy 222-232
  Operation of 'Analogy' explained (1-2) 220
  The validity of 'Analogy' (4-5) 223
  Similarity, a positive entity (18) 225
  Different kind of Similarity (20) 225
  Similarity something wholly different from the Properties on which it is based (21) 225
  The Similarity of twins explained (22-23) 226
  Similarity different from the classes (26) 226
  Similarity amenable to Sense-perception (34) 227
  It exists in its entirety in each member (35) 227
  The object of Analogy (37) 227
  This object not amenable to any other means of knowledge (38) 227
  Semblances of Similarity (40) 227
  Analogy is not Inference (43-44) 228
  Use of Analogy as Distinct means of knowledge (52) 229
  Section 8: Apparent Inconsistency 230-43
  Case of the operation of Apparent Inconsistency 230
  Example (2) 230
  Apparent Inconsistency not the same as Inference (8-9) 231
  Apparent Inconsistency not included in Negation (36) 234
  Apparent Inconsistency not included in Verbal Authority (51) 237
  The example not explicable by Sense-perception (60) 238
  The example not explicable b Analogy (74) 240
  Uses of Apparent Inconsistency in Mimansa (87) 242
  Section 9: On Negation 243-52
  Cases of the Operation of Negation as a Means of Knowledge (2) 243
  Differences between Negation and Sense perception, (17) 245
  The functioning of Negation purely Mental (27) 247
  Difference between Negation and Inference (29) 247
  Bauddha objection: "The Non-appearance of Sense perception, would form the Middle Term" -Reply to this (38-39) 248
  How Negation can be a Means of Cognition (45) 250
  Negation a distinct means of Cognition (54-55) 251
  Other so-called Means of Cognition included in the six herein enumerated (57) 251
  Section 10: On Citrakshepa 252-54
  "The Citra Sacrifice cannot bring about cattle," &., and hence they are untrue (2-3) 252
  The arguments in favour of this condemnation 252
  From Analogy, the falsity shown to belong to the passages dealing with the Agnihotra, &c., also (15) 254
  Section 11: On Sambandhakshepa 254-261
  The truthful character of Vedic passages based upon their eternality (1) 254
  Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations (4-5) 254
  Objections against this: no sort of relationship possible (6-10) 255
  These objection met (11-12) 255
  The different methods of the comprehension of this relationship (21-24) 257
  "The words cannot have any denotativeness, prior to the recognition of the relationships" (33) 259
  Such denotativeness shown by Usages (34) 259
  The Cognition of the said relationship is only an accessory in the comprehension of the meanings of words (42) 260
  "There cannot be any natural relationship between the Word and its signification" (45) 261
  Section 12: On Sphota 261-81
  Consideration of the nature of word (1) 261
  Cognition of the word by means of Sense-perception (4) 262
  The name 'Word' applicable, even before the comprehension of Meaning (8) 262
  No Constituent parts of Letters (13) 263
  The Letter Cognisable of Sense-perception (14) 263
  There is only one individual of each Letter (15) 263
  Diversity only apparent ? due to the diversity in the degrees of effort (25) 265
  No such Class as 'gatva' possible (27) 265
  No similar denial of the Class 'Cow' possible (35) 266
  Perversities of Perception cannot affect our conclusions (41-44) 268
  The expression 'Avarnakula' explained (49) 269
  Accents are merely different forms belonging to the same Letter (57-58) 270
  No such Class as 'gocabdatva' (66) 272
  The idea of the sameness of the Word due to the identity of component letters (67) 272
  Instance of gradual operations leading to a common result (74) 273
  Applicability of the Present Tense to the functioning of the Word (80) 274
  The whole Word can signify what its parts cannot (86) 275
  Objection ? "No denotative potency inhering in the parts, these could be none in the whole" (87-88) 275
  This objection applies to the Spheta theory also (91) 275
  More Assumptions necessary for the Spheta theory than for the Mimansaka (94) 276
  The Cognition of the last latter of the word is the cause of that of the meaning of the whole word (96) 276
  No assumption of an intermediary Sanskara necessary (97) 279
  The assumption of an imperceptible factor in the process is necessary for the Sphota theory also (104) 277
  Simultaneity of letters composing a word may be admitted on the ground of their eternality and omnipresence (107) 277
  Various theories as to the cognition of the Word as a whole (111) 277
  Mental recognition of the word as one component whole admitted by all (113) 277
  But the word as a whole cannot be cognised apart from the constituent letters (118) 279
  The idea of the Word as one, explained (121) 279
  The Sphota theory makes the agency of the words towards the denotation of its meaning, the subordinate factor (127) 280
  The Sanskara, if any, must be regarded as forming part of the denotative process of the word (130) 280
  The Sphota cannot indicate the meaning (133) 280
  Section 13: On Akrti 281-95
  Necessity of establishing the fact of the word denoting the Akrti (class) (1) 281
  "Akrti" ? Class (3) 282
  Commonality is necessary for the collective idea of a number of things (4) 282
  All objects are recognised in two forms ? as Individuals, and as belonging to a class made up of certain other Individuals (5) 282
  Mutual dependence between Class and Individual (9) 283
  Both Class and Individual necessary 283
  No such Class as 'Vastutva' (21-23) 285
  Classes restricted to distinct individuals, through natural capabilities (28) 286
  Relationship between Class and Individual purely natural (31-32) 287
  Individuals do not signify Classes (34) 287
  Without Class, verbal Testimony and Inference, &c., could not function as means of right knowledge (39) 288
  The Class 'Cow' applies only to such animals as are endowed with the dewlap, &c., - explained (45) 289
  Fixity of relation between class and Individuals based upon Direct Sense-perception (48) 290
  The Class not identical with the Individual (52-55) 291
  The Class as a whole is of Uniform Character (56-57) 291
  Class does not consist of similarity among Individuals (65) 293
  Section 14: On Apoha 295-328
  There is no positive entity in the form of Negation (2) 295
  The abstract forms of objects cannot be in the form of Negations (3) 295
  All non-cows cannot be negative by an Individual Cow (5) 296
  Partial Non-Negation not compatible with General Negation (7) 296
  The generic property of 'cowness' is the only means of having an idea of cow in general (10) 297
  Signification of "Non-Brahmanahood" explained as consisting of 'Manhood as apart from the Brahmanas' (18) 298
  All negation rest in Positive Entities (35) 301
  Usage not based upon Ultimate Entities ? like the Atom (36) 301
  The idea with reference to the denotation of words always appears in the shape of a real positive entity (39) 302
  We do not recognize any Ideas as mere Negations (41) 302
  The Mimansaka's Classes being distinct positive entities, are different from another; the Apohist's Classes, in the form of Negations, must be identical with one another (44-45) 303
  A postulating of differences among them would necessitate the admission of positive entities (46) 304
  No diverse Apohas possible (50) 304
  The Apohist could not distinguish the cow from the horse, - both being Negations of the Elephant (55) 305
  No definite cognition of difference among Individual Animals possible for the Apohist (65-66) 307
  Verbal testimony and Inference not applicable to the cause of Apoha, which is devoid of positive relationships (73-74) 308
  The Rejection of Non-Cow would apply to the Cow as well as to the Horse (76) 309
  Rejection of Non-Cow is not amenable the Senses or to Inference (78-79) 310
  Persons not having any notions of Negation, are found to have ideas of the Cow: this fact not explicable by the Apohist (80) 310
  The denotability of any object by 'Non-Cow' cannot be explained (81-82) 311
  The admission of the cow as an independent positive entity, to serve as the object of the negation by Apoha; then the assumption of this latter would be absolutely useless (84-85) 311
  Two negative entities cannot be related as the Container and the Contained (85-86) 311
  How relationship possible between the Negative Apoha and a Positive Entity (86-87) 311
  No cognition of Apoha actually found to be produced from such words as 'horse' and the like (88-89) 312
  In the case of the word 'Entity' the Apoha could not but be in the form of the negation 'non-entity' ; and this double negative would constitute a Positive Entity (95-96) 313
  No Vasana possible, with regard to a negative entity (100) 313
  Apoha never actually cognised as significant (106-107) 315
  No idea of Positivity possible with regard to the Apoha (113-14) 316
  The Apohist cannot explain the relationship expressed by 'blue lotus' (115-17) 316
  He could not explain the expression 'San ghatah' (121-22) 317
  Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128) 319
  Specially as no such intervening factor as 'Apohavattva' is possible (129-30) 319
  No implication of the Apoha possible (133) 320
  No gender, &c., could apply to the Apoha (135) 320
  The individual is not implied by the Apoha (136) 320
  The Apohas of gender, &c., could not be the object of Specification (137) 321
  In the case of Verbs, there is no notion of Negation (139) 321
  There can be no negation in a double negative (140) 321
  Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutual negation of objects (147) 322
  Non-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50) 322
  The Apohist cannot explain 'Rajnah purushah' (157) 324
  A negation cannot have properties (163) 324
  Naiyayika argument against Apoha not tenable (165) 326
  Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176) 328
  Section 15: Vanavada 329-47
  The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1) 329
  The parts are not Manifesters of the Class (4) 329
  The bring about the Idea of the Class (7) 330
  Various usages based upon ideas of Class (15) 331
  Meaning of the word 'Akrti' (16) 331
  It cannot mean shape (17) 332
  Specification of Class due to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27) 333
  Class inhering in each Individual is perceived by the Senses (30-31) 334
  The Class manifested by the Individual (43) 336
  The idea of "Cow" not based upon individual Cows (45) 336
  Object of the Idea of "Cow" (46) 337
  The Class 'Cow' is one only (47) 337
  Idea of 'Cow' not based upon Similarity (48) 337
  Single idea of class 'Cow' not false (49) 337
  Citing of the instance of 'Forest' not irrelevant (50) 337
  The idea of Singleness with reference to the 'Forest' explained ? First Explanation (55-62) 339
  The single word 'Forest' can apply to a number of trees (64) 341
  Second explanation of Singleness of Forest (63-69) 341
  Other explanations of the Word 'vana' (66) 341
  Third Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (69-70) 341
  Fourth Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (70-71) 343
  Substrate of the idea of 'Cow' (73-74) 343
  Whole not absolutely different from its parts-as class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76) 343
  The idea of 'Cow' not due to the conglomeration of the various parts of its body (82-83) 345
  The Fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89) 346
  Section 16: Sambandhakshepaparihara 347-74
  Propriety of the introduction of the questions of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1) 347
  Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the word (5) 348
  Nor, is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7) 348
  The question of relationship has been brought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eternality (10) 349
  Denotation of words not based pimarily upon Conventional Rules (12) 349
  The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26) 352
  The necessity of assuming Potency (29) 353
  If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word (30) 353
  The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relations (41) 355
  This knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42) 355
  The world could have had no beginning in time (47) 356
  No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59) 356
  The Veda could not have proceeded from any Creator (61) 358
  Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of 'Creator' (61) 358
  No proof for admitting a 'Pralaya' (68) 359
  Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86) 360
  So functioning of Sankhya "Attributes" possible (87) 360
  The bondage of soul not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89) 363
  The Knowledge cannot be the cause of Deliverance (94-106) 364
  The Eternal Character of Deliverance based upon its Negative Character (107) 367
  The nature of Deliverance (108) 367
  Method of obtaining Deliverance (110) 367
  The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16) 368
  The verbal relationship of the Proper Name (120) 369
  The verbal relationship distinguished from those of Common Name (122-23) 369
  Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Meanings (136-27) 373
  Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42) 374
  Section 17: Citrakshepaparihara 375-81
  Falsity of the premises brought forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1) 375
  Passages laying down such result do not lay down immediateness of their appearance (2) 375
  The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5) 379
  Even in ordinary actions results do not follow immediately after them (7) 377
  The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citra Sacrifice performed by them in their previous birth (13) 378
  Results not due to mere chance (18) 379
  The Naiyayika theory of immediate sequence of the result as untenable as the "Chance" theory (22) 380
  The non-appearance of the results due to impediment in their appearance (26) 381
  Section 18: Atmavada 382
  The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1) 382
  Denial of Soul makes the whole Veda open to objection (3) 382
  The Soul is different from the Body and is eternal (7) 383
  Objections against the eternality of the Soul (8) 383
  Reply to above (13) 384
  People are always cognizant of the fact of a certain result as appearing from a certain action (15) 384
  The Soul's liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22) 385
  No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23) 386
  The character of Doer and Enjoyer belong to the Person, the Soul continuing throughout the various modifications (29) 387
  The "Series" of ideas as held by the Baudda not tenable (33) 387
  It is not possible for mere "Ideas" to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth (59) 392
  No intermediate subtle body is possible (62) 393
  Even If such a body existed, no Ideas could enter into it (64) 393
  Ideas cannot exist in the Sense-organs (68) 394
  The first Idea of Man after birth cannot be proved to be the product of any foregoing idea (70) 394
  A Person, or Soul, alone could bear within himself the potentialities of Idea (73) 395
  Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul can be the performer of sacrifices (74) 395
  The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76) 395
  The Body, &c., could have no actions except, those that belonged to the Soul (78) 396
  Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls is not necessarily identical (85-86) 397
  The Ego does not become affected by any action except his own (89) 397
  In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his body (90) 398
  The Vaceshika arguments for the existence of Soul put forward (92-101) 398
  These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106) 400
  The arguments of the Bhashya: The soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I' (107) 401
  Intelligence cannot belong to material things (111-12) 401
  The knower cannot be a mere Idea (115-16) 403
  The "Series" of Ideas cannot be the object of the recognitions of 'I' (120) 404
  Impressions can bring about a recognition only in the case of the previous cognizing 'I' being the same as the present 'I' (124-25) 404
  Such notions as 'I am fat' must be regarded as misconceptions (127) 405
  The Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from 'I' (128) 405
  The Idea of 'My Soul' is due to the Cognition being distinct from the Soul (130) 405
  Refutation of arguments against the Existence of Soul (137-39) 407
  In the Knowing of Soul, one must supplement the Veda with the Brahmanas (140) 407
  The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other Soul (143) 407
  One Soul is cognised by another by as observance of its Actions (145) 408
  The Soul is imperishable (147) 408
Sutras VI ? XXIII   409-495
  On the Eternality Word 409
  Reasons for insisting upon the eternality of Words(1, 2,) 409
  A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3) 409
  Objection against the eternality of words (Sutras 6-11) 410-12
  Words are caused entites (and hence transient) (9) 410
  Words are caused because there is a difference in the same word as pronounced by different persons (10) 411
  They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11) 411
  They are caused because they are brought about by efforts (13) 411
  Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17) 412
  They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18) 412
  Reply to the above objection (Sutras 12-23) 412
  All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20) 412
  The word is not accepted by all philosophers to be due to human efforts (20-22) 413
  As Destruction also is uncaused, the argument urged in Sutra 6 becomes contradictory (29-30) 414
  The perception of Akaca after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32) 414
  Various interpretations of the 'non-eternality of the word' put forward and refuted 415
  Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perceived, because of the absence of manifesting agencies (40) 416
  It is by means of a Supersensuous power that the utterance imparts s Supersensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it becomes the cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45) 417
  The Utterance belongs to the Air, and not to the Organs (49-50) 417
  Objections: The word being onluy a change in the Akaca of the ear, brought about buy utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all pervading (56-58) 418
  Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-65) 420
  Above objections answered: Diversity of auditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Ears (65-66) 420
  The Ear is not identical with Akaca (66-67) 420
  The organic change takes place in the physical substratum (the tympanum of the ear) 420
  The cognition taking place in the bodily organs, one man's cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75) 421
  Similarly one man's deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77) 422
  Similarity of conditions between the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimansa theory of their manifestation 423
  Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaiceshika view (88-90) 423
  Objection to the Vaiseshika view (90-106) 424
  The Sankhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121) 426
  The Mimansaka view explained (121-30) 429
  What is Cravanendriya? (130-134) 430
  The argument propounded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words found to be inconclusive (155) 434
  Objections in Sutra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157) 434
  Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to Sutra 9 435
  Explanation of Sutra 16 (201) 443
  Explanation of Sutra 17: answer to Sutra 11 (211) 445
  Explanation of Sutra 18: Eternality of Words (230) 448
  The arrangement of letters in words is not 'caused' (288) 460
  'Shortness,' 'Length,' &c., of vowel-sounds only mark divisions of time (303) 463
  What do you mean by 'Non-eternality' in the case of words? (327): objections 466
  Necessity of asserting 'eternality' of words (356) 470
  It is necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations) 470
  'Idea' and 'Action' as eternal as the class 'word' and class 'action' (398) 477
  Arguments against 'subtle destructions' (425) 481
  Arguments against non-eternality, and for Eternality of words summed up (443) 484
Sutras XXIV ? XXVI.    
  On Sentence 486-552
  Objections against the Eternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda in particular (1-110) 486
  Reply to the above (110) 504
  Further objections (168-181) 514
  Answered (182-221) 517
  Change of denotation of words explained (222-246) 526
  Explanation of Bhavana (247-316) 531
  Explanation of Vikalpa ?Option (317) 542
  Explanation of Sutra 25 (340) 546
Sutras XXVII ? XXXII.    
  The Veda not the work of an author 553-555

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