This set consists of the following 20 Books:
Volume 1 (Part - I): Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Bibliography
(ISBN: 97881208003084, Edition: 2009)
Volume 1 (Part - II): Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Bibliography
(ISBN: 9788120803084, Edition: 2009)
Volume 2: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya - Vaisesika up to Gangesa
(ISBN: 9788120803091, Edition: 2011)
Volume 3: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and his Pupils
(ISBN: 97881208030107, Edition: 2015)
Volume 4: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120803114, Edition: 2012)
Volume 5: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - The Philosophy of the Grammarians
(ISBN: 9788120804265, Edition: 2015)
Volume 6: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Indian Philosophical Analysis Nyaya Vaisesika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani
(ISBN: 9788120808942, Edition: 2008)
Volume 7: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Abhidharma Buddhism
(ISBN: 9788120808959, Edition: 2011)
Volume 8: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D.
(ISBN: 9788120815537, Edition: 2011)
Volume 9: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D.
(ISBN: 9788120819689, Edition: 2008)
Volume 10: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Jain Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120831698, Edition: 2014)
Volume 11: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Advaita Vedanta from 800 to 1200
(ISBN: 9788120830615, Edition: 2013)
Volume 12: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Yoga: India's Philosophy of Meditation
(ISBN: 9788120833494, Edition: 2011)
Volume 13: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Nyaya Vaisesika Philosophy from 1515 to 1660
(ISBN: 9788120835122, Edition: 2011)
Volume 14: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Jain Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120836150, Edition: 2013)
Volume 15: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Bhedabheda and Dvaitadvaita Systems
(ISBN: 9788120836372, Edition: 2013)
Volume 16: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Philosophy of Purva Mimamsa
(ISBN: 9788120836440, Edition: 2014)
Volume 17: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Jain Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120836457, Edition: 2014)
Volume 18: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Dvaita Vedanta Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120836464, Edition: 2015)
Volume 19: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Acintyabhedhabheda Vaisnava Philosophy
(ISBN: 9788120839977, Edition: 2015)
This continues the first volume of the series. It indicates the scope of the project and provides a list of sources which will be surveyed in the subsequent volumes, as well as provide a guide to secondary literature for further study of Indian philosophy. It lists, in relative chronological order, Sanskrit and Tamil works. All known editions and translation into European languages are cited; where published versions of the text are not known, a guide to the location of manuscripts of the work is provided. Also it adds books and articles in European languages relating to the classical text, as well as those of a more general nature relating to schools or systems of Indian Language thought. The citations of published works in the present volume will cover 10,000 items.
Karl H. Potter is Professor of Philosophy and south Asian Studies at the University of Washington, and is General Editor of the present series, which attempts to summarily present the thought of all the great philosophical systems of India.
This is the first Volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, an endeavor by an international team of scholars to present the Contents of Indian philosophical texts to a wider public than has hitherto been possible. This Bibliography in effect constitutes, with additions and revisions, the table of Contents for the subsequent volumes of the Encyclopedia, each of which deals with the literature of one of the systems of Indian thought. The Board of Editors for this project includes scholars from India, Japan, Europe and America, and contributions are solicited from every Partof the globe.
The remaining volumes of the Encyclopedia attempt to provide a definitive account of current knowledge about each of the systems of classical Indian philosophy. Each of those volumes consists of an extended analytical essay together with summaries of every extant work of the system for which a summarizer can be found. The staff of the Encyclopedia hopes to be able to present accounts of Indian philosophical systems which are philosophically interesting while maintaining high standards of scholarship.
With such an ambitious project in mind it has been necessary to delimit the scope of the Encyclopedia's coverage rather carefully. The Encyclopedia is intended to provide an account of works of Indian philosophical literature which are (1) of philosophical interest throughout; (2) theoretical rather than purely practical in their intended function, and (3) polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate. The decision to limit coverage to this area implies no disrespect to the much wider philosophical literature of India. It is not denied that, for example, the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita are philosophical texts, though they are not included within the primary scope of this Encyclopedia (though commentaries upon them are). Furthermore, it is freely admitted that there have undoubtedly been important omissions whose absence is not easily, if at all, defensible according to the criteria just set forth.
Some additional remarks of explanation concerning the first- mentioned criterion of inclusion are perhaps called for. Undoubtedly the gravest difficulty is met in trying to distinguish "philosophical" works from works in other fields. The compiler has attempted to utilize distinctions drawn from both Western and Indian understanding of the scope of philosophy in preparing his list of works. In Indian terms this Bibliography, and the Encyclopedia generally, is concerned primarily with material designated as darsana in Indian curricular classifications. A good deal of the darSana literature is didactic in function, teaching proper practices in seeking salvation-this portion is excluded by the second criterion. There are other works, however, which are in Western terms theological rather than philosophical, even though Indian classifications do not distinguish these areas. Works which are clearly theological or religiously sectarian have been excluded (although title of some such works may remain in this edition of the Bibliography due to the compiler's ignorance of the nature of the work). Classics such as the Upanisads and the Pali and Jain canons are not listed since though they contain philosophical material they are not sustainedly polemical and not systematically philosophical throughout. Again, however, commentaries on such works fall within the scope of coverage here.
The number of those who have contributed materially to the preparation of this and previous editions of this Bibliography has grown so large that it is impossible to thank them all. I should like, however, especially to thank Dr. Thomas Ridgeway for his help in preparing this third edition for camera-ready printing, helping me to plumb the obscure complications of the computer.
|List of Abbreviations||5|
|PartOne: Sanskrit Texts With Dates Known, Listed in Chronological Order under Author's Names (Numbered)||45|
|PartTwo: Sanskrit Texts, Author's Dates Unknown (DU)||813|
|PartThree: Authors of Unknown Dates Listed in Alphabetical Order with Names of Works (ADU)||891|
|PartFour: Secondary Literature||901|
|Abhidharma Buddhism (AB)||925|
|Sarvastivada and Vaidhasika Buddhism (SB)||946|
|Buddhist Logic (BL)||947|
|Yogacara Buddhism (YB)||951|
|Madhyamaka Buddhism (MB)||957|
|General Buddhism (GB)||967|
|Saiva Siddhanta (SS)||1153|
|Kashmir Saiva (KS)||1160|
|General Saivism (GS)||1167|
|Bhedabheda/ Dvaitadvaita (BD)||1169|
|General Hinduism (H)||1176|
|Index of Names||1322|
|Index of Titles||1450|
This volume provides a detailed resume of current knowledge about the classical Indian Philosophical Systems of Nyaya and Vaisesika in their earlier stages, i.e. covering the literature from their inception in the sutras of Gautama and Kanada before the time of Gangesa (about A.D. 1350). The summaries are arranged in relative chronolo-gical order to assist the reader in tracing the development of the syncretic school's thought. Scholars around the world - India, Japan, America - have collaborated in the undertaking. The summaries in the volume serve us a tool for introducing Indian thoughts into their courses on problems of philosophy, history of thought, etc. and guide the students for further study. The index appended will enable the reader to identify all the passages summarized here on a Particular topic.
The many competences of the authors of summaries include the Indian collaborators' knowledge in depth of Indian thoughts and the western points of view of the Western scholars.
The present volume provides a detailed resumé of current knowledge about the classical Indian philosophical system of Nyaya-Vaisesika in its earlier stages. Specifically, it covers the literatures of Nyaya and Vaikika from their inception in the respective sutras up to the time of Gangesa, that is, about A.D. 1350. This dividing point is regularly accepted in the tradition, since with Gangea it is felt that a new start is made within the systems, the result coming to be known as Navyanyaya, “new” Nyaya. We hope that a volume will follow covering the remainder of the Nyaya-Vaiseika literature from Gangesa to the present.
A volume already published, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies (New Delhi Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), provides a useful guide to the literature, both primary and secondary, on the Nyaya-Vaisika school, and citations in the present book make constant references to the Bibliography, such references usually appearing in the form of “B” followed by the number of entry cited.
The form of this book features an extended introductory section followed by summaries of works belonging to the system’s literature. These summaries are arranged in relative chronological order to assist the reader in tracing the development of the school’s thought. Summaries have been solicited from scholars around the world— Indian, Japanese, and American scholars have collaborated in the undertaking. This international aspect of the book is one of its pleasantest features, serving to put philosophers and Indologists around the world in closer touch with one another.
A few words of explanation and advice as to how to use this book may be in order. Perhaps the first and foremost thing that needs to be said is that this volume is not intended to be analytically definitive: it invites the attention of philosophers and scholars rather than making such attention unnecessary. The thinking behind the preparation of this volume has been that philosophers without tended training in Sanskrit and Indian studies are not in a very good position to appreciate the contributions made by classical Indian philosophy toward the solution of perennial philosophical problems. This is Partly due to the fact that the tradition in which the Indian schools arise and grow is foreign to Western philosophers, but our thinking is that this fact is an avoidable hazard. It is also Partly due to the type of translations that have been produced by Indian and Western Sanskrit scholars; these translations, while usually accurate, are not always philosophically perspicuous, which is to say that they do not always bring out what a professional philosopher will find most interesting and identifiable in the material. The production of an acceptable translation is, and ought to be, a serious and extensive scholarly problem, and the summaries in PartII of this book are in no way intended as surrogates for such translations. Nevertheless, we think that philosophers should be provided with a tool for introducing Indian thought into their courses on problems of philosophy, history of thought, etc., and that the translations and other materials currently available to them do not make it really possible for them to work up Indian thought without more training than most philosophers are willing or able to expose themselves to. Our aim here, then, is to provide the philosopher with an account of the systematic thought of India which is less detailed than an accurate translation, but more detailed than the standard introductory textbook on Indian philosophy.
It is to be stressed that the work is addressed to philosophers primarily, and Indologists secondarily. Of course we hope that the materials here presented will, within the limits of our intent, be adjudged sufficiently accurate in terms of scholarship. The editor has endeavored to obtain the work of some of the leading scholars of the system to furnish summaries. However, these summaries omit large portions, may well omit sections which others deem of primary importance, and will otherwise deviate from the evaluations likely to be made by the Sanskritist. In order that there be no misunderstanding it is well to mention these points here. These summaries, then, are not substitutes for scholarship, but guides and markers for further study on the Partof trained scholars.
In studying the philosophy of the Nyâya-Vaiesika school one finds that a fair amount of the literature occurs in the sütra or commentary form so well known in India. The reader should bear in mind that, in the summary of one of the sütras, say, what is summarized is no more than what is actually said there; if the summary seems imprecise and laconic, that is because (if we have done our work well) the sutra has those features. It is characteristic of this tradition that the commentators spell out what they believe to be the intent of the authors of the sutras; thus the reader should, if he is tracing the thought of the school on a given topic, be careful to read the summaries of the commentators in conjunction with that of the sutra. The index provided is intended to enable the reader to identify all the passages summarized here which bear upon a given topic and he is advised to use it frequently. Sometimes too an author will comment on a topic in a Partof his work unrelated to any logical development that the ordinary reader can discern here again the reader may well miss this contribution unless he uses the index.
This volume has been in preparation for a number of years. Work on it began in the early 1960s. The editor wishes to thank the American Institute of Indian Studies for awarding him a follow ship in 1963-64 which enabled him to visit prospective contributors and utilize the resources that India provided for furthering his work, later on in the summer of 1967 he received a summer session grant form the University of Minnesota which enabled him to use the widener library to locate out of the way secondary materials in preparing his introductory section. He is extremely grateful for both these opportunities.
A full scale philosophical system is generally expected to speak to problems in the following areas metaphysics epistemology, ethic and theory of value logic and philosophical method. The system of Indian philosophy known as Nyaya Vaisesika is such a full scale system. Its contribution en each and every one of these areas is extensive interesting and usually of fundamental importance as this introduction will attempt to show.
Metaphysics: Nyaya-Vaisesika offers one of the most vigorous efforts at the construction of a substantialist, realist ontology that the world has ever seen. It provides an extended critique 0f eventontologies and idealist metaphysics. It starts from a unique basis r ontology that incorporates several 0f the most recent Western insights into the question of how to defend realism most successfully. This ontology is “Platonistic” (it admits repeatable properties as Plato’s did), realistic (it builds the world from “timeless” individuals as well as spatiotemporal points or events), but neither exclusively phvsicalistic nor phenomenalistic (it admits as basic individuals entries both directly known and inferred from scientific investigations)’ Though the system has many quaint and archaic features from a modern point of view, as a philosophical base for accommodating scientific insights it has advantages: its authors developed an atomic theory, came to treat numbers very much in the spirit of modern mathematics, argued for a wave theory of sound transmission, and adapted an empiricist view 0f causality to their own uses.
Epistemology: Whereas in “modern” philosophy of the West the idealist critique 0f substance initiated by Berkeley has never been curiously challenged, the philosophers of the Nyaya-Vaikika school entered the controversy very early in its history against Buddhists who used Berkeley an arguments. The resulting polemical battle may well represent the most important confrontation in philosophical literature between so-called naive realism and the threats to it from idealist sources. Nyaya offers an account of perception which makes sense of our belief in an external world, yet promises to explain the fact of perceptual error without allowing that opening wedge of idealism, the admission that the mind creates certain Parts of our world (and so why not all of it ?). The intricacy of this discussion between Nyaya and Buddhism brings out many fascinating and little understood aspects of the two views and what they require from their adherents.
Ethics and Theory of Value: The Nyaya-Vaisesika system provides no startling new ideas over and beyond what is generally acceptable to Hindus, but it presents many carefully gauged arguments for the standard position, involving belief in transmigration, karma, and the possibility of liberation from future rebirths. It does not discuss questions of “ethical theory” as we understand that term in contemporary philosophy, since that was the business of others (Mimamsakas) in the peculiar division of labor adopted by the ancient Indian thinkers. However, it endorses many of the general ethical attitudes of Hindu sages, questioning some in passing. On one point Nyaya is recognized by Hindus to have provided a definitive treatment, and this is on arguments for the existence of God.
Logic: Nyaya grew in Partas a theory of philosophical debate, and among Hindus has been accepted as the system which specially studies the theory of arguments good and bad, in keeping with the division of labor principle alluded to in the previous paragraph. This does not mean that all Hindu philosophers accepted every point in the Nyaya account, but they certainly tended to look to Nyaya for definitive treatment and detailed discussions of intricate points. Nyaya had its great rival, however, in the logic developed by the Buddhists, and from this controversy developed one of the mast comprehensive logical theories the world has known. Indian logic is never conceived as “format” in the Western sense, but as an account of sane processes of reasoning it has few equals in the West for attention to detail.
Philosophical Method: Topics in this area are of the greatest current interest to philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. Western philosophers sometimes seem to suppose that the “linguistic turn” in recent philosophy is a unique phenomenon, a turning- point in the history of philosophy. Perhaps it is, but if so it took place many centuries ago in India, where attention to grammar was commonplace by the 4th century B.C. The Nyaya theory 0f language, 0f meaning and the meaningfulness of words and sentences, shows subtly at the levels of syntax semantics and pragmatics Nyaya also gave prolonged attention to defense of the empirical theory of validity and truth opposing uncritical use of introduction and authoritarian appeals to revelation.
PartOne: Introduction to the philosophy of Nyaya Vaisesika
|2||Theory of Value||18|
|3||Nature of a philosophical System||38|
|6||Qualities and motions||112|
|7||Universals Individuals and absences||133|
|8||Meaning and truth||147|
PartTwo: Summaries of works
|Vaisesikasutras (Masaaki Hattori)||212|
|Nyayasutras (karl H. Potter)||221|
|Nyayabhasya (karl H. Potter)||240|
|Dasapadarthasastra (masaaki Hattori)||275|
|Padarthadharmasamgraha (karl H. Potter)||282|
|Nyayavarttika (karl H. Potter)||304|
|Nyayamanjari (karl H. Potter, J.V. Bhattarchar, U. Arya)||343|
|Nyayakalika (J.V. Bhattacharya)||394|
|Nyayasara (karl H. Potter)||400|
|Nyayabhusana (B.K. Matilal)||410|
|Vyomavati (V. Varadachari)||425|
|Nyayavarttikatatparyatika (B.K. Matilal)||455|
|Nyayakandali (karl H. Potter)||485|
|Laksanavali (karl H. Potter)||523|
|Laksanamala (S. Subramanya Sastri)||525|
|Atmatattvaviveka (V. Varadachari)||526|
|Nyayakusumanjali (karl H. Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharya)||557|
|Kiranavali (B.K. Matilal)||589|
|Nyayamuktavali (S. Subrahmanya Sastri)||604|
|Nyayalitavati (J.N. Mohanty)||613|
|Tarkikarakasa with Sarasamgraha (karl H. Potter)||629|
|Saptapadarthi (karl H. Potter)||643|
|Nyayamala (S. Subramanya Sastri)||645|
|Mahavidyavidambana (E.R. Sreekrishna Sarma)||647|
|Krianavalidarpana (G. Bhattacharya)||652|
|Trakabhasa (karl H. potter)||664|
|Nyayaratna (V. Varadachari)||669|
This volume summaries what we know of early Advaita Vedanta upto the Samkara's pupils, Suresvara, Padmapada, Totaka and Hanstamalaka. An analytical introduction by the editor introduces the reader to the concepts utilized by Gaudapada, Samkaracarya and Mandana Misra in expounding and defending the Advaita view. This is followed by summaries of all the authentic Advaita works of these authors, together with those of Suresvara and Padmapada as well as a number of other works which have been attributed to Samkara, Totaka and Hastamalaka. This volume is divided into two Parts and is enriched with an elaborate Introduction discussing briefly the history of the school its theories of value, language and relations and its metaphysics and epistemology.
This volume, the third in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, is the first of those devoted to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta. It covers the writings of Gaudapada, Samkaracarya, Mandana Misra and Samkara’s pupils: Suresvara, Padmapada, Totaka, and Hastamalaka (the last according to traditional authorities only).
The remarks offered in the preface to volume two in this series relating to the general intent of the Encyclopedia apply to this volume and others to follow. To review briefly: this volume is intended, not as a definitive study of the works summarized, but as an invitation to further philosophical attention to them. The plan has been to make available the substance of the thought contained in these works, so that philosophers unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty in understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where such exist) can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered. The summaries, then, are intended primarily for philosophers and only secondarily for Indologists, and certain sections of the works have been omitted or treated sketchily because they are repetitious or deemed less interesting for philosophers, though they may be of great interest to Sanskritists. I might also add that the summaries are not likely to make interesting consecutive reading; they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. It is hoped, on the other hand, that the editor’s Introduction will provide a readable account of some of the pertinent features of Advaita Vedanta for those hitherto unacquainted with that system of thought.
Preparation of this volume has been assisted materially by the gracious assistance provided by several agencies and individuals. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. DePartmen of State, represented by Ms. Evelyn Barnes, kindly provided the project a generous grant in PL-480 rupees to cover preparation of this and other volumes. This grant made possible contacts with Indian colleagues and provided honoraria for a number of the summaries here included. The grant has been administered through the American Institute of Indian Studies, which has provided generous assistance in easing administrative details connected with the gathering of summaries, in arranging editorial travel and consultation, and in providing secretarial assistance and supplies. I wish especially to thank Pradip R. Mehendiratta and Edward C. Dimock for their good offices. In 1975 I received a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies through the Joint Committee on South Asia of the American Council of Learned Societies and Social Science Research Council that enabled me to make use of the unparalleled collections at the India Office Library and British Museum in London, without which opportunity a number of the summaries could not have been completed and much scholarly information could not have been conveyed or alluded to through references.
I wish to thank James Settle of the American Council of Learned Societies as well as the authorities and staff members at the libraries mentioned. Finally, there are several individual scholars who are probably not aware of the extent of their contribution to this volume through their helpful and provocative conversation with me over the years in connection with Advaita. I wish especially to record my appreciation and debt to Anthony J. Alston, Daniel H. H. Ingalls, T. R. V. Murti, and Allen W. Thrasher for sharing their scholarship and thought with me. I am, needless to say, responsible for all misinterpretation of the materials that have crept into what follows.
|PartOne: Introduction to the Philosophy of Advaita Vedanta|
|1. Historical Resume||3|
|2. Theory of Value||22|
|3. Philosophy of Language||46|
|4. Identity and Difference: The Theory of Relations||62|
|5. Advaita Metaphysics||74|
|6. Advaita Epistemology||92|
|PartTwo: Summaries of Works|
|Gaudapadakarikas, or Agamasastra (Karl H. Potter)||105|
|Brahmasutrabhasya (Karl H. Potter)||119|
|Brahadaranyakopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||180|
|Taittriyopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||204|
|Upadesasahasri (Karl H. Potter)||217|
|Chandogyopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||254|
|Aitareyopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||270|
|Isopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||278|
|Kathopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||280|
|Kenopanisatpadabhasya (Karl H. Potter)||281|
|Mundakopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||284|
|Prasnopanisadbhasya (Karl H. Potter)||289|
|Bhagavadgitabhasya (Karl H. Potter)||294|
|Mandukyopanisadbhasya with Gaudapadakarikabhasya (Karl H. Potter)||308|
|Daksinamurtistotra (Karl H. Potter)||317|
|Pancikarana (Karl H. Potter)||318|
|Aparoksanubhuti (Karl H. Potter)||320|
|Atmabodha (Karl H. Potter)||323|
|Satasloki (Karl H. Potter)||324|
|Balabodhini, or Atmajnanopadesavidhi (Karl H. Potter)||326|
|Atmanatmaviveka (Karl H. Potter)||328|
|Tattvabodha (Karl H. Potter)||331|
|Dasasloki (Karl H. Potter)||333|
|Vakyavrtti (Karl H. Potter)||334|
|Vivekacudamani (Karl H. Potter)||335|
|Sarvavedantasiddhantasarasamgraha (Karl H. Potter)||339|
|Advaitapancaratna, or Atmapancaka (K. Raghavan Pillai)||343|
|Vakyassudha, or Drgdrsyaviveka||344|
|Commentaries on other Upanisads||345|
|3. Mandana Misra||346|
|Brahmasiddhi (Allen W. Thrasher)||347|
|Brhadaranyakopanisadbhasyavarttika (S. Subrahmanya Sastri)||420|
|Taittiriyopanisadbhasyavarttika (Karl H. Potter)||521|
|Naiskarmyasiddhi (Karl H. Potter)||530|
|Daksinamurtivarttika, or Manasollasa (Karl H. Potter)||550|
|Pancikaranavarttika, or Pranavavarttika (Karl H. Potter)||560|
|Pancapadika (Karl H. Potter)||564|
|6. Totaka, or Trotaka,||598|
|Srutisarasamuddharana (Karl H. Potter)||598|
|Hastamalakaslokah (Edeltraud Harzer)||601|
Samkhya is one of India’s oldest philosophical systems, and this volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, coedited by Gernald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, and under the general editorship of Karl H.Potter, traces the history of the system from its beginnings in the third or fourth century. The volume includes a lengthy Introduction (written by G.J. Larson) which discusses the history of the system and its philosophical contours overall. The remainder of the volume includes summaries in English of all extant Sanskrit texts of the Samkhya system. Many of the summaries are of texts that have never been edited, translated of studied before, most notably extensive treatments of the Yuktidipika, the samkhyavrtti and the Samkhyasaptativrtti. The volume is designed for philosophers, cultural historians and students of comparative studies generally. In addition, since the volume contains so much material that also prove to be of interest to area specialists, Indologists and Sanskritists.
Gerald James Larson is professor of the history of religions, Department of religions studies, university of California, Santa Barbara, USA. He is the author of Classical Samkhya: An Interpretation of its History and meaning (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979; revised second edition); Myth in Indo-European Antiquity (coedited with C.scott Littleton and J. Puhvel, University of California press, 1974); and In her Image (coedited with P. Pal and R. Gowen, regents of the University of California, 1980); and numerous articles on Indian philosophy and religion.
Ram Shankar Bhattacharya is editor of the journal Purana; senior research scholar in the all India Kashiraj Trust, Fort Ramnagar, Varanasi; and was for some years in the research department of Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, he is the author of numerous editions, translations and studies of original Sanskrit texts in Hindi, Bengali, Sanskrit and English.
Many years ago when I met the great Gopinath kaviraj for the first time in Varanasi, he inquired about my word. I commented that I was working on one of the ancient systems of Indian philosophy, namely, the Samakhya. He impatiently waved his hand to interrupt me. "Samkhya," he said, "is not one of the systems of Indian philosophy. Sankhya is the philosophy of India!" He was referring, of course, to the ancient period, but he also went on to stress the remarkable influence that Samkhya has had on almost every phase of Indian culture and learning. Philosophy, mythology, theology, law, medicine, art, and the various traditions of Yoga and Tantra have all been touched by the categories and basic notions of the Samkhya. This is not at all to claim that these various areas of learning and cultural practice have accepted the dualist metaphysics of Samkhya or its overall classical systematic formulation. To the contrary, there have been intense polemics over the centuries against the Samkhya position. What is striking, however, is the ubiquitous presence of the Samkhya network of notions, functioning almost as a kind of cultural “code” (to use a semiotics idiom) to which intellectuals in every phase of cultural life in India have felt a need to respond.
The present volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies attempts to trace the history and to interpret the meaning of Samkhya philosophy from its beginnings in the ancient period to the present time, a period of some twenty- five hundred years. As might well be imagined, it has not been an easy task to accomplish this in one volume. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya and I have had to make some difficult editorial decisions by way of limiting the boundaries of our undertaking. One such decision concerned the manner in which we would treat ancient and/or "popular" (Nontechnical) Samkhya passages. For a time we considered the possibility of including summaries of Samkhya passages in the Upanisads, the Mahabharata (including the Bhagavadgita), the Puranas, the medical literature, and so forth. As we proceeded in our work, however, it became clear that these passages could be best treated in the Introduction to the present volume. More than that, it became clear that these passages represent what could be called "Proto-Samkhya" and should be clearly distinguished from what we are calling in the present volume "Pre-Karika-Samkhya." "karika-samkhya," "Patanjala- samkhya," "Karika-Kaumudi-samkhya," "Samasa-Samkhya," and "sutra-samkhya" (and see Introduction).
A second editorial decision concerned the manner in which we would deal with the extensive number of passages in Indian philosophical literature that criticize Samkhya from the perspective of other traditions, passages, for example, from Nyaya, vaisesika, Buddhist Jaina, Mimamsa, and Vedanta works. Again, for a time we considered the possibility of including at least some of these passages, but we ultimately determined that such passages appropriately belong in their own respective volumes in the Encyclopedia series and not in the Samkhya volume itself.
A third editorial decision concerned the manner in which we would deal with the issue of the literature of Yoga. Our own view is that "Patanjala-Samkhya" is an important type of samkhya philosophy and deserves to be treated as such, but we encountered the practical difficulty of some seventy Sanskrit texts on Yoga that should be considered. The only sensible solution appeared to be, therefore, to prepare a separate volume of the Encyclopedia series for the Yoga materials with appropriate cross-references in both the samkhya and Yoga volumes. Eventually, then, when both volumes are published, they can be used in tandem.
APartfrom such external editorial decisions, that is to say, what to exclude from the volume, we also had to make a number of decisions regarding the internal boundaries of the volume. It was obvious from the beginning, for example, that three of our texts required special treatment, namely, the Samkhyakarika, the Tattvasamasasutra, and the Samkhyasutra. These are the three fundamental and primary texts of the tradition upon which most other texts are based, and each presented a unique problem. Because the Samkhyakarika is the oldest systematic text available, we thought it appropriate to present an extensive treatment of it. Indeed, the so-called "summary" of the Samkhyakarika in the volume is considerably longer than the original text itself! In our view, however, since our task was not that of translation but, rather, that of presenting an overview of te systematic philosophical arguments in the text, we felt justified in taking some liberties in unpacking those arguments. Regarding the Tattvasamasasutra, the problem was the reverse. The tattvasamasa is not really a text in any sense. It is a checklist of topics upon which several commentaries have been written. We have, therefore, presented it in its entirety as a checklist. The samkhyasutra, as is well known, is a late compilation, and there is no authoritative tradition either for the sequence of sutras or their interpretation aPartfrom the reading and interpretation offered, first, by Aniruddha, and then later by Vijnanabhiksu (who generally follows Aniruddha, throughout). We have, therefore, presented the sutras themselves in a bare, outline form. We have, therefore, presented the sutras themselves in a bare, outline form. We have, then, presented a full summary of Aniruddha’s reading and interpretation followed by a shorter summary of Vijnanabhiksu’s reading and interpretation (stressing only those views of vijnanabhiksu that clearly differ from Aniruddha).
In three instances in the volume we have presented unusually detailed summaries, namely, those for the Samkhyavrtti, the samkhyasaptativrtti, and the Yuktidipika. The former two texts are those recently edited by Esther A. Solomon, and because they have been unknown in Samkhya studies until now, we invited Professor Solomon to prepare full treatments of both. The latter text, the Yuktidipika, is undoubtedly the most important text for understanding the details of the Samkhya system, but until now no translation has been available. We thought it appropriate, therefore, to include as full a treatment of it as possible. The summary of the Yuktidipika in this volume is not by any means exhaustive, but it does provide a wealth of information that has until now been unavailable.
Dr. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya and I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those who helped to bring this volume to completion. First, of course, our thanks to the many contributors (see list of contributors) who prepared the published summaries. Second, a special word of thanks and acknowledgement to those who prepared summaries of passages that could not be included in the final published version of the volume- passages, for example, from Jaina, Buddhist, or epic literature that, based on our final editorial decisions, finally fell outside of the boundaries of the volume, or summaries in which it became apparent that a particular text was simply repeating what had been said earlier in terms of philosophical interpretation. In this regard, we would like to thank and acknowledge the help of Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Calcutta Sanskrit college), Dr. Sabhajit misra (university of Gorakhpur), Dr.R.K.Tripathi (Banaras Hindu university), and Dr. S.P. Verm a (kuruksetra university).
Several research assistants have helped us in our work along the way, and we would like to thank and acknowledge them as well: Dr. Jayandra soni, formerly of Banaras Hindu University and currently at Mcmaster University in Ontario, Canada; Dr. James McNamara, former doctoral students in religious studies at the University of California, santa Barbara. Also, a special word of thanks for the research assistance of Dr. Edeltraud Harzer, of the Unirersity of Washington, seattle. Our thanks, furthermore, to the American Institute of Indian studies and the Indo-U.S. Subcommission for Education and culture for financial assistance to our various contributors and to the coeditors, and, finally, our thanks and appreciation to Karl H. potter for his continuing patience, encouragement, and help in his capacity as general editor of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.
For the nonspecialist reader of the volume, it should be noted that the Index provides brief definitions of many technical Samkhya terms before listing page numbers and may be used, therefore, as a glossary for those unfamiliar with the Sanskrit terminology of the Samkhya system. An additional glossary for classical Samkhya terminology may also be found in Gerald J.Larson, Classical samkhya (2nd edition, Delhi: motilal Banarsidass, 1979), pp. 237-247.
Full diacritical marks are given only for all primary entries of texts and authors in the volume. In the case of modern Indian scholars, namely, authors of secondary work, summarizers, and other contributors, names are cited without diacritical marks, in accordance with current convention in modern India, Likewise, the names of modern Indian cities are given without diacritical marks.
|PartOne : Introduction to the philosophy of Samkhya (Gerald James Larson)|
|The History and Literature of Samkhya||3|
|I.||Proto-Samkhya and Pre-Karika-Samkhya||3|
|II.||The Samkhya Textual Tradition||14|
|Karika-Samkhya and Patanjala-Samkhya||18|
|The philosophy of Samkhya||43|
|I.||Samkhya as Enumeration||48|
|II.||Samkhya as process materialism||65|
|III.||Samkhya as contentless consciousness||73|
|IV.||Samkhya as rational reflection||83|
|PartTwo: Summaries of works|
|7.||Patanjali (the Samkhya teacher)||129|
|Samkhyakarika (karl H.potter; Gerald J. Larson)||149|
|12.||Patanjali (the Yoga teacher)||165|
|14.||Samkhyavrtti (Esther A. Solomon)||179|
|15||Samkhasaptativrtti E.A. Solomon)||193|
|17.||Vyasa, or Vedavyasa||225|
|18.||Yuktidipika (Raghunatha Sharma, Dayanand Bhargava, and shiv kumar sharma)||227|
|19.||Jayamangald (Ram Shankar Bhattacharya)||271|
|21.||Matharavrtti (Harsh Narain)||291|
|Tattvakaumudi (G.J. Larson)||301|
|25.||Kramadipika (Anima Sen Gupta)||321|
|Samkhayasutravrtti (G.J. Larson)||333|
|Samkhyapravacanabhasya (Sangamlal Pandey)||376|
|Samkhyasara (R.S. Bhattacharya)||401|
|Tattvayatharthyadipana (Kapil Deo Pandey)||413|
|Gunatrayaviveka (R.S. Bhattachary)||419|
|Samkhyacandrika (A. Sen Gupta)||421|
|Tattvavibhakara (Kedaranatha Tripathi and R.S. Bhattacharya)||431|
|Samkhyatattvavivecana (A. sen Gupta)||443|
|36.||Sarvopakarinitika (K.D. Pandey)||445|
|37.||Samkhyasutravivarana (A. Sen Gupta)||447|
|Samkhyataruvasanta (R.S. Bhattacharya)||451|
|Upodghata (R.S. Bhattacharya)||463|
|Tattvakaumudivyakhya (E.A. Solomon)||467|
|Amala (Kalidas Bhattacharya)||473|
|Avaranavarini (K.D. Bhattacharya)||488|
|Samkhyasutravrtti (R.S. Bhattacharya)||501|
|Vidvattosini (R.S. Bhattachayra)||509|
|purnima (K.D. Bhattacharya)||521|
|Tattvabodhini (Prabal kumar Sen)||445|
|Kiranavali (R.S. Bhattacharya)||451|
|Samkhyakarikabhasya (A. Sen Gupta)||554|
|52.||Rajesvara sastrin Dravida||559|
|Tattvakaumuditika (R.S. Bhattacharya)||559|
|Gunamayi (K.D. Bhattacharya)||563|
|Saraprabha (R.S. Bhattacharya)||577|
|Samkhyatattvaloka (R.S. Bhattacharya)||581|
|Susama (R.S Bhattacharya)||591|
|Sarabodhini (A. Sen Gupta)||599|
|65.||Sri Rama Pandeya||621|
This volume of Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies is devoted to the Philosophy of Grammarians. The introductory essay summarizes the main philosophical ideas contained in grammatical works. The summaries of the main sources that follow concentrate on the Philosophical ideas contained therein, so that the philosophers who are unable to read the original Sanskrit can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered. Covered in this text are chapters on Metaphysics, Epistemology, Word-meaning and sentence meaning, Accounts of Vedic Literature like Yaska's Nirukta, Panini's Asthadhyayi, Patanjali's Mahabhasya and 80 other accounts. An exhaustive bibliography of original and secondary writings on the philosophy of grammar is included. Cumulative Index is also given. Bhartrhari, Mandanamisra, Kondabhatta and Nagesa have been dealt with at length.
This Volume the fifth in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies is devoted to the philosophy of the Grammarians. The introductory essay is intended to set their school in its context and to summarize the main Grammarian teachings. The summaries of primary sources that follow the introduction aim at making available the substance of the main philosophical ideas contained in these works, so that philosophers who are unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty in understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where such exist) can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered. The summaries, then, are intended primarily for philosophers and only secondarily for indologists. Certain sections of the works have been omitted or treated sketchily because they are repetitions or deemed less interesting for philosophers, though they may be of great interest to Sanskritists. The summaries are not likely to make interesting consecutive reading: they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. The appendix, which contains a lengthy bibliography of original and secondary Writings on the philosophy of Grammar, is also presented as an aid to research.
References in the footnotes such as “0273” are to the bibliography presented in the appendix. References such as “RB10337” are to the first volume of this encyclopedia, 2nd edition (1984). Abbreviations used are listed at the beginning of the appendix.
Preparation of this volume has been made possible by grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the University of Calgary. These grants made possible the obtaining of the summaries and funded the travel that the editorial work required. The editors wish to thank Pradip R. Mehendiratta for his good offices. A debt of gratitude is also owed to the late Professor T. R. V. Murti, who gave generously of his time in was king with Harold Coward in the volume’s planning stages. A research fellowship awarded to K. Kunjunni Raja by the Calgary Institute for the Humanities enabled the two editors to work together in completing the project. Special gratitude is due to Karl H. Potter, editor of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, for his many contributions, which have added greatly to the value of this volume.
Language has been one of the fundamental concerns of Indian philosophy and has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers from the outset. In India the study of language has never been the monopoly of the Grammarians or the Rhetoricians. All schools of thought began their philosophical discussions from the fundamental problem of communication. The poet philosophers of the Rg Veda were greatly concerned with the powers and limitations of language as a means of communicating their mystic personal experiences of an ecstatic nature to their fellows and they tried to stretch the power of language by various means. They praised language as a powerful and benign deity every ready to bestow favors on her devotees. The entire creation of the world was attributed by some sages to divine language and it was generally recognized that the ordinary speech of mortals was only a fraction of that language.
Among the six accessories to the study of the Vedas two are directly concerned with language grammar or linguistic analysis and etymology or interpretation of the meanings of selected words in the Vedas through etymological methods. Another accessory metrics is concerned with prosody.
Among the systems of Indian Philosophy Purvamimamsa is called vakyasastra or the science of sentences interpretation and the Nyaya system was also intrinsically language oriented. The Buddhist and Jain schools of though have also devoted considerable attention to the working of language. Grammar and literary criticism are directly interested in language problems including semantic and philosophical issues and Grammarians have claimed the status of an independent darsana for themselves.
The Indian approach to the study of language and linguistic problems has been characterized by both analysis and synthesis. On the one hand, a systematic attempt was made to analyze speech utterance in terms of sentences and words, stems and suffixes, morphemes and phonemes. The verbal root was considered as the core element to which proverbs, primary suffixes, and secondary suffixes, as well as nominal or verbal terminations, were added to evolve the word. On the other hand, rules of coalescence (samdhi) between these various elements and between words in a compound word or a sentence were studied and systematized. Rules of syntax were also studied carefully and attempts made to identify the cementing factors helping to form an integral unit.
The analytical method was older and more pop War. The Sanskrit term for grammar, vyäkarana, means literally “linguistic analysis”. Kumarila Bhatta, in the beginning of the seventh century, said that “we cannot think of any point of time totally devoid of some work or other dealing with the grammatical rules treating of the different kinds of roots and suffixes.” Sakalya’s padapatha of the Rg Veda was one of the early attempts in the direction of analysis; he broke down the samhitá text of the Rg Veda into words, identifying even the separate elements of Compound words. The Brhaddevatâ, attributed to Saunaka, says that a sentence is made up of words, and words are made up of phonemes (varza).’ Pãnini, who flourished about the fifth century B.C., brought the descriptive grammar of the Sanskrit language to its highest perfection in his Astadhyayi, which has been praised by Leonard Bloomfield, the father of modern linguistics, as “the greatest monument of human Intelligence.” Patnini’s primary concern was the building up 0f Sanskrit words, both Vedic and classical, from verbal roots, proverbs, primary and secondary suffixes, and nominal and verbal terminations; but he was also interested in syntactic problems involved in the formation of compound words and the relationship 0f the nouns in a sentence with the action indicated by the verb. Panini did not neglect meaning, but he was aware of the fact that meaning was likely to change over time and that the final authorities regarding meaning are the people who speak the language.
It was the etymological school 0f Yaska, author of the Nirukta commentary on the ghan(u list of select words in Vedic literature, that undertook a semantic analysis 0f words with their components in order to explain their meanings in the contexts of their occurrence. This school generally subscribed- to the view that nouns are derived from verbal roots. The Undisutras follow this view and attempt to find derivations for even apparently integral words.
Mimamsa, called vakyalasira, was mainly concerned with the methodology of textual interpretation in order to give a cogent explanation 0f prescriptive scriptural texts. It had to deal with apparent absurdities, inconsistencies, and contradictions, besides ambiguities, and evolved rules of interpretation that were accepted generally by all schools of thought and were used freely in legal practice and in commentaries, The Mimãmsakas used both analysis and synthesis in their approach to textual problems. They gave a semantic definition of the sentence, evolving the concepts of mutual expectancy (dkankra), consistency (yogyata), and contiguity (asatti) as factors necessary for the existence of a sentence. It was the Mimamsa school that developed the theory of metaphor to explain the apparent absurdities and inconsistencies in Vedic texts.
The Nyaya school, mainly interested in the theory of knowledge and the truth or falsity of judgments, had to be concerned with the theory of meaning, because understanding the proposition was a primary requirement for making any significant study about it.
The literary critics who were concerned with the understanding and appreciation of literature were very much interested in the stylistic analyses of language and in finding out the deviance of literary language from ordinary language, in order to see how far poets have been able to communicate their vision of beauty and emotional experience through the medium of words.
It is clear that for centuries the various schools of thought in India have carried out studies that have produced insights into the working of language. The Grammarians’ interest was not confined to the description and analysis of a particular language, but extended to the true nature and potentialities of language, including its role in effecting liberation.
One of the fundamental problems discussed is the relation between the linguistic elements (sabda) and their meanings (artha). The term sabda is normally used by the Grammarians to refer to a linguistic eement, a meaningful unit of speech.4 Patañjali’s definition is that sabda is that which, when articulated, is seen to convey the idea of the referent. Mandana Misra defines it in his Sphotasiddhi as the cause that produces the idea of its meaning. In any case, it is the meaning bearer. I ordinary parlance people may use the word sabda to mean sound, as pointed out by Patanjali himself, but for the Grammarian it is the meaning-bearing unit.
Is it the articulated sound, or the phoneme (varna), or the word pada), or the sentence (vakya) that is referred to by the term sabda? According to the sphota theory of Bhartrhari it is the complete utterance the sentence that is the unit, and it is called vakyasphoja; but at a lower analytical level the word can be considered as the unit, for which the term padasphota is used by the Grammarian. Those who know the language very well think and speak in units of sentences and also hear whole sentences. It is only those who d0 not know the language properly who hear words or phonemes or bits of sounds and have to struggle with them to get the connected sentence meaning. But in grammatical texts the words are taken as the unit for the sake of easy understanding.
This view is not acceptable to the Mimamsakas, who consider the letter (permanent articulated sound-unit) or phoneme (varna) to be the sabda or unit of language and the meaning bearer. They assume phonemes to be permanent and each utterance to be their realization. To the Naiyäyikas sabda means sound produced by the speaker and heard by the listener, and it is impermanent; pada means a morpheme (meaningful unit).
What is meant by artha or meaning? Is it the universal that is intended, or the particular? According to Kãtyãyana and Patanjali, two different positions were held by two ancient Grammarians, Vyadi and Vajapyayana, the former holding that words refer to dravya, ‘substance” or “individual”, and the latter holding that words (including proper names) refer to jail, “universal” or ‘‘attribute”. Papini seems to have left the question open, holding that words could refer to individuals or to the universals. The Mimamsakas held that the primary meaning of a word is the universal arid the sense of the particular in a sentence is obtained either through secondary significative power (according to Bhata Mimamsakas) or through both the universal and the particular being grasped by the same perceptive effort simultaneously (according to the Prabhakaras). The early Naiyayikas considered the meaning of words as comprising universal (jail), configuration (akrti), and particular;5 later Naiyayikas held that the primary meaning of words is the individual as qualified by the universal. The Buddhists of Dignaga’s school held that the meaning is vikalpa, a mental construct that has no direct correspondence with the real, its nature being to exclude other things (anyapoha). The function of a word or a name is the exclusion of other possibilities.
The significative power of words (sakti) is based on the relation that exists between a word and its meaning. The Grammarians hold that in the case of ordinary words in everyday speech it is permanent; but in the case of technical terms it is based on the convention. The Mimamsakas consider the relation as “original” (autpattika), that is, as permanent or eternal. The Grammarians explain this permanence in two ways: pravahanityata and yogyatanityata. We learn language from our elders; they in turn learned it from their forefathers; thus it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society. This type of permanence is pravahanityata. The other view is based on the innate capacity of words to express any meaning; this capacity (yogyata) is restricted by convention. Patanjali made a distinction between absolute eternality (kutasthani4yata), by which an item is not liable to any modification, and the perennial nature as used through generations of speakers (pravahanityata).
It is generally believed that in an ideal language a word must have only one meaning, and a sense must have only one word to express it. This binary relationship between a word and its meaning is accepted in principle by all schools of thought. It is also believed that this relationship, which i5 the basis for the significative power of words, is stable and constant because linguistic communication would be imposible without it. If there is no general understanding of the meaning of words shared by the speaker and listener there will be chaos and mutual comprehension will be jeopardized.
The existence of polysemy is recognized in actual practice, however. Two words ma” have the same form, and the same word may develop more than one meaning. The problem of homophones and homonyms been discussed by scholars like Bhartrhari. Yaska’s discussion about the principle of word derivation in Sanskrit also sheds considerable light on the problem of synonyms. Nouns are normally derived fl-nm verbal roots. If all nouns are so derived from verbal roots denoting action, every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is associated, and by the same token each noun could be applied to as many objects as are associated with that action indicated by that verbal root. Yãska’s answer to the problem is that there are no restrictions. Language designates things in an incomplete manner; it can choose only one 0f the many activities associated with an object. Hence there is some sort of permanent relation between a word and its meaning.
It is accepted that even the primary meaning 0f a word is not definitely circumscribed and that the boundaries of the meaning often change on the basis of contextual factors, not only in the case of ambiguous words but even in that of ordinary words: thus “man is mortal” does not mean “woman is immortal”; but in the phrase “man and woman”, “man” does not include “woman”. When there is conflict between the correct etymological meaning and the popular usage, the meaning current in popular usage among the educated elite is to be accepted. Grammatical analysis and etymological interpretations are only means of approach; the final authority is the popular usage of the cultured.
Even though it is accepted that every word has a primary stable meaning core, in actual practice shifts in meaning, metaphoric transfers, and secondary usages are quite common. If there is discrepancy in sense when the primary meaning is taken, the passage will have to be explained by resorting to the secondary meaning. There are three conditions considered necessary for resorting to secondary meaning. The first, is inconsistency or incongruity of the words taken in the literal sense. A sentence like “He is an ass” or “He is a firebrand” cannot be taken in the literal sense because the human being referred to cannot be an animal or an inanimate object. A sentence like “The house is in the river” does not make sense, because a house cannot exist in the river. In such cases the primary meaning of the word has to be given up and another meaning used. The second condition is that the actual meaning and the primary meaning must be related in some way; it may be on the basis of similarity or common quality or it may be on the basis of some other relationship like proximity. The example “He is an ass” can be explained if the term “ass” is interpreted as “a fool” (as the donkey is notorious for its dullness). The example of the house on the river has to be explained by taking “river” to mean the bank of the river on the basis of proximity. The third condition for resorting to secondary significance is either sanction by popular usage, as in the case of faded metaphors, or a special purpose for which it is resorted to, as in the case of intentional metaphors. The inconsistency 0f primary meaning can mean impossibility of syntactic connection from the point of view of meaning, or it can mean inconsistency in the context. As an example, in “see that crows do not spoil the curd” “crows” implies all beings, including a dog, who might spoil it.
Literary critics like Anandavardhana proposed the element 0f purpose in intentional metaphors and pointed out its importance in enriching literature’s content.
How can we get a connected meaning from a sentence if each word gives only its isolated sense, which is of a universal nature? This problem has been discussed in India since ancient times, and three main factors have been pointed out as unifying of sentence meaning: expectancy consistency and contiguity. Words in a sentence must have mutual expectancy. Pãnini hinted as much when he stressed the need for samarthya or capacity along the meanings of words for mutual connection, mainly in compound words.6 This sdmart4ya has been interpreted as similar to akanksã or mutual expectancy and unity of sense. Later the Mimamsakas developed this concept, and the logicians made further modifications. Mutual expectancy consists in a word being unable to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word. Literally it is the desire on the Partof the listeners to know the other words in the sentence in order to complete the sense. A word is said to have expectancy for another if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an utterance. The Mimimsakas were more interested in psychological expectancy, while the logicians and the Grammarians stressed the need for syntactic expectancy.
To this primary condition were added two more, yogyata or consistency of sense and asatti or the contiguity of the words. Grammarians did not emphasize the importance of yogyata for to them it is enough for a sentence to give a syntactically connected meaning. Its veracity is not a condition. From the Grammarian’s point of view laksanã, secondary meaning, is also of little interest. “He is a boy” and ‘He is an ass” are equally valid for them. Even empty phrases like “the child of a barren woman” are linguistically valid to them, for Grammarians are not concerned -uh the real existence of the thing meant by an expression. Yogyata involves a judgment on the sense or nonsense of a sentence. There is difference of opinion about whether it should be taken as a positive condition. If the lack of yogyata inconsistency-is only apparent and can be explained away by resorting to the metaphorical meaning of a word in the sentence, there is no difficulty in understanding the sentence’s meaning.
Asatti or contiguity is the uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken apprehension of the words in a sentence. In the case of elliptical sentences, one school believes that the syntactic relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning, while another school insists that the missing words have to be supplied and the meaning obtained. Some take tatparya, the intention of the speaker known from contextual factors, as a fourth condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.
Regarding the comprehension of the sentence meaning there are two main theories, called anvitabhidhana and abhihitãnvaya. Speech is purposive in nature. People use words with the intention of conveying a connected, unified sense. Hence from the use of words in juxtaposition is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention of conveying a connected sense. Expectancy, consistency, and continuity help in this comprehension of a unified sentence meaning. The sentence meaning is something more than the sum of the word meanings. Besides the word meanings, the syntactic connection of the word meanings has to he conveyed. The abhihitãnvaya theory says that in a sentence each word gives out its individual isolated meaning (which is universal) and their significative power is exhausted with that. Then with the help of 1ak1a,ã (secondary significative power) the syntactic relationship is obtained, and thus the sentence meaning is understood. According to the ancnabhidhana school, by contrast, each word in a sentence conveys not only its isolated meaning but also the syntactic element. The words convey the meaning of the universal and simultaneously the meaning as referring to the particular. The words themselves also give the syntactic relationship. Thus the entire sentence meaning is conveyed by the words themselves. The Naiyayikas, who believe that the words in a sentence denote primary meanings that are particulars as qualified by universal traits, contend that the sentence meaning is an association of the word meanings.
Even in ancient India there were some scholars who emphasized the unreal nature of words and advocated the need for taking the sentence as a whole. In the Nirukta Yaska refers to Audumbarayana’s theory that it is the statement as a whole that is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer.’ The sphota theory, fully promulgated by Bhartrhari in the fifth century of the Christian era, is one of the most important contributions of India to the problem of meaning. He insisted that the fundamental linguistic fad is the complete utterance or sentence. Just as a letter or a phoneme has no parts, so also the word and the sentence are to be taken as complete integral units, not as made up of smaller elements. Bhart1hari says that although linguistic analysis—splitting sentences into words and further into roots and suffixes and into phonemes—may be a useful means for studying language, it has no reality. In a speech situation, communication is always through complete utterances. The speaker thinks and the listener understands the utterance as a single unit. It is only those who do not know the language thoroughly who analyze it into words, and further bits, in order to get a connected meaning. Those who know the language will conceive the idea and the expression as a single unit and express it; and the listener likewise comprehends it as a whole, the understanding is as an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha). The fact that the expression has to be through the medium of phonemes, through a temporal or spatial series, does not warrant our considering it as made up of parts. When a painter conceives a picture in his mind and paints it on a canvas, he may use various colors, and make various strokes; that does not mean that the picture is not a unit. And we see the picture as a unit, not as different colors and strokes. Just as the meaning is unitary, integral, and indivisible, the symbol that signifies it must also be unitary and indivisible. This concept is called sphota—the sentence taken as an integral symbol, in which its apparent parts are irrelevant to it as parts. It is not something hypothetically assumed to explain language behavior; it is actually experienced and known through perception. On hearing a sentence those who know tile language well hear the sentence, not the phonemes or sound bits or even words. Those who do not know the language may hear only the sound bits. The sphota theory says that hearing the whole sentence is the real experience, while the apparent experience of hearing the sound bits is only for those who do not know the language.
It may he noted that even the so-called unity of meaning is often an illusion, for it is the language that makes the unity. Yaska in the fifth century B.C. and, following him, Bhartrhari in the fifth century of the Christian era have pointed out that a verb conveys a series of operations or activities taking place in a particular temporal sequence. Thus the word “cooks” conveys the idea of a series of activities— preparing the fire, putting the vessel on it, pouring water in the vessel, washing the rice, putting it in the water, blowing the fire to make it burn properly, putting out the fire, removing the excess water, and so on. It is the word ‘‘cooks’’ that collects all of these activities into a unitary, integral action. Each of these activities can be further analyzed into a series 0f activities taking place in time. Later philosophers of language made further componential analysis of words from the semantic point of view and declared that every verbal root (dhatu) involved two semantic factors, activity (vyapara) and goal or result (phala). The verb “he cooks” means an activity directed toward the softening of the rice, and so forth. There is a difference of opinion about whether both arc primary meanings of the verbal root or one can be taken as the main meaning and the other as subsidiary. The verb was divided into the root and the suffix, and separate meaning bits assigned to them. Maidana Misra said that the meaning of the root is the result, and it is the suffix that indicates the activity. With the addition of proverbs the meaning changes considerably in Sanskrit, and there have been discussions of whether all the meanings are present in a latent form in the root, to be revealed by the prolverbs, or these proverbs can be assigned specific meanings.
The theory of literal (primary) and metaphoric (secondary) meaning developed by the Nyaya and Mimamsa schools of sentence interpretation in ancient India was extended farther by Anandavardhana in the second half of the ninth century to include emotive and other associative meanings under linguistic meaning. He did not attack the usual division of speech into words into stems and suffixes and the distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of words. He accepted all of these concepts but in addition he postulated a third capabililty of language which he called vyanjana or the capacity to suggest meaning other than its literal or metaphoric meaning. Anandvardhana pointed out that his suggestive function of language has a vital role to play in literature.
|Part One: Introductio to the Philosophy of the Grammarians (Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|1. Historical Resume||3|
|4. Word Meaning||63|
|5. Sentence Meaning||83|
|Part Two: Survey of the Literature of Grammarian Philosophy|
|1. Philosophical Elements in Vedic Literature (John G. Arapura and K. Kunjunni Raja)||101|
|2. Philosophical Elements in Yaska's Nirukta (K. Kunjunni Raja)||107|
|3. Philosophical Elements in Patanjali's Astadhyayi (K. Kunjunni Raja)||111|
|4. Philosophical Elements in Patanjali's Mahabhasya (K. Kunjunni Raja)||115|
|5. Bhartrhari Trikandi or Vakyapadiya, with Vrtti on Book 1 and 2 (Ashok Aklujkar)||121|
|Tika on Patanjali's Mahabhasya (K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|6. Durvinita or Avinita||175|
|8. Hari Vrsabha or Vrsabhadeva (Ashok Aklujkar)||179|
|9. Mandana Misra||181|
|Sphotasiddhi (G. B. Palsule, Harold G. Coward, and Karl H. Potter)|
|Commentary on Bhartrhari's Trikandi|
|(K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|Pradipa on Patanjali's Mahabhasya (S.R. Bannerjee)|
|15. Maitreya Raksita||207|
|18. (Risputra) Paramesvara II||213|
|Sphotasiddhigopalika (K.A. Subramania Iyer)|
|19. Sesa Krsna||215|
|Sphotatattvanirupana (G. B. Palsule)|
|20. satyananda or Ramacandra Sarasvati||219|
|21. Sesa Cintamani||221|
|22. Sesa Viresvara or Ramesvara||223|
|23. Sesa Narayana Bhatta||225|
|25. Isvarananda or Isvaridatta Sarasvati||229|
|26. Bharata Misra||231|
|Sphotasiddhi (G.B. Palsule)|
|27. Sphotasiddhinyayavicara (G.B. Palsule)||235|
|29. Appayya Diksita I||239|
|30. Bhattoji Diksita||241|
|31. Sesa Visnu||243|
|32. Sivaramendra Sarasvati||245|
|33. (Sesa) Cakrapani (Datta)||247|
|34. Mallaya Yajvan||249|
|35. Nilakantha Sukla||251|
|36. Narayana (Sastrin)||253|
|37. Konda (or Kaunda) Bhatta||255|
|Vaiyakaranabhusana and Vaijakaranabhusanasara (S.D. Joshi)|
|38. Taraka Brahmananda Sarasvati||309|
|39. Cokkanatha or Sokanatha Diksita||311|
|40. Tirumala Yajvan||313|
|41. (Rama) Narayana (Sarman) (Vandyopadhyaya)||315|
|43. Hari Diksita||319|
|44. Ramabhadra Diksita||321|
|Saddarsinisiddhanta samgraha (Vyakarana Section)|
|(K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|Sabdabhedanirupana (K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|45. Nagesa (or Nagoji) Bhatta||323|
|Paramalaghumanjusa (K. Kunjunni Raja)|
|46. Jnanendra Sarasvati||351|
|47. Gopalakrsna Sastrin||353|
|49. Vaidyanatha Payagunda||357|
|50. Satyapriya Tirtha Svamin||359|
|51. Jayakrsna Maunin||361|
|53. Vasudeva Diksita||365|
|54. Srikrsna Bhatta Maunin||367|
|Sphotacandrika (G.B. Palsule)|
|55. Umamahesvara or Abhinava Kalidasa||371|
|56. Nilakantha Diksita||373|
|57. Asadhara Bhatta||375|
|59. Indradatta Upadhyaya||379|
|60. Krsnamitracarya or Durabalacarya||381|
|62. Dharanidhara (II)||385|
|63. Mannudeva or Manyudeva or Gopaladeva||387|
|64. Bhairava Misra||389|
|65. Kumara Tataya||391|
|66. Satara Raghavendracarya (Gajendragadkar)||393|
|67. Gangadhara Kaviraja||395|
|68. Taranatha Tarkavacaspati||397|
|69. Khuddi Jha (Sarman)||399|
|70. Nityananda Panta Parvatiya||401|
|71. Dravyesa Jha||403|
|72. Suryanarayana Sukla||405|
|73. Gopala Sastri Nene||407|
|74. P.S. Anantanarayana sastri||409|
|76. V. Krsnamacarya||413|
|77. Sadasiva sastri (Sarman)||415|
|78. Bala Krsna Pancoli||417|
|79. Rama Prasada Tripathi||419|
|80. Rudradhara Jha Sarman||421|
|81. Kalika Prasada Sukla||423|
|82. Sabhapati Sarman Upadhyaya||425|
|83. Raghunatha Sarman||427|
|84. Satyakama Varma||429|
|85. Ramajna Pandeya||431|
|Bibliography of Grammar|
|(Vyakarana) (Karl H. Potter)|
|Part1: Authors Whose Dates Are (more or Less) Known||433|
|Part2: Authors and Works Whose Dates Are Unknown||439|
|Part3: Secondary Literature on Vyakarana||517|
The present volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies takes up the history of Nyaya-Vaisesika where Volume Two left off in the 14th century. With Gangesa we enter the literature that has come to be known as Navyanyaya, i.e. new Nyaya Gangesa's seminal work, the Tattvacintamani is one of the most famous, as well as most difficult works of Indian Philosophy and this Volume begins with the most exhaustive account of ists Contents hitherto available. Over a dozen different summarizers have collaborated in preparing this treatise which totals some 300 pages.
The volume reconstructs the development of Nyaya-Vaisesika through the next two centuries. Some fifty author's names are known to us from this period, and 36 of their works are summarized. The volume closes its reconstruction of literary history into the early 16th century, with Raghunatha Siromani the great commentator on Gangesa's seminal works and one of the most innovative analytical philosophers the world has known.
Although this is but a brief attempt to cover the complex literature of the period, this volume represents the basic elements of present-day understanding of the contributions of the philosophers discussed. A detailed introduction by the two Editors provides a bird's eye view of the ideas expounded in the text. A total of 22 different scholars combine to render the gist of these materials available to the general public. Subsequent volumes in this siries will take Nyaya-Vaisesika to the present.
Volume Six of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies picks up the history of the Nyaya - Vaisesika system where Volume Two left off. The time covered in this volume is much smaller than in any of the previous volumes of the Encyclopedia, a scant two hundred years between approximately 1310 and 1510. There are good reasons for this intensive attention to such a brief period. For one thing, two of Indian's most remarkable philosophers, Gangesa and Raghunatha Siromani, are covered in these pages-in fact, they initiate and terminate the period surveyed. More generally, we here begin to treat the literature of Navyanyaya, a movement comparable in its implication to the burgeoning of symbolic logic and its concomitant philosophical speculations found in the writings of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein in the West at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The excitement of newly pioneered techniques of philosophical analysis developed by Gangesa spawned a bevy of philosophical talents. Indeed, this period is even richer than we are able to summarize here, since a good part of it is still unavailable in print.
The history of Indian philosophy, and specifically of Navyanyaya, has been treated in a quite extensive literature. The Bibliography of Indian Philosophies (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, referred to below as "B"; Revised Edition, New Delhi: Banarsidass and Princeton, Princeton University Press 1983, referred to as "RB") provides assistance in suggesting a chronology of Indian thought in general within which Navyanyaya philosophers find their appropriate places.
The form of this book features an extended introductory section followed by summaries of works belonging to the system's literature. These summaries are arranged in relative chronological order to assist the reader in tracing the development of the school's thought. Summaries have been provided by scholars from India, England and the United States. Remarks in the Introductions to previous volumes of the Encyclopedia explaining the intended reading public to whom these volumes are addressed apply here as well.
Thanks are due to the American Institute of Indian Studies, the Indo-U.S. Subcomission for Education and Culture, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, the Joint Committee on South Asia of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, and the National Endowment for the Humanities; all of these bodies provided needed assistance in the development of this volume through financial assistance of various sorts. Finally, special thanks are due to Laura Townsend for assistance in preparation of the manuscript.
|Part One: Introduction to the Philosophy of Navya-Nyaya|
|2||Relation and Analysis of Awareness||15|
|Part Two: Summaries of Works|
|6||Cinnam Bhatta or Cennu Bhatta||368|
|11||Jivanatha Misra of Jayanatha Misra||375|
|12||Bhavanatha Misra or Duve or Ayaci Misra||375|
|13||Jinavardhana Suri or Adinatha Jain||376|
|27||Sesananta Padarthacandrika on Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi||472|
|30||Pragalbha Misra or Subhandara||486|
|31||Jayadeva or Paksadhara Misra||486|
|32||Srinatha Bhattacarya Cakravartin||489|
|34||Krsnananda Vidyainoda or Vidyavirinci||490|
|35||Janardana of Mithila||490|
|39||Narahari Upadhyaya or Mahesvara Visarada||491|
|45||Ratnakara or Visnudasa Vidyavacaspati||520|
Soon after the time of Gautama the Buddha a literature began to grow, involving the reported words of Gautama, the rules and procedures governing the order of monks he founded, and attempts to set forth his philosophical teachings as understood and developed by his immediate pupils and the schools of Buddhist thought which grew in succeeding generations. The present volume undertakes to summarize the gist of these philosophical teachings, termed Abhidharma, from the first texts that developed after the Buddha up to and including the mammoth text called Mahavibhasa, generated from a convention held in the first or second century A.D.
Thus all the texts here summarized originated in a period from no earlier than 350 B.C. through no later than 150 A.D. The authors of these texts are mainly concerned to set forth the tenets and arguments of Buddhist philosophy as understood by what came to be two main literary traditions of Abhidharma. One of these traditions migrated eventually to Sri Lanka, and it is its literary corpus that is now known as the Pali canon. The other tradition, which stemmed from the northern part of India, came to be known as Sarvastivada, as in its texts it was proposed that the momentary factors (dharma) that comprise the components of the Buddhist universe really exist, not only such factors presently occurring but past and future ones as well. Each of these two schools had its own Abhidharma, two sets of seven texts each, in which their views are set forth in extensive detail. It is the thoughts presented in these texts, together with a handful of other sources of the period, that comprise the contents of the present volume.
This volume is the combined work of a team. Some sixteen scholars contributed to the summaries or the introductory material. The Editors likewise comprise a team. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. is Professor of East Asian Languages at the University of California at Los Angeles. Padmanabh S. Jaini is Professor in the Department of South and Southeast Asian Language at the University of California at Berkeley. Noble Ross Reat is Professor in the Department of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Queensland. Karl H. Potter is Professor of Philosophy and South Asian Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, and is the General Editor of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.
With the present volume of the Encyclopedia we begin taking up the philosophy of Buddhism in South Asia. When this project was first planned, many years ago now, it was thought that Buddhist philosophy would be handled expeditiously in one volume on Abhidharma Buddhism and three more on Mahayana. After further reflection, however, it became apparent that though this division may represent what impose latter-day distinctions on a tradition which has a lot more in common throughout than such a division would well represent. As a result it has been decided to treat Buddhist philosophy all together chronologically, beginning with the Buddha and ending when Buddhist thought leaves India around the 14th century A.D. Thus Abhidharm and Mahayana writers will be treated side by side, and some may find distinctions among schools of Buddhism dealt with insufficiently for their liking. We can only say that it seems wisest not to impose more divisions into Buddhism may clarify the lines of distrinction among Buddhist schools and sect that is still a subject on which opinions differ, often heatedly.
Let me remind our readers that the scope of these volumes is limited to summaries of text that are of philosophical interest throughout, theoretical rather than practical in their intended function, and polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate. In the present volume these criteria have been interpreted broadly and loosely. Nevertheless, as in the volumes dealing with Vedanta, for example, where we summarize commentaries on the Upanisads but not those Upanisads themselves, in the present volume and the subsequent ones to appear dealing with Buddhism the original sutras, the earliest literature regularly ascribed to the Buddha or his immediate disciples, is not summarized, following the same lines of distinction.
The present volume confines itself to Abhidharma philosophical texts. It may well be that certain of the Prajnaparamita sutras had their origin at a time within the period covered here. However, since dating is quite unclear in such cases we have decided to take up those sutras in the next volume on Buddhism, where we shall discuss in greater detail the question of the dates and affiliation of the earliest Mahayana Buddhist materials.
The preparation of this volume was made possible in part by a grant from the Division of Research Programs of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent Federal agency. We acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the Endowment for this and subsequent volumes dealing with Buddhism, as well as for making possible acquisition of some of the summaries appearing in other volumes of our Encyclopedia. Thanks are also due to Smithsonian Institution for assistance relating to travel and maintenance for the General Editor while collecting some of the materials included herein, and to the American Institute for Indian Studies for their assistance like ways. Finally, the editorial team would like to express particular thanks to Collett Cox, who read the finished manuscript and made helpful suggestions, and to Laura Townsend, our faithful typist.
|Part One: Introduction|
|1||The Historical Buddha and His Teachings (Noble Ross Reat)||3|
|2||The Buddhist Way to Liberation (Karl H. Potter)||59|
|3||The Development of Abhidharma Philosophy [Ropbet E. Buswell, Jr. and Padmanabh S. Jaini]||73|
|4||A Few Early Abhidharma Categories [Karl H. Potter]||121|
|Part Two: Summaries of Works|
|1||Dhammasangani [K.H. Potter]||137|
|2||Vibhanga [K.H. Potter]||165|
|3||Dharmaskandha (Fred Greiner)||179|
|4||Puggalapannati [K.H. Potter]||189|
|5||Sangitiparyaya [Christian Lindtner]||205|
|7||Patisambhidamagga [James P. McDermott]||219|
|8||Kathavatthu [James P. McDermott]||265|
|9||Mahaniddesa [Grace G. Burford]||305|
|10||Culaniddesa [Grace G. Burford]||313|
|11||Sariputrabhidharmasastra [Shinyo Yoshimoto]||317|
|12||Yamaka [Karen C. Lang]||327|
|13||Patthana [K.H. Potter]||337|
|14||Dhatukaya [Robert E. Buswell, Jr.]||345|
|15||Dhatukatha [K.H. Potter]||359|
|17||Prakaranapada [Christian Lindtner]||375|
|18||Petakopadesa [George D. Bond]||381|
|19||Nettippakarana [George D. Bond]||403|
|20||Jnanaprasthana [Edwin Gerow and Karl H. Potter]||417|
|21||[Bhadnta] Dharmasri, Abhidharmahrdaya or Abhidharmsara [Charles Willemen]||451|
|22||Milindapanho [K.H. Potter]||471|
|23||Ghoska, Abhidharmamrta [Robert Kritzer]||489|
|24||Mahavibhasa [Shohei Ichimura with Kosho Kawamura, Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Collett Cox]||511|
|Glossary - Index||595|
The following volume constitutes the second in a series devoted to Buddhist philosophy. It takes up more or less where its predecessor, Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia, leaves off, around the beginning of the second century. This is a period still not will understood, with a great deal of scholarly disagreement remaining about many aspects of the history and thought of the period. The editor of the volume has tried to utilize the most up-to-date scholarship known to us.
The Volumes on Buddhist philosophy treat the subject altogether chronologically beginning with the Buddha and ending when Buddhist thought leaves India around 14th century. The purpose behind this approach is to avoid imposing more divisions into Buddhism than are historically apparent. The scope of these volumes is limited to summaries of the texts that are of philosophical interest throughout theoretical rather than practical in their intended function, and polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate. These criteria have been interpreted here broadly and loosely. In these volumes dealing with Buddhism the original Sutras, the earliest literature regularly ascribed to the Buddha or his immediate disciples, is not summarized.
The entire Encyclopedia has been planned to present as consistent an account as possible of the history of Indian philosophical thought, citing experts on the points that seem debatable.
The following Volume constitute the second in a series devoted to Buddhist philosophy. It takes up more or less where its predecessor, Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia leaves off around the beginning of the second century A.D. This is a period still not well understood with a good deal of scholarly disagreement remaining about many aspects of the history and thought of the period. As merely one example it remains a debated point whether there were on or two Vasubandhus, with respected scholars taking both sides of the issue. The Editor of the present Volume makes no claim to expertise on such issues. Where reputable scholars disagree it is difficult to know which way to turn when attempting to summarize the history and beliefs of the period. We have tried to utilize the most up-to-date scholarship known to us at the time of writing with full realization that tomorrow new evidence or better arguments may settle such issues definitively in the minds of scholars. When this happens the treatment here will evidently become out of date. Since given the plan of the entire Encyclopedia we are more or less committed to presenting as consistent an account as possible of the history of Indian philosophical thought, citing experts known to us on points that seem debatable.
It will be evident to the readers of what follows that there remains a good deals to be done in bringing to light the thought of the Buddhists of the present period. A Large number of texts are essentially unexplored by the scholarship in the Western world at least. The Editor of the present Volume being unable to read the languages of much excellent scholarship Chinese, Japanese and Russian and whose facility in European languages in halting has been forced to reply on publications in English for ht most part although he has tried to become acquainted with some of the material available in French and German. Furthermore he is not conversant with Tibetan the language in which quite a bit of Buddhist literature is primarily and in some cases solely available. Fortunately others have conveyed to the English-reading public some of the most important findings of those writing in other languages. Nevertheless these failings underline the point that our attempt here to deal with the scholarship on Indian philosophy has serious limitations and that improvements on it by those whose linguistic abilities are greater or who number more than the single person who has tried to put the present account together, are clearly called for.
Thanks are due to various sources of funding that helped make the present volume possible; in particular grants from the Smithsonian Institution the American Institute of Indian studies and the National Endowment for the Humanities contributed to the overall effort. We owe our gratitude to those scholars living and dead, whose understanding of the contents of the works summarized here is utilized. In particular I wish to thank Stefan Anacker and Christian Lindtner for their generous assistance and for helpful comments on sections of the manuscript, though they are in no way responsible for the mistakes that have inevitably crept into the results.
This the third Volume in this Encyclopedia to deal with Buddhist philosophy, takes the reader from the middle of the fourth century to the end of the sixth. Many of the authors and texts treated here are not well known to the casual student of Buddhism. The most important author is clearly Dignaga who is almost entirely responsible for turning Indian Buddhism toward an exhaustive analysis of epistemic considerations and in particular of inferential reasoning. But other authors whose works are summarized here deserve to be better known in particular the rival Yogacara commentators Buddhapalita and Bhavya, the latter of whom in particular introduces for the first time into Buddhism contrasts between the viewpoint of his particular brand of Buddhism and all the other system of contemporary India, and not just the Buddhists.
In the Preface of Volume VIII the previous volume of this Encyclopedia dealing with Buddhist philosophy, certain disclaimers were made by this Editor. These remarks concerning the limitations on our knowledge of the Buddhist authors and works and the shortcomings of the Editor's understanding of the material there surveyed apply like wise to material in the present Volumes, whose Editor is unfortunately the same person. I can only hope that some one more conversant with the languages and literature of Buddhist philosophy can be found to write the Introductions to the future Volumes.
This Volume like its predecessors, has been made possible in part by grant from various agencies: the American Institute of Indian studies, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Smithsonian Institute as well as the University of Washington. Many thanks to all. I should like particularly to thank Prof. Eli Franco for his needed last- minute corrections to the Introduction, some of which came unfortunately, though no fault of his, too late to incorporate into the final version published here an Dr. Christine Mullikin Keyt has as before provided invaluable aid in resolving many of the problems that have arisen during the preparation of the manuscript on my present computer and its predecessors.
The philosophy of Jainism is the subject of a large body of literature, but a great deal of it consists of standard summary reviews that are not sufficiently accurate to bring out the uniqueness of Jain thought. The core thesis of Jain philosophy is that of anekantavada, often rendered as "many-sidedness" for example. Such a rendering by itself fails to get to the unique contribution of the Jain positions, which is just that every serious account of the world contains elements of truth, but that any single linguistic expression must fail to comprehend all those partially true perspectives or viewpoints, not because those viewpoints are false, but because the complete truth is not consistently expressible in any natural language, since any such expression must necessarily involve contradictions. The Jain position leads to evident problems in assessing any of the philosophical thesis broached by a Jain-are we to take them as truth-claims, or as merely some among an indefinite incompatible ways of looking at the world? If the latter, how can the Jain saint have or gain knowledge-can he grasp collectively all the indefinite number of true theories? And if the former, what happens to the truths presumed to be contained in each of the incompatible alternative viewpoints? The works summarized in this Volume explore these questions and their possible answers.
I wish to begin by offering my profound thanks to Dalsukh Malvania, who over thirty years ago agreed to take on the onerous task of editing this first Volume of the Encyclopedia to be concerned with Jain philosophy. Unfortunately he was unable to complete the task, and Jay Soni has agreed to assist by writing the Introduction and providing expert advice. Shortcomings of this Volume should not, however, be ascribed to either Malvania or Soni; they are entirely my own.
Since it has recently been questioned, perhaps a word of explanation about the intended scope of coverage in Volumes of the Encyclopedia, which may go some way towards answering questions that may arise about the works chosen for summation in the present Volume. According to a policy that was announced in the very first edition of Volume One, the Bibliography is "intended to provide an account of works of Indian philosophical literature which are (1) of philosophical interest throughout; (2) theoretical rather than purely practical in their intended function, and (3) polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate." Readers of previous Volumes will appreciate that out of respect for those whose personal preference is for a given philosophical system I have refrained from using these strictures to preclude the appearance of favorite works which may not hew precisely to these three requirements. Some beloved works, for example, consist essentially of advice to the aspirant for liberation. To use the three requirements listed above to exclude such favored texts would have unduly offended those readers and made the Volume somewhat less useful to them. It seems thus wisest to exercise the policy stated above in a relaxed manner, enabling inclusion of borderline cases favored by the system's followers.
One or two words recapitulating my policies on a couple of matters. Standardization of translations of technical terms, which we have followed in this and previous Volumes, may cause the style of exposition to appear cramped and otherwise difficult to read; even possibly misleading renditions may occur in a few cases. The problem comes about as a result of the tension between two aims I have tried to follow, one to provide an accurate (although not always standard) rendition of the term where it occurs, and the other to use the same translation of the Sanskrit term throughout if this is at all possible. I apologize for any problems that may have been caused by my intentions in this matter.
In order to make the summaries less prolix I have followed a fairly strict policy in the present Volume (I have been working toward it in previous Volumes). The chosen English rendition of a technical Sanskrit term is given (in Sanskrit, not in Prakrit) at the first occurrence of that term. The Sanskrit term, and its chosen translation (or, in a limited number of cases, alternative translations) appear in the Glossary-Index, which should be used to remind the reader of the Sanskrit term, or range of terms, that is being rendered through the English word provided.
My thanks, once again, to Christine Keyt for her generous help in all sorts of matters having to do with this computer age, and for her assistance in making it possible to keep the Bibliography up to date and available through the Internet (at https://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter). Readers wishing to keep up with the literature on their favourite philosopher, school or topic are invited to avail themselves of this information.
What is Jainism? Jainism is a word derived from "Jaina" or "Jain", which in turn is derived from the Sanskrit word jina, literally meaning "conqueror". In the Jaina tradition a jina is a unique human being who, through severe ascetic discipline, has conquered, overcome or broken the bonds of the passions which bind one to worldly life and values, and who teaches the basic doctrine of nonviolence. A jaina or Jain is one who follows this and other teachings of a jina, and for the ascetics, being a Jain means one who strives to lead a lifestyle on the model of a jina. Since the life and teachings of a jina serve as a bridge or ford (tirtha) to cross over beyond the stream of worldly existences, a jina is also called a maker of such a ford, a tirthankara. The Prakrit term niggantha (nirgrantha in Sanskrit), literally "free from bonds," was originally used to designate such a person and the ascetics of the tradition.
Jainism as it has survived to this day is traced back to the life and teachings of the jina Mahavira (literally, the "Great Hero"), whose given name was Vardhamana. However, in the Jain tradition Mahavira is not the only jina and his position and significance has to be seen in the light of the Jain conception of time. Time is seen as a wheel which beginninglessly and endlessly rotates of its own accord. The wheel of time has twelve spokes which represent the different eras of time on a cosmological scale, each era being made up of thousands of years. The twelve eras are divided into two equal half-periods of the downward motion (apcsarpini) and the upward motion (utsarpini) of the wheel of time, with six eras in each. According to the tradition twenty-four jinas are born as human beings in each half period of cosmological time, in the third and fourth eras of each. In the present downward motion of the time-wheel Vrsabha was the first and Mahavira, who was a contemporary of Gautama Buddha, the last jina. Scholars ascribe undoubted historicity to Mahavira and his predecessor Parsva, the twenty-third jina, who lived about 250 years earlier. It is in this sense that Mahavira is not the founder of Jainism, but rather a reformer who based his life and teachings on those of his predecessor (e.g., adding one more "great vow" to Parsva's four for the ascetics). Unlike the Buddhist view that the Buddha set in motion the law of beings and things with his first sermon as recorded in the famous Dharmacakrapravartanasutra, the Jains believe that the law of beings and things is eternal and has always been so, with Mahavira resuscitating the basic doctrines of the tradition.
A moot question is: In what sense can persons like Mahavira (or the Buddha or the Upanisadic thinkers) be regarded as philosophers? Nothing of what Mahavira taught (as with the Buddha too) is available in his original words, his life and teachings being redacted finally by others into a canon several centuries after his death. Even Mahavira's dates are a matter of debate, although there is clear evidence that Mahavira was the Buddha's contemporary, sometime between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E. Mahavira can be regarded as a philosopher in the sense that his life, teachings, ideas and concepts moulded the philosophical activity of the thinkers in the tradition since then. Mahavira serves as a model not only for achieving the goal of enlightenment which he himself realized, the goal of nirvana or moksa which is common to Buddhism and Hinduism as well, but also as a model for insightful thinking about human nature, life and the world.
Everything that comes under the rubric of Jainism encompasses a vast area, because through the influence of. Mahavira and his teachings the Jains have made major contributions in all fields of learning ranging from philosophy to literature, from rules governing religious thought and practice to temple architecture. Jainism is an indigenous, inalienable and well represented part of Indian thought, of Indian art and literature, in short of Indian culture. This point is significant to note because, especially as far as the contribution of Jain philosophy is concerned, independent studies of specific themes are relatively few concerned to what has been done in Hinduism and Buddhism. Whereas it is impossible to deal with Jain philosophy in a vacuum and to fully comprehend its significance without recourse to corresponding developments in Buddhism and. Hinduism, the reverse is no less true. Several intricate philosophical problems remain obscure without an adequate understanding of Jain philosophy, e.g., the innumerable references to anekantavada, the famous doctrine of manifoldness, which is a small, albeit basic, part of Jain thought. One is led to ignore the fact that Jain philosophy has made other contributions apart from the syad- and naya-vada aspects of anekantavada, e.g., insightful deliberations concerning dravya, guna and paryaya (substance, quality and mode). This volume on Jainism will make it evident that throughout its history Jain thinkers have kept pace with equal developments in Buddhism and Hinduism.
Ontology and Metaphysics
Implicitly or explicitly, Jain thinkers trace back the inspiration for the source of their philosophical ideas ultimately to the essence of Mahavira's teachings, and the earliest sources for Mahavira’s ideas are the canonical works of the tradition, from which the thinkers drew. This is not the place to discuss the complex issue of the Jain canon. Suffice it to say that both the major groups of Jains, the Digambaras and the Svetambaras have groups of texts which they regarded as sacred because they contain Mahavira's basic teachings. These canonical works make laborious reading especially because of their repetitive nature (obviously based on an oral tradition); whatever is philosophically relevant in them has to be extracted out of a huge volume of material on a: wide range of topics, such as the conduct of the monks and nuns and general rules for ascetics. In other words, Mahavira's teachings are scattered over the canon in an unsystematic manner.
Whereas a systematic study of the philosophical elements in the works of the Jain canon is undoubtedly a fruitful undertaking, such a study will be a restricted endeavor insofar as one will be hard-pressed to link it to later philosophical activity. A case in point is anekantavada. This famous doctrine of manifoldness, often erroneously taken as a synonym for Jain philosophy as a whole, is based on Mahavira's method of seeing the truths concerning all objects of inquiry from particular standpoints or perspectives. Later thinkers developed this basic idea into an elaborated systematic theory in such a way that the link to the canonical works either becomes lost or is blurred. The case is similar to taking the works of Badarayana for Vedanta or Jaimini for Mimamsa as a source, instead of directly dealing with the Vedic texts for the development of the philosophy in the respective traditions. The question then is: are there comparable works in the Jaina tradition?
The first attempt to present Jain philosophy in the form of the classical Sanskrit sutras of the other schools of Indian philosophy was done by Umasvati (also called Umasvami) in his so-called pro-canonical work Tattvarthastra (also called Tattvarthadhigamasutra). Indeed, there have been early successful attempts to deal with Jain philosophy in a similar manner in the Prakrit language as well, for example, by Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divakara. There is no conclusive dating of these pioneer thinkers in the Jain tradition, the last of whom belonged to the fifth or sixth century CE. Summaries of their works are dealt with below in this volume; hence it is not necessary here to deal with Jain ontology arid metaphysics in detail in this Introduction. Rather, an attempt is being made here, with reference to Umasvati and Kundakunda, to deal with a basic problem related to these aspects of philosophy, namely, with the terms tattva and padartha which are used for both the basic ontological and the metaphysical categories. The first question is whether there are seven (Umasvati) or nine (Kundakunda) such categories.
This is the second Volume of this Encyclopedia devoted to Advaita Vedanta. It takes up the history of that movement from where Volume Three of this Encyclopedia left off, and covers the literature from Vacaspati Misra in the tenth century to Citsukha scholar from around the world both living and dead.
In the Introduction the Editor reviews a contentious issue among contemporary Advaita scholars concerning the accuracy of the interpretations of Samkara’s intensions found in the writings of the various schools (Bhamati, Vivarana, and Suresvara’s) that developed subsequent to Samkara’s lifetime.
Kari. H. Potter is professor of Philosophy and South Asian Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, and is General Editor of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.
In the Introduction to Volume Three of this Encyclopedia, where Advaita Vedanta philosophy prior to the times dealt with in the present Volume was reviewed, an attempt was made to characterize the basic tenets of Advaita (cf. pp. 6-7 of that Volume). To remind the reader, we repeat that list of Advaita propositions here:
1. The purpose of philosophy is to point the way to liberation (moksa) from the bondage of rebirth (samsara).
2. Bondage is a product of our ignorance (avidya): the true Self (atman) is not bound, does not transmigrate, is eternally liberated.
3. Bondage is beginningless and operates with regularity as long as ignorance is not removed.
4. Since bondage depends on ignorance, liberation is manifested upon the removal of ignorance by acquiring its opposite, namely knowledge (vidya).
5. The operation of ignorance consists in its creating apparent distinctions (bheda), though none actually exist.
6. Therefore, knowledge involves the awareness that all distinctions are false, especially the distinction between the knower and the known.
7. This awareness, which constitutes liberating knowledge, which is free from subject-object distinctions, is pure, immediate consciousness (cit, anubhava).
8. The true Self is just that pure consciousness, without which nothing can be known in any way.
9. And that true Self, pure consciousness, is not different from the ultimate world Principle, Brahman, because if Brahman were conceived as the object of Self-awareness it would involve subject-object distinction and as said above, differences are the product of ignorance.
10. The real is that which is not set aside as false, not sublated (badha), in contrast to products of ignorance, which are eventually sublated.
11. Assuming the above criterion of reality, it follows that Brahman (the true Self, pure consciousness) is the only Reality (sat), since It is untinged by difference, the mark of ignorance, and since It is the one thing that is not sublatable, for sublation itself depends on there being consciousness.
12. Pure consciousness is experienced during deep sleep; since we awake refreshed, it is inferred that pure consciousness (reality, Brahman, the true Self) is also the ultimate bliss.
By implication, all the philosophers whose works were summarized in Volume Three were assumed to hold views in accordance with those listed above. In particular, it was assumed that Samkara’s two most well-known students, Padmapada and Suresvara, accepted these twelve views. Furthermore, if the kind of Advaita Vedanta taken to be taught by Samkara consisted of these same twelve views, one would assume that later Advaitins who view themselves as followers of Samkara and adhere to his interpretations of the Upanisads would also accept these twelve views.
Nevertheless, one finds that, when we turn to development, classed as Advaitin, that take place over the next two or three centuries and which are now to be surveyed in the present Volume, the philosophers to be covered are constantly being Volume, the philosophers to be covered are constantly being classified by tradition and by Advaita scholars as being divided into two or three “post-Samkara schools”. The tenets ascribed to members of these several schools differ quite markedly from each other, and it will be the task of this Introduction to briefly review those differences and assess what they suggest about the development of Advaita during this period.
Readers of Volume Three will, it is hoped, recall that it was made quite clear there that Samkara’s views were not the only ones that flourished prior to the ninth century and made claim to representing the views promulgated in the Upanisads. For one thing, there were the traditional Purvamimamsakas who viewed the Vedas, including the Upanisads (=Vedanta) as consisting essentially of injunctions (vidhi; niyoga), so that the purport of the Vedic corpus consisted of advice to us as to how we should act. To be sure, they construed knowing as one kind of acting, so that on their account the Vedas no doubt told us how things are (i.e., what we should know), but the way in which they tell us this (so the Mimamsakas claim) is solely through providing authoritative commands guiding us to appropriate activity, including how to think correctly. In effect this reflects the ancient understanding of the Vedas as the authorless, beginningless authority governing the distinction between right and wrong as well as between true and false.
Secondly, there were various philosophers, most of whose writings have been lost (though some passages are available as quoted by others), who became known as “Bhedabhedavadins”, philosophers such as Bhartaprapanca, who preached a “combined-path” view, construing the Vedas and Upanisads as advising us how things are as well as how to act.
And thirdly, there were those, the Advaitins, who took the Vedas as providing knowledge, knowledge of principles such as the represented in the twelve-fold list given above. This third group included Samkara himself, but also included Mandana Misra, whose type of Advaita assumes, unlike Samkara’s, that even after liberation meditation (prasamkhyana) is still required for the liberated on to remove the remnants of his ignorance. (See Volume Three, pp. 47-61, for a review of some of the features of these distinct positions).
Secondly, there were various philosophers, most of whose writings have been lost (though some passages are available as quoted by others), who became known as “Bhedabhedavadins”, philosophers such as Bhartaprapanca, who preached a “combined-path” view, construing the Vedas and Upanisads as advising us how things are as well as how to act.
And thirdly, there were those, the Advaitins, who took the Vedas as providing knowledge, knowledge of principles such as are represented in the twelve-fold list given above. This third group included Samkara himself, but also included Mandana Misra, whose type of Advaita assumes, unlike Samkara’s, that even after liberation meditation (prasamkhyana) is still required for the liberated one to remove the remnants of his ignorance. (Seen Volume Three, pp. 47-61, for a review of some of the features of these distinct positions).
One might suppose that during the period to be surveyed in the present Volume some of the implications and influences of these several positions will continue to play a part, and indeed so it has been claimed in several cases which will be duly noted. Nevertheless, it is standardly assumed, first, that all the philosophers whose works will be surveyed in this Volume are members of the third group, and second, that their works constitute explanations and further development of Samkara’s position.
That last assumption has been questioned in recent times. A number of modern interpreters of Advaita have written passionately to the effect that the views of one of Samkara’s pupils, Padmapada, misinterpret Samkara and that only Suresvara (another of Samkara’s pupils) properly and correctly understands the master’s real position. Padmapada has come to be associated with the “post-Samkara school” known as the Vivarana School (named after the title of a commentary, Prakasatman’s Vivarana, on Padmapada’s Pancapadika). The Vivarana School is nowadays regularly counted as one of two (or three) post-Samkara “schools”, a second being the Bhamati school (named after the title of Vacaspati Misra’s commentary on Samkara’s Brahmasutrabhasya). It is not clear (to this writer at any rate) how far back into Advaita history this division of post-Samkara schools goes, or for that matter whether it properly consists of a twofold rather than a threefold distinction, with an unnamed “school”, stemming from Suresvara, counting as the third. In any case, such distinctions constitute a standard part of attempts to understand the history of the development of Advaita over of these “modern interpreters” of which I speak, only Suresvara interprets his teacher correctly. Since by and large the “Suresvara interpretation” is represented in the Advaita literature only by Suresvara and his (rather few) commentators, this means that these modern interpreters are implying that most Advaitins after Samkara’s time are confused and basically mistaken, and that 99% of the extant classical interpretive literature on Samkara’s philosophy if off the mark.
This is clearly a remarkably radical conclusion. Yet, there is good reason to think that it may well be true. Gertainly, doubts on that score are not out of place. In the remainder of the present Introduction we shall survey the innovative theses of Padmapada and Vacaspati Misra, the “founders” of the Vivarana and Bhamati schools respectively, and try to assess to what extent they depart from Samkara’s and/or Suresvar’s positions. In the curse of this we hope to review many of the most important, and in any case the most controversial, interpretations of the philosophers whose works are surveyed in the present Volume.
We take as our point of departure a section of V.N. Seshagiri Rao’s little book entitled Vacaspati’s Contribution to Advaita (Mysore 1984), of which Chapter VII concerns “Vacaspati’s Distinctive Contributions to Advaita”. As will be seen, Seshagiri Rao not only tells us which are Vacaspati’s contributions, but also which are the contrasting Vivarana school interpretations and, in some cases, what Samkara’s and Suresvara’s positions are on those topics as well.
“(1) According to Vacaspati, the locus (asraya) of avidya…is the individual self (jiva) and Brahman is its content (visaya). In maintaining this emphatic view, Vacaspati closely follows Mandana and parts company with Samkara who avoids asking the question.”
“This view on the problem of the locus of avidya…is opposed to the view of the Vivarana School which maintains that Brahman is both the locus and content of avidya. Both the Vivarana and Suresvara maintain that the jiva cannot be the content of avidya inasmuch as the former is a modification of avidya. To say that jiva is the locus of avidya, they point out, is to commit the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyonyasraya dosa). That is, without avidya its effect, viz. jiva, cannot be explained.
“Thus the Vivarana School does not admit any distinction between the locus (asraya) and the content (visaya) of avidya”.
“Both Mandana and Vacaspati do not agree with this view of the Vivarana School. There cannot be the defect of mutual dependence, they point out, as the series (viz., of jiva and avidya) is beginningless like that of the sprout and the seed (bijankura nyaya). In fact Mandana explains away this difficulty by pronouncing that since avidya is indeterminable, difficulty by pronouncing that since avidya is indeterminable, all inconsistencies become meaningful. Vacaspati here closely follows Mandana and replies to the objection with Mandana’s standard answer.”
“Thus Vacaspati and Mandana have shown that it is the jiva that is the locus of avidya and not Brahman, since from the standpoint of Brahman no avidya is possible. By no stretch of imagination could there be even a tinge of ignorance in Brahman - points out Vacaspati. He fights shy of such a position.”
“(ii) Further, according to Vacaspati, avidya differs from individual to individual. It is positive and specific to each jiva. In fact there are as many avidyas as there are jives. He thus believes in a plurality of even mula-avidyas. This is a remarkable view of Vacaspati that is opposed to the Vivarana School, which postulates only one avidya that is common to all the jives but has different modes or potencies (saktis) to bind the jiva.”
“Further, Vacaspati recognizes two kinds of avidya: (1) Mula avidya or primal ignorance (karana avidya) and (2) Tula avidya or derivative ignorance (karya avidya). Both are beginningless. If the derivative avidyas, in his view, are sublatable by cognition of the content to which they refer, the primal ignorance is removable only by the knowledge of the supreme reality.”
“As already said, the distinctive feature of Vacaspati’s version of Advaita is that he recognizes a plurality of even mulavidyas. This he postulates in order to show the distinction between the bound and the released and thus to avoid the paradox ‘ekamuktau sarvamukti prasangah’, which is the inevitable outcome of the avidyavada of the Vivarana School.”
“(iii) Again, if avacchedavada is Vacaspati’s most advanced and pet theory, pratibimbavada is advocated by the Vivarana school to the exclusion of avacchedavada.
“(iv) If the Bhamati school advocates a plurality of jives through its postulation of many avidyas, the Vivarana school moves to reconcile the plurality of the jives with the singleness of avidya by postulating many powers (sakti) for the one and the only one avidya.”
“(v) If the Bhamati school advocates a plurality of jives through its postulation of many avidyas, the Vivarana school moves to reconcile the plurality of the jives with the singleness of avidya by postulating many powers (sakti) for the one and the only one avidya.”
“(v) Again the views of the two school on sabda or Vedic testimony differ from each other. The questions that raise their heads here are: Is sabda or testimony (sruti) an instrument of knowledge? If so, what is the nature of the knowledge arising from sabda? If sruti is an instrument of knowledge, is it a direct or an indirect instrument? What is its place and significance?”
“Vacaspati’s view is that sabda…gives only indirect and mediate knowledge. It is to be made direct and immediate through constant practice of rational contemplation (manana) and meditation (nididhyasana) which is the direct cause of realisation. This view is technically termed ‘”rasamkhyana” which is fully upheld by Mandana and Vacaspati. Thus according to Vacaspati the knowledge arising out of the Upanishadic texts like ‘tattvamasi’ is indirect and mediate…Vacaspati is of the view that when sastrajnana (repeated reflection on, e.g., “I am Brahman (Aham Brahmasmi) is continued relentlessly it ends up in self-realisation and this experience of the self removes all avidya.”
“The knowledge of reality obtained from the sruti according to Vacaspati is thus not a direct realisation of it but indirect cognition. This has to be strengthened and intensified through incessant practice of meditation if it is to lead to Brahman-realization.”
“Thus for the school of Mandana and Vacaspati the internal organ (manas) is a sense-organ. It intuits the Real aided by knowledge gained through Vedic testimony (sabda) and reasoning thereon. It generates in the conditioned self the immediate psychosis of “I”, resulting in direct perception (pratyaksa) of the self. Thus, according to Vacaspati nididhyasana is the principal organum of the knowledge of self whereas sravana and manana are secondary.
“The Bhamati school thus holds that ‘the final intuition cannot be effective in destroying ignorance which is immediate unless it is itself immediate, that the immediacy can come only from the functioning of a sense organ, and that this sense organ is the mind.”
“This view of Vacaspati is diametrically opposed to the view of the Vivarana School, according to which sravana is the principal incentive towards the realisation of Atman and manana and nididhyasana are subservient to it (phalopakaryanga). The manana and nididhyasana, in other words, only effect the concentration of the mind. The mind is not an instrument here for the realisation of Brahman. And the Vivarana would simply quote the Chandogya sruti, which says Vivarana would simply quote the Chandogya sruti, which says that by mere instruction immediate knowledge is effected.”
“To this view of the Vivarana Vacaspati would react by saying that the intuition (‘thou art the tenth’) results only from the sense organ as aided by that statement. The statement ‘thou art the tenth’ produces no intuition except through the mind. The cognition remains mediate because of the nature of the instrument (verbal testimony) and is not delusive.”
“(vi) For the Bhamati school manas, as already said, is a sense organ (indriya) and it is a percept of the witness (saksin). The knowledge of happiness, misery, etc. are valid since they are generated by the manas which is a sense organ. In general, according to Vacaspati, all sense-generated awareness is valid. Vacaspati’s argument is that manas is the instrument for internal perception and therefore it is a sense organ. When it transcends the finest, it enjoys the state of transcendental reality. Vacaspati as already noted rejects the view that the Upanishadic texts can directly produce intuitive insight. On the other hand, he emphasizes the need for contemplation or nididhyasana. Manas for him, is a sense organ and knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajnana) arises through manas. But on this account, it should not be interpreted that Brahmajnana is mental awareness, as Brahman according to Vacaspati is not the content of the mind that is impure. Brahman, on the other hand, is the content of the vrtti that removes the obscuration of ignorance. Thus according to Vacaspati pure manas (vrtti that removes the obscurations of ignorance) originates Brahman-knowledge. It is the instrument in giving rise to the knowledge. It is the instrument in giving rise to the knowledge of the identity of Atman and Brahman.”
“But Padmapada points to the possibility of one’s being aware of oneself without the instrumentation of mind. In the view of the Vivarana, immediate cognition many result even from virbal testimony without the functioning of a sense organ, internal or external, and…the mind is not a sense organ. Padmapada argues that consciousness itself is of the nature of illumination, it does not need mind to illuminate it, even as one lamp does not need another lamp to show it. Thus for the Vivarana manas is not a sense organ…”
“But according to the Vavarana school pure Brahman, unenveloped by any adjunct (upadhi) is an object of a mental awareness (mavnovrtti). That is, it is the nondelimited Brahman that is the object of akhandakaravrtti.”
“Vacaspati does not accept this. According to him, pure Brahman cannot be the content of any awareness. If is self-effulgent. The conditioned Brahman alone is the content of realization…”
“(viii) Again, there is a difference between the Bhamati and the Vivarana schools with regard to the discussion whether or not the Upanishadic pronouncement “The self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and contemplated thereon’ constitutes an injunction (vidhi). According to the Vivarana school self-realisation, the ultimate aim of life, is possible only through such an injunction (to see, hear, reflect, i.e., to study)..It is at the root of studying and understanding the Vedanta.”
“But Vacaspati is of the view that hearing, thinking and contemplating are not the contents of any injunction, but are only objects of factual statement (vihitanuvadaka). These belong to the realm of pure knowledge (jnana) which is completely devoid of any injunctive force. Vacaspati goes on to say that knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of it are fulfilled, and for this no injunction is necessary. Thus seeing, hearing and reflecting only indirectly show us the path of self-realization; they are not injunctions…”
In the passage quoted Seshagiri Rao has identified eight different points on which the Vivarana and the Bhamati schools differ. Although he does not explore the question of Samkara’s and Suresvara’s position on these points, we may make an attempt while summarizing Rao’s findings. In what follows, S stands for Furesvara’s position, V for the Vivarana interpretation, and B for the Bhamati reading.
1. On the question whether Brahman is the locus, the content, or both of ignorance: V says that Brahman is both the locus and the content of ignorance. B says that Brahman is the content of ignorance, but that the self (jiva) is the locus of ignorance. The position of S is that Brahman isn’t a kind of thing that can or cannot be a locus.
2. On the question: how many primary (mula-) ignorances are there?, B says that there are many primary ignorances, at least one for each self. V says that there are many selves, but only one primary ignorance. And S says again that, since ignorance is not a thing at all, the question doesn’t arise.
3. On the question: How can the one Brahman cause many things? B says that it is just as space causes the space in a pot, since the pot-space is a part (avaccheda) of space. V. says that as the thing reflected in a mirror causes its reflection (pratibimba), though it is not different from its reflection. And S says that Brahman doesn’t really cause anything (although S was the first to suggest the above and other analogies intended to explain the appearance of Brahman being a cause).
4. On the question: How many powers (sakti) are there for a self? B says that the only “power” of a self is just the ignorance(s) it has. V says that the one, primary ignorance has many powers (pertaining to the difference selves). And for S the question doesn’t arise.
5. On the question: What is the relation between the understanding gained through studying scriptural passages (srutijnana) and the gaining of liberation?, V and S say that srutijnana is the direct (aparoksa), immediate and primary means for gaining liberation, since through it one directly cognizes Brahman. Thus one can gain liberation while still living. B says that srutijnana is only an indirect (paroksa) means, since even after realization one must still meditate (prasamkhyana). Thus, liberation while living is impossible, since meditation is still required until one’s final demise.
6. On the question: Is the mind (manas) a sense-organ? B says yes, V says no, and S responds (in effect) “Who cares?”
7. On the question: Can one cognize pure Brahman (=Brahman without conditions (nirupadhikabrahman)) in liberation? V answers yes, pure Brahman can be a content of a mental activity (manovrttijnana), e.g., in deep sleep. B and S, however, say no, pure Brahman is not a content of any awareness; only conditioned Brahman can be cognized. In deep sleep one does not cognize anything.
8. On the question: Do the Upanisads enjoin listening, considering, reflecting (sravana, manana, nididhyasana)? V answers yes, the Upanisads contain injunctions (vidhi) to do so. B and S, however, say no, they are not enjoined there, though they are referred to.
9. On the question: Can action (karman) be conducive to desiring understanding (vividisa)? Vanswers yes and adds that action can be conducive not only to the desire to understand but to the arising of understanding (vidyotpada) itself. B and S also answer yes, but differ from V in that they hold actions not to be conducive to the arising of understanding-that comes from knowledge only.
Reflection on these points of difference suggests that the understanding of both the Vivarana and the Bhamati “schools” deviates from Samkara’s (and Suresvara’s) account in fundamental ways. But one must also note that the number of issues with regard to which the Bhamati (B) agrees with Samkara as interpreted by Suresvara (S) outweighs the number where the Vivarana (V) opinion accords with (S). This suggests that there is a fundamental aspect of the Vivarana viewpoint over which it differs from the viewpoint of the Bhamati, and that this aspect is at the heart of the discrepancies noted in our list. This aspect is important enough to be pertinent to the claims of the “modern interpreters” That Padmapada is the source of misunderstanding the proper Advaita position-that proper position being the position of Samkara as understood by Suresvara.
|Part One: Introduction||3|
|Part Two: Summaries of Works|
|1||Vacaspati Misra (940), Brahmasutrabhasya-Bhamati||33|
|2||Ananyanubhavananda (945), Atmatattva||72|
|3||(Nitya) Bodhaghana (945)||72|
|4||Vimuktatman (1000), Istasiddhi||73|
|5||Jnanaghana (1000), Tattva (pari)suddhi||163|
|6||Prakasatman (1000), Pancapadika-Vivarana||405|
|9||Sarvajnatman (1027), Samksepasariraka||436|
|11||Uvatacarya (1060), Isavasyopanisad-Bhasya||511|
|12||Samkhapani (1070), Brahmasiddhi-Vyakhya||511|
|13||Isvaratirtha (1140), Satasloki||511|
|14||Anandabodha (1150), Nyayamakaranda||512|
|18||Gangadhara (1167), Advaitasataka||547|
|19||Sriharsa (1170), Khandanakhandakhadya||557|
|20||Gaudesvara Jnanottama (1175), Jnanasiddhi||583|
|22||Anandanubhava (1190), Nyayaratnadipavali||583|
|27||Jnanottama Misra (1190), Istasiddhi-Vivarana||593|
|29||Jnanottama Bhattaraka (1190), BSBhasya-Vidyasri||601|
|30||Uttamajnana Yati (1200), Tattvasuddhi-Tippana||601|
|32||Citsukha (1220), Adhikaranamanjari||602|
|37||Citsukha, Naiskarmyasiddhi-(Bhava) Tattvaprakasika||606|
|41||Citsukha, Citsukhi or Tattvadipika||607|
|Glossary - Index||709|
The Volume Yoga: India’s Philosophy of Meditation, traces the intellectual history of Patanjala Yoga philosophy from the early centuries of the Common Era through the twentieth century. This volume also provides a systematic discussion of the philosophy of classical Yoga. Particular attention is given to the meaning of “concentration” (samadhi), “engrossment” (samapatti) and the “extraordinary cognitive capacities” (vibhutis, siddhis) and the role that these notions play in the Yoga philosophy, which are relevant for issues currently under discussion in contemporary western philosophy of mind. The volume as well compares and contrasts classical yoga philosophy with classical Samkhya and with Indian Buddhist thought. Although the primary focus of the volume is on Patanjala Yoga, the system of Hatha Yoga and other satellite systems of Yoga are discussed as well, and an attempt is made to differentiate clearly the classical system of Yoga Sastra from Hatha Yoga and the other satellite systems.
Some twenty-eight Sanskrit texts of Patanjala Yoga are summarized or noted in the volume. Twenty-six volumes of Hatha Yoga and the texts of some other satellite systems are also included. Altogether the volume contains summaries and or notations for some seventy-five Sanskrit texts.
Gerald James Larson is Rabindranath Tagore Professor Emeritus, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA, and Professor Emeritus, Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Ramshankar Bhattacharya was editor of the journal, Purana, and for many years a member of the research division of the Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi.
There has been a long period of time between the publication of the Samkhya volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Volume IV) in 1987 and this sequel on Yoga. Nevertheless, in our view, the two volumes are best used in tandem, since Patanjala Yoga as a philosophical tradition is unintelligible without the Samkhya ontology and epistemology. As may be recalled from our earlier Samkhya volume, we are inclined to go even further and to claim that Yoga as a philosophical tradition is a particular form of Samkhya, namely Patanjala-Samkhya. The expression “…as a philosophical tradition,” of course, is a fundamental caveat, and this will be discussed at some length in the Introduction. It will be shown that although Yoga and Samkhya are by no means identical and that there are significant differences in the classical formulation of each system, the family resemblance is so striking that it is impossible to discuss one system apart from the other.
I deeply regret that Dr. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya’s untimely death kept him from composing the Introduction to this volume on Yoga. He very much wanted to do the Introduction, since he viewed the philosophy of Yoga as an area of his primary scholarly interest through the years. His great erudition is to be found in his many critical editions of the Sanskrit texts of Yoga in the medium of Sanskrit. Also he wrote at least a brief summary of his views on Yoga in the medium of English in his book, An Introduction to the Yogasutra, already mentioned above in the foregoing In Memoriam.
Two additional acknowledgment are also necessary. First, varieties of Yoga have become popular throughout the world, and this volume on Yoga of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, if for no other reason than providing a summary overview, should at least touch upon these popular traditions. I would like to thank Ms. Autumn Jacobsen, a doctoral student in Religious Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, who wrote the final portion of the Introduction to this Volume, namely the section entitled “Contemporary Yoga Traditions”.
Second, thanks to Richa Pauranik Clements, my doctoral student at Indiana University, Bloomington, who assisted me in the editing of many of the summaries. The bibliography on Yoga, of course, is vast, and we had to make difficult decisions about what to include and what not to include, both in terms of primary and secondary works. We hope that our selection, if not exhaustive, is at least representative of the most important texts. Also, it should be noted that we have divided the texts into two main groups, the Patanjala Yoga texts and what we have called “The Hatha Yoga System and Other Satellite Traditions of Yoga”. The dating of texts in the later centuries, of course, is nearly an impossible task, and it should be recognized that our attempts at dating are almost all only rough approximations.
|In Memoriam -Dr. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (1927-1996)|
|Part One: The Philosophy of Yoga|
|The History and Literature of Yoga|
|The History of Yoga: Preliminary Remarks||21|
|Historiography on Yoga||30|
|Early “samkhya” and “yoga”||33|
|Samkhya and Yoga as System of Thought||36|
|Samkhya, “sastitantra”, Varsaganya and Isvarakrsna||37|
|Samkhya and Vindhyavasin||37|
|Vindhyavasin and Vasubandhu||39|
|Vindhyavasin and Vedavyasa||40|
|Yoga, Samkhya and Buddhist Thought||42|
|Yoga as a Hybrid System of Thought||44|
|Yoga and Samkhya: The Important Differences||46|
|Chronology of Yoga Philosophy-Principal Texts through Vijnanabhiksu||52|
|Composition of the Yogasutra and the Identity of Patanjali||54|
|Concluding Comments on the History of Yoga||67|
|The Philosophy of Patanjala Yoga|
|The Philosophy of Yoga: Some Preliminary Methodological Remarks||70|
|The Philosophy of Yoga: An Introductory Overview||75|
|The Materialism of Yoga||78|
|The Dualism of Yoga||86|
|The Theism of Yoga||92|
|The Yoga of Action (kriyayoga), and the Limbs of Yoga (yoganga)||116|
|Comprehensive Reflection (samyama) and the Extraordinary Cognitive Capacities (vibhuti, siddhi)||120|
|Spiritual Liberation (kaivalya)||133|
|The Hatha Yoga System and Other Satellite/Sectarian Yoga Traditions in India|
|Natha Siddhas, Kanphata Yogis, and the Kaula Cult||146|
|Contemporary Yoga Movements (by Autumn Jacobsen)|
|The Yoga Tradition of the Mysore Palace||148|
|Self-Realization Fellowship or Kriya Yoga||156|
|White Lotus Yoga||159|
|Part Two: Summaries of Works|
|Texts: Patanjala Yoga Traditions|
|1. Patanjalayogasastra (Yogasutras, attributed to Patanjali) (c. 350-400)||161|
|2. Patanjalayogasastrabhasya (Samkhyapravacana, attributed to Vedavyasa) (c.350-400)||184|
|3. Tattvavaisaradi of Vacaspati Misra (c. 950)||218|
|4. Patanjalayogasastravivarana or Patanjalayogasutra-bhasyavivarana, attributed to Samkara Bhagavatpada (c. 1050-1350)||239|
|5. Kitab Patanjala or “The Book of Patanjali” of al-Biruni (c. 1050)||261|
|6. Rajamartanda of Bhojadeva or Bhojaraja (c. 1050)||266|
|7. Sarvadarsanasamgraha of Sayana Madhava (c. 1350)||282|
|8. Maniprabha of Rarmananda Yati or Ramananda Sarasvati (c.1550-1600)||282|
|9. Patanjalarahasya of Raghavananda Sarasvati (c.1550-1600)||294|
|10. Yagavarttika of Vijnanabhiksu (c. 1550)||295|
|11. Yogasarasamgraha of Vijnanabhiksu (c.1550)||320|
|12. Pradipika of Bhavaganesa (c.1600-1700)||333|
|13. Yogasiddhantacandrika of Naraya Tirtha (c.1600-1700)||334|
|14. Sutrarthabodhini of Narayana Tirth (c.1600-1750)||353|
|15. Brhativrtti of Narayana Tirtha (c.1600-1700)||353|
|16. Laghuvrtti of Nagoji Bhatta or Nagesa (c.1700-1750)||355|
|17. Yogasudhakara of Sadasivendra Sarasvati (c. 1700-1800)||356|
|18. Yogacandrika of Anantadeva Pandita (c. 1800-1900)||359|
|19. Rajayogabhasya of Samkaracarya (c.1890s)||361|
|20. Yogabhasya of Balarama Udasina (c. 1890s)||366|
|21. Vaidikavrtti of Svamin Hariprasada (c. 20th century)||367|
|22. Sivoktayogayukti of Hariharananda Aranya (c. 20th century)||367|
|23. Paribhakti of Hariharananda Aranya (c. 20th century)||369|
|24. Yogakarika of Hariharananda Aranya (c. 20th century)||372|
|25. Bhasvati of Hariharananda Aranya (c. 20th century)||379|
|26. Yogapradipika of Baladeva Misra (c. 20th century)||396|
|27. Kirana of Krsnavallabhacarya (c. 20th century)||403|
|28. Jnananandabhasya of Jnanananda (c. 20th century)||406|
|TEXTS: The Hatha Yoga System and Other Satellite Traditions of Yoga|
|29. Kaulajnananirnaya, attributed to Matsyendranatha (c. 900-950)||436|
|30. Siddhasiddhantapaddhati, attributed to Goraksanatha (c. 100-1250)|
|31. Goraksasataka, attributed to Goraksanatha (c. 1200-1250)||455|
|32. Goraksapaddhati attributed to Goraksanatha (c. 1000-1250)||464|
|33. Yogabija, attributed to Goraksanatha (c.100-1250)||464|
|34. Goraksasiddhantasamgraha, author unknown||470|
|35. Siddhasiddhantapaddhati of Nityanatha (c.1000-1400)||476|
|36. Yogayajnavalkya, author unknown (c.1200-1300)||476|
|37. Hathayogapradipika of Svatmarama Yogin (c.1350-1400)||489|
|38. Gherandasamhita, author unknown (c.1650-1700)||502|
|39. Sivasamhita, author unknown (c.1650-1700)||506|
|40. Satcakranirupana (6th chapter of Purnananda’s Sritattvacintamani) (c.1600-1700)||516|
|41. Vasisisthasamhita, author unknown (c.160-1700)||521|
|42. Satkarmasamgraha of Cidghananandanatha (c. 600-1700)||521|
|43. Hatharatnavali of Srinivasabhatta (c. 1600-1700)|
|44. Hathasamketacandrika of Sundaradeva (c. 1850)||526|
|45. Hathatattvakaumudi of Sundaradeva (c. 1850)||531|
|46. Yogacintamani of Sivananda (c. 1850)||535|
|47. Yogataranga of Devatirthasvamin (c. 1855)||543|
|48. Jyotsna of Brahmananda (c. 1850-1900)||547|
|49. Yogakarnika of Aghoranandanatha (c. 1905)||560|
|50.Yogarahasya of Satyadeva (c. 1920)||561|
|51. Brhadyogiyajnavalkya, author unknown (20th century)||568|
|52. Yogataravali of Samkaracarya (c. 20th century)||574|
|53. Pavanavijayasvarodaya, author unknown (c. 20th century)||576|
|54. Uttaragita, author unknown (. 20th century)||583|
|Appendix: Some additional texts|
|55. Yogavasistha, author unknown (c. 10th century)||589|
|Yoga Upanisads (1200-1600)|
|List of Work Cited||641|
In this Volume the history of Nyaya-Vaisesika is resumed from Volume Six of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Series and brought up to the time of Gadadhara (ca. 1660). This is the period of the great subcommentators (Jagadisa, Mathuranatha, Gadadhara) on Raghunatha Siromani’s Tattva-cintamanididhiti, the culmination of some of the most intricate philosophical analysis the world has ever known. Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has in his extensive Introduction provided a thorough explanation of the basic style and content of these sub-commentators, along with a readable account of many of the main topics discussed in these works. His Introduction is followed by analyses of some of the chapters of these subcommentaries, provided by those few Indian scholars of recent times able to command the difficulties their interpretation poses. These summaries can be consulted for an initial acquaintance with the topics covered, free from the intricacies of the subcommentaries.
|List of Contributors||5|
|In Memoriam: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya||21|
|Part One: Introduction (Sibajiban Bhattacharyya)||3|
|A. Substance in General||35|
|B. The Individual Self||36|
|D. Space and Time||40|
|F. The Concept of Cause||45|
|G. Theory of Causation||48|
|H. Theory of Universals||54|
|(1) Technique of Forming Abstracts||56|
|(2) Abstracts of Compound Words||61|
|(3) Higher Order Abstracts||62|
|J. Theory of Definition||67|
|(1) The First Type of Definition||69|
|(2) The Second Type of Definition||76|
|(3) Relation between Two Types of Defining Marks||77|
|(4) Some Special Features of Navya-Nyaya Theory||79|
|(5) The Technique of Expressing Universality||83|
|K. Some Terms of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyaya||86|
|(2) The Navya-Nyaya Theory||88|
|(3) The Navya-Nyaya Technique||89|
|(4) The Concept of Limiter||90|
|B. Nature of Cognition||106|
|C. Duration of Cognitive Mental States||107|
|(1) Three Moments of a Cognitive Act||107|
|(2) Relation between an Act and a Disposition||108|
|(3) Relation between Acts||109|
|(a) Psychological Relations||109|
|(b) Epistemic Relations||110|
|D. Classification of Cognitions||115|
|E. Some Ontological Remarks||116|
|(1) Collective and Abstract Terms||116|
|(3) Kinds of Perception||119|
|(a) Construction-Free Perception||119|
|(b) Construction-Filled Perception||120|
|(c) Special Perception||122|
|(d) Cognition of Qualified Qualification||126|
|III.||Theory of Inference||129|
|A. Structure of Inference||132|
|(1) Pervasion and Generalization||136|
|(2) The Possibility of the Psychological Process of Generalization||137|
|(a) The Purva-Mimamsa Theory||137|
|(b) The Navya-Nyaya Theory||138|
|(c) The Navya-Nyaya Theory of Tarka||139|
|(d) The Carvaka Theory||143|
|(e) Cognition by Comparison (upamiti)||144|
|IV.||Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyaya Theory of Language||145|
|A. Concept of Language||145|
|B. Navya-Nyaya Theory of Language||148|
|C. Sanskrit as the Object Language||149|
|D. Divine Origin of Language||151|
|E. Theories of Language-Learning and Theories of Meaning||153|
|F. Language as Means of Communication||153|
|G. Ontology of Spoken Sentences||154|
|H. An Ontological Problem Concerning Meaning||157|
|I. The Navya-Nyaya Theory of Meaning||160|
|J. The Navya-Nyaya Theory of Word-Meaning||161|
|K. The Import of Sentences||164|
|L. Cognition of Sentence-Meaning||165|
|M. Jagadisa’s Theory of Words Occuring in a Sentence||169|
|N. Gadadhara’s Theory of Word-Meanings||170|
|O. Gadadhara’s Theory of Anaphora||173|
|Part Two: Summaries of Works (Arranged Chronologically)||179|
|1. Madhava Sarasvati (1515)||181|
|2. (Pundarikaksa) Vidyasagara (1520)||185|
|3. Damodara Thakkura (1520)||186|
|4. Kesava Misra Tarkacarya (1525)||186|
|5. Visvakarman (1525)||187|
|6. Narayana Bhatta (1530)||192|
|7. Haridasa Nyayalamkara Bhattacarya||192|
|8. Balabhadra Misra (1530)||194|
|9. Raghupati Misra (1535)||196|
|10. Bhagiratha or Megha Thakkura||196|
|11. Devanatha Thakkura Tarkapancanana (1540)||207|
|12. Janakinatha Cudamani Bhattacarya (1540)||208|
|13. Madhava Bhatta (Somayajin) (1540)||217|
|14. Mahesa Thakkura (1545)||217|
|15. Madhusudana Thakkura (1545)||217|
|16. Durgadatta Misra (1550)||218|
|17. Madhava Misra (1550)||218|
|18. Vamesvara or Vamadhvaja (1550)||219|
|19. Krsnamisra (1550)||220|
|20. Candisvara (1550)||222|
|21. Kanada Tarkavagisa (1560)||222|
|22. (Vacaka) Gunaratna (1570)||224|
|23. Ramakrsna Bhattacarya Cakravartin (1570)||225|
|24. Rajacudamani Diksita (1570)||226|
|25. Krsnadasa Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya (1570)||230|
|26. Raghava Pancanana (1570)||268|
|27. Ananta Bhatta (1570)||269|
|28. Ramabhadra Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya (1570)||269|
|29. Visvanatha Tirtha (1570)||275|
|30. Bhaskara (1570)||275|
|31. Padmanabha Misra (1578)||276|
|32. Govardhana Misra (1580)||291|
|33. Madhava Misra (1590)||294|
|34. Gunananda Vidyavagisa Bhattacharya (1590)||294|
|35. Gopinatha Thakkura (1590)||297|
|36. Yallayarya (1590)||298|
|37. Bhavanada Siddhantavagisa (1600)||299|
|38. Vidyanivasa Bhattacarya (1600)||301|
|39. Kesava Bhatta (1600)||301|
|40. Yadavacarya (1600)||303|
|41. Krsnadeva Sanmisra (1605)||307|
|42. Subhavijaya Gani (1607)||308|
|43. Visvanatha (1610)||308|
|44. (Bhava) Ganesa Diksita (1610)||309|
|45. Dharmarajadhvarindra (1615)||309|
|46. Annambhatta (1620)||310|
|47. Rama Tarkalamkara (1620)||340|
|48. Kaundinya Diksita (1620)||341|
|49. Jayarama Nyayapancanana (1620)||341|
|50. Rudra Nyayavacaspati Tarkavagisa (1625)||343|
|51. Jagadisa (Misra) Bhattacarya (1630)||344|
|52. Agnihotra Bhatta (1630)||390|
|53. Ramanuja Diksita (1630)||390|
|54. Harirama Tarkavagisa (1635)||390|
|55. Visvanatha Nyayasiddhanta Pancanana (1635)||419|
|56. Gaurikanta Sarvabhanuma Bhattacharya (1635)||420|
|57. Kaunda Bhatta (1640)||424|
|58. Pedda Diksita (1645)||425|
|59. Murari Bhatta (1645)||426|
|60. Ramakrsna Adhvarindra (1650)||426|
|61. Bhavadeva (1650)||430|
|62. Gopinatha Maunin (1650)||431|
|63. Mathuranatha Tarkavagisa (1650)||432|
|64. Govindachandra Bhattacharya (Cakravartin) (1655)||488|
|65. Raghudeva Nyayalamkara Bhattacarya (1657)||489|
|66. Prahlada Krsnacarya (1660)||501|
|67. Author Unknown (1660)||502|
|68. Raghunatha (1660)||503|
|69. Srikantha Diksita (1660)||504|
|70. Gadadhara Bhattacharya Cakravartin (1660)||504|
|Book One: Perception||507|
|Book Two: Inference||508|
|Book Three: Comparison||532|
|Book Four: Verbal Testimony||532|
|Glossary - Index||591|
Covering Jaina Philosophy from where Volume Ten left off toward the end of the tenth Century this Volume covers 355 woks of 99 Jain philosophers who lived between 1000 and 1300 A.D he of a number of a number of famous Jaina authors are covered in the list along with summaries of many of their works.
Piotr Balcerowicz on the Jaina theory viewpoints or perspective (Naya) which introduces this Volume shows how that theory. Set forth in the famous account of seven fold predication (Saptapadarthi) avoids skepticism contradiction or violation of the law of excluded middle while presenting a plausible if complex way of gauging reality.
The most significant and intriguing Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical heritage is beyond doubt the theory of the multiple aspects of reality (Anekantavada) which is developed into a method of four standpoints (Niksepa, nyasa), of sevenfold modal description (saptabhangi syadvada), and the doctrine of viewpoints (naya), i.e., the sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications. At the same time no other Jaina concept has fanned so much controversy as the idea that one and the same sentence can be either true or false, which seems implied by the admission of the reality of these multiple aspects
An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiple aspects of reality in general and the doctrine of viewpoints in particular consists in a belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts of the real ranging from monism and eternalism (Advaita) to pluralism and momentariness tksanikavada), In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and interdependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various standpoints. The ontological framework is provided by the concept of substance (Dravya), which is characterized simultaneously by origination, continued existence and annihilation, insofar as it is endowed with qualities (gu1).a) and transient modes (Paryaya) as well as with directly experienced though verbally inexpressible momentary occurrences. Any truth-conducive analysis which is supposed to map the ontological structure onto an epistemological- conceptual framework should therefore take into account the individual ontological context and accompanying circumstances of any phenomenon or entity under examination.
This ontological assumption requires that truth should only be complete truth whereas incomplete truth would be but a misnomer for utter falsehood However limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from all its temporal spatial causal and other relations and emphasize but one aspect relevant to a given moment.
Due to the infinite manifoldness of interdependencies of aspects of the word, including various temporal and spatial perspectives as well as either as either universal or particular reference a vast ranges of Properties each of them being equally justified can be predicated of a given entity with equal right And that will lead eventually to seeming contradiction. The Jainas maintain that such contradictions that ensue from unconditional assertions standing in opposition to one another can be resolved when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration.
Given The Jains ontological assumption description of the epistemological level be complex each of such dichotomizing categories as big/ small Good /bad existent/ nonexistent true/ false etc. that are mutually related when dissociated from its opposite is false In other words each automatically entails its opposite but the model is not dialectical but rather assumes that there are multiple standpoints from which each category may be pertinent To correlate such individual partial standpoints is the task of the Jaina method of syadvada which systematizes possible arrangements of seemingly contradictory statements.
Interestingly enough, it is the model of perspectives (Naya) which the Jainas use to interpret and incorporate various philosophical theories or world views into a consistent holistic framework, instead of the doctrine of seven fold modal description (saptabhangi, syadvada). Numerous Jaina authors such as Akalanka, Siddhasena Divakara, Siddhasena Maharnati, and Mallisena correlated particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools only under the Naya scheme.
On the other hand, the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (saptabhangi) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of origination, continuation and decay, that of the relation between the. universal and the particular, and that of the relationship between a substance and its properties/modes. Essentially, all the examples of the application of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change
Due to multifaceted circumstances, any assertor sentence can only be relatively true Therefore all viewpoints with no exceptions are false views when strictly] related to their respective spheres (Paksa) however when understood] as mutually dependent, they become viewpoints conducive to truth Siddhasena, Divakara, Sanmatiprakarana 1.21 This relativity however, is not tantamount to professing skepticism and the Jainas are quite explicit about that The possibility of attaining truth is ensured jointly by the concept of comprehensive and consistence-based cognitive criteria (Pramana) and partial, aspect-qualified viewpoints as instrument of detailed examination. However, the existence of truth as such and the possibility that it can become the content (Visaya) of cognition is eventually warranted, according to Jaina belief, by omniscience (kevalajaana). The latter assumption led to such paradoxical contention as that ultimately truth consists of all false statements taken together (let there be ) prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false view that are conducive to immortality that are venerable and lead to the salvific happiness (Sanmatiprakarana )
This relativity of every predication and the impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about reality could theoretically lead to two more beside skepticism different approaches On the one hand it could be (taken as )a reason good enough to dispense with the soundness of discursive thinking altogether and in this way it would embrace the negative approach of Nagarjuna and be reflected in the structure of the tetra lemma ( catuskoti) The dependent character of every notion and conceptual representation the ineffable and complex structuring of reality (Prapanca) as it is reflected in the rational and dichotomizing mind inescapably involves real contradictions Virodha and antinomies (Prasanga) On the other hand the result could as well be an all inclusive positive approach Two contradictory conclusions derived one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis eg things arise from a cause and things do not arise from a cause do not have to unconditionally negate discourse about causality there is motion and there is no motion there is time there is part and a whole etc. such seemingly contradictory conclusion should make us only perceptive of the fact that they may and indeed do pertain to different contexts. This would be the Jaina approach.
Despite this the Jaina theory of anekantavada has frequently and undeservedly been blamed with disregarding the law of excluded middle or the law of non contradiction in a stronger or weaker sense. However one and the same sentence (P) when negated conditionally (i.e) with the particle Syat from a certain point of view) Yields not a contradictory statement (p) in the sense that when combined with the initial statement P is an application of the law of excluded middle (PV-P) but refers to a different context viz its points of reference of the two conjuncts is different.
Jaina realism has it that even images in a dream are not purely figments of our conceptualization but have some kind of objective basis and rational justification by the same token our statements pertaining to reality are claimed by the Jainas to possess some truth however the infinity of ontological correlations can in no way be reflected in our language due it inherent limitations (Avadharana) That is way a range of utterances articulated about one and the same object seemingly sanding in contradiction to each other may be consistent taking its varios contexts and ramifications into consideration.
The way we deal with cognized objects is reflected in the Jaina Scheme of Nayas and this takes Place on the conceptual (Svadhigama Jnanatmaka verbal (Paradhigama ) Vacanatmaka jnanatmaka (Paradhigaama Vacanatmaka ) and practical (Vyavahara) Level since all these three are interconnected. A set of conditionally valid viewpoints was not only considered an ancillary theoretical device subordinate to the theory multiplicity of reality and was supposed to corroborate the latter but from the very beginning of Jaina epistemology it coexisted with cognitive criteria (Pramana ) as an alternative epistemic instrument All states of al Substances that are comprehended by means of all cognitive criteria are (equally) capable of being predicated of by means of all (conditionally valid) viewpoints in a detailed manner (Uttaradhyanasutra 28-24)
Here we clearly find a conviction that given utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity. The viewpoints (Naya) organize the world of our practical dealings and within their sphere of practical application they help us determine the truth value of a proposition by way of its contextualization within a given universe of conceivable points of reference. They are not supposed to contribute anything new to our Knowledge as Akalanka declares (at Tattvarthikavarttika on 1.6) Application of viewpoints with regard to things cognized by means of cognitive criteria is the basis of every day practice Accordingly the Nayas only selectively (Vikaladesa) arrange comprehensive Data material already acquired acquired.
Thus Pramanas serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognitions and are expected to ensure the acquisition of truth whereas the viewpoints are an attempt to contextualize any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth.
The assumption of the manifold character of reality in which thing relate to each other by an infinite number of relations can be viewed from infinite an angles as well as reflected in our language infinity of interrelations corresponds to a theoretically infinite number of predications each retaining its validity only conditionally viz restricted to its particular perspective.
Usually but not always conditionally valid predication are divided into two major classes substantial (Dravyastikanaya ) or substance expressive (Dravyarthikanaya) and attributive ( Paryayastikanaya) or a expressive (Dravyarthikanaya) and attributive (Paryayastikanaya ) Whereas the format emphasizes continuity and essential identity of evolving thing the latter predominantly deals with the mutable character of phenomena and their transient manifestations and accentuates the attributive side of reality Most commonly theses two classes of conditionally valid viewpoints are further subdivided into the seven following types.
|Part One:||Introduction (Balcerowicz)||23|
|1||Kakuda Suri (970)||41|
|3||Vardhamana Suri (999)||41|
|5||Madhavacandra Traividya (1010)||44|
|6||Devagupta Suri or Jinacandra gani (1017)||44|
|9||Vadiraja Suri (1042)||213|
|11||Ramasena/ Nagasena (1050)||216|
|14||Ananda Suri (1070)||230|
|15||(Maladharin) Abhayadeva Suri(1070)||231|
|16||Santi Suri (1080)||240|
|21||Siddhasena sadharana or Suri(1100)||265|
|22||Candraprabha Suri (1102)||266|
|23||Nemicandra Suri or Saiddhantika or Devendra Gani(1104)||266|
|24||Jinavallabha Suri or gani(1110)||281|
|25||Haricandra Gani (1110)||283|
|27||Haribhadra Suri (1115)||283|
|28||yasodeva Suri or Dhanadeva(1118)||284|
|29||Jinadasa Gani or Mahattara (1118)||286|
|31||Gunakara Suri (1122)||292|
|32||Sakalakirti Bhataraka (1125)||292|
|33||Yasobhadra or Yasodeva (1125)||293|
|34||Vijayasimha Suri (1126)||293|
|38||Maladharin Hemacandra (1130)||295|
|39||Siddha Suri (1136)||324|
|41||Ramadeva Gani (1140)||324|
|43||vadideva Suri (1143)||325|
|44||Jinadatta suri (1145)||359|
|46||Author Unknown (1150)||362|
|49||Dhanavijaya Gani (1150)||365|
|50||Candrakirti Gani (1155)||365|
|55||Ratnaprabha Suri (1167)||375|
|56||Jinabhadra Suri (1170 )||376|
|59||Naracandra Upadhyaya (1175)||390|
|60||Sri Candra Suri or Candrasena Suri (1178)||391|
|61||Hemacandra (Kalikalasarvajna (1180)||394|
|63||Padmaprabha Maladharideva (1180)||497|
|64||Siddhasena Suri (1191)||499|
|67||Jinatilaka Upadhyaya (1200)||503|
|68||Mayilla Dhavala (1200)||503|
|69||Raksananda Guru (1200)||517|
|70||Dharmaghosa Suri (1206)||518|
|71||Jinadatta or Jinapala Suri (1208)||518|
|73||Hemacandra Suri (1210||521|
|74||Ajita Deva Suri (1216)||522|
|75||Jinapati Suri (1221)||523|
|77||Sarvadeva Suri (1240)||524|
|78||Haribhadra suri (1241)||524|
|80||Mahendrasimha Suri (1247)||527|
|82||Balacandra Suri (1248)||529|
|84||Tilakacarya or Tilaka Suri (1240)||530|
|89||Laksmitilaka Gani (1260)||556|
|92||Devendra Suri (1271)||557|
|96||Prabodhacandra (Gani) (1290)||561|
All too frequently the term Vedanta is used when what is meant whether recognized or not is Advaita Vedanta and more specifically the Philosophical system associated with Sankaracarya. Yet in fact Vedanta Literally meaning the concluding portions of the Veda ie the Upanishads is Properly used in Indian Philosophy to Designate those systems that take such text as the Upanishads authoritatively along with a few others such as the Brahma sutras alternatively known as the Vedantasutar. There are a goodly number of philosophical systems other than Sankara’s that fall into the classification of Vedanta systems many of them virtually unknown to most students.
The names of many of the Vedanta Systems derive from their respective theories concerning the relations between Brahman Celebrated in the Upanishads as the highest principle and Atman the individual self Advaita argues these are identical non different (Abheda) Dvaita says they are completely different (Bheda) Other Vedantic systems resist these extremes and argue that the relation between Brahman and self is one of identity in difference (Bhedabheda) The best Know such system is the Visistadvaita system of Ramanuja and the Srivaisnavas but there are many others . Here in this Volume the Literature of several others of this Bhedabheda persuasion those associated with the names of Bhartrprapanca Bhaskara and Srikantha are explored.
What is Relation? Everything is determined to be true or false on the basis of direct experiences alone. Philosophy primarily explains different kinds of experiences. Every experience involves some kind of relation. That relation determines cognition of it, which is an experience. Determinate experiences are made possible by relations. An abstract entity has no relation to anything. Relations determine facts. Hence, relations playa very important role in knowledge.
Every relation involves two terms, viz., a Pratiyogin (counter-positive or referenda) and an anuyogin (referent). The pratiyogin is that which "rests" on a substratum (or locus) and the anuyogin is that substratum.
In Buddhist philosophy relations are contingent reality, that is to say, no ultimate reality at all. Ultimate reality is unrelated; it is non-relative, it is the absolute. Relations are constructions of our imagination, they are nothing actual. The Indian realists, however, kept to the principle that relations are as real as the things related and that relations are perceived through the senses. Udyotakara says that the perception of the connection of an object with its mark is the first act of sense-perception from which inference proceeds. According to him this connection is perceived by the senses as well as the connected facts.
Dharmakirti in the first stanza of his work Sambandhapariksa states that: relation necessarily involves dependence. Therefore, relations do not really exist in the sense of ultimate or independent reality. Vinitadeva, in another passage, states that the expressions "related to another", "dependent on another", "supported by another",&amp;amp;amp;quot;subject to another's will" are convertible. Causality, contact, inherence and opposition are not realities by themselves. There are no "possessors" of these relations otherwise than in imagination. A reality is always one reality. It cannot be single and double at the same time. Vacaspatimisra quotes a Buddhist who remarks that these relations considered as objective realities are, as it were, unfair dealers who buy goods without ever paying any equivalent. They indeed pretend to acquire perceptiveness, but possess no shape of their own which they could deliver to consciousness as a price for the acquisition of that perceptiveness. If a thing is a separate unity it must have a separate shape which it imparts to consciousness in the way of producing a representation. But a relation has no shape apart from the things related. Therefore, says Vinitadeva, a relation in the sense of dependence cannot be something objectively real. Neither can a relation be partially real, because to be partially real means nothing but to be real and non-real at the same time, since reality has no parts. What has parts can be real empirically, but not ultimately.
Kesavamisra defines a relation as follows: "A relation must be different from its relate, dependent on both and single (Sambandho hi sambandhibhyam Bhinnah, Ubhayasritah, Ekasca), as, for example, in the contact between a kettle-drum and a stick. The contact relation tsamyogasambandha) is different from the kettle-drum and the stick because the kettle- drum and the stick are substances (Drarya) and contact is a quality (gu1fa) dependent on both, and is a single entity; According to the Naiyayikas a relation can be perceived. Vatsyayana says that a relation is seen, i.e., perceived.' Similarly, Visvanatha says that contact is an object of the eye" and the perception of Inherence is due to the relation of attributiveness.
Like Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas maintain that a relation is perceived. Kumarila Bhatta in his Slokavarttika, interpreting the words Janatasambandhasya, says that they mean that a permanent relation, whether it be a case of co-existence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of Krttika with Rohini where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter may be inferred) or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and a species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between' two things and a third thing, which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is perceived. Sucaritamisra in his Kasikia. On Stokavarttika says that to indicate that relation is perceived it is said in Slokavarttika yadavastu lokal pratipadyatesmin dvidhiipi tat sakyat eva Vaktumiti.
In Samkarite Advaita philosophy, all relations are purely conceptual and superimposed, because Sarnkara holds that real existence (Paramarthasatta) is one, whereas the phenomenal world is illusory, vyavahiirika. In this sense, no relations possess reality from the ultimate standpoint. So, relations such as cause and effect, etc. are held to be illusory (Vivarta).
According to the Saivas, the entire manifestation, whether subjective or objective, is due to the will of the universal self. Relation is nothing but a special category based on the general category-unity in multiplicity-involving two external realities. Because both the material and the subject that works on it are the manifestations of the ultimate, the relation naturally does not depend on the individual self, but ultimately depends on the universal self Some Vedantic schools such as those of Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, etc., to establish the truth of the proposition that relations are real, recognize that each existent has a twofold aspect: one its causal state and the other its effectual state. Take for example the pot, the dish, etc., and the clay. The pot is different from the dish in nature and shape, but there is also non-difference so far as both are clay. They are thus both different and non-different from each other. In this manner both non-difference and difference are equally real, and so all relations are real.
II. Types of Relation There are indefinite numbers of relations in Indian philosophy. According to Naiyayikas, the principal relations are contact (Sam yoga) and inherence (Samavaya). Sa1 1yoga is defined as the contact of two things that were first separate and therefore there can be no contact between two all pervading things which are never apart from each other.' For example, the tree is perceived through contact with the eye's rays. Inherence is an intimate or inseparable relation. Its blue color cannot be separated from the blue lotus. Annarnbhatta defines samavaya as an intimate relation between two things which are technically called Ayutasiddha. Ayutasiddha means those things which have never existed in a separate condition without themselves being destroyed. Ayutasiddha things are limited number to 0) the component parts of a composite whole, (2) a quality (Guna) and what is qualifies (Gunin); (3) a motion (kriya) and what moves (kriyavan), (4) an individual (Vyakti) and a universal (Juati), and (5) an eternal substance (Nityadravya) and its individuate (visesa) .
All these cases concern different aspects of the problem of the one and the many. But the Madhva philosopher thinks they are not all aspects of the same type. Some of them concern the relationship between a substance and attribute, of a property- possessor (Dharmin) to its multiple properties (dharma), while others provide an account of the plurality of the relations between a substance and other things, separate from some and yet in relation with others. These two aspects are considered in a distinct way by the Madhva: the first is classed under the notion of what is qualified. (Visita) while the other is comprehended in the notion of difference (Bheda) of real entities and divides them one from the others.
III. Relation of Bhedabheda. In the place of inherence the Bhatta Mimamsakas and Advaitins recognize the relation of difference-cum-identity (Tadatmya). The relation of Tadatmya, according to Bhatt as, is not absolute identity as the Naiyayikas .take it to be, but it is identity in a relative sense, i.e., identity (Abheda) compatible with difference (Bheda-Sahisnu). Though difference and identity are ordinarily opposed to each other, yet they are taken by the Bhattas to be compatible with each other, on the ground that it is experience, after all, that determines the compatibility or incompatibility of two things and that experience warrants the recognition of difference, associated with identity, as forming the relation between Jati and yakti. In the proposition "this is a horse (ayaJ1 Asvah), for instance this refers to a particular (Vyakti) and horse according to the Bhattas, primarily refers to Hoarseness (Asvatva), which is a universal (Jatti). According to this view, in the judgment embodied in this proposition Jatti is equated with a Vyakti. But this equation cannot be absolute as, in that case, the two words this and horse would turn out to be synonyms. Therefore the Bhattas argue that, on the strength of what is presented in cognition, a particular relation consisting in difference-cum-identity (Bhedabheda) should be recognized in the case of Jati and vyakti.
In the philosophy of Nimbarka, a relation always presupposes difference and non-difference (Bhedabheda). When we say that the universe is non-different from Brahman, we do not mean thereby by non-difference absolute identity but simply that the universe is absolutely dependent on Brahman, which can have no existence and activity independently of Him, just as the thousand-rayed sun, having independent existence and activity in contrast to its own rays, is their soul and the rays are non-different from it. Thus, non-difference here means essential dependence and not absolute identity. The relation of identity is possible between two things when they are non- different in some way or other. No identity is possible between a cow and a horse. Again, identity is not possible in the case of a single horse as well. But there is a relation of identity between an effect and its cause, an attribute and its locus, a power and its possessor, i.e., only between two things which are both different and non-different. Otherwise, in accordance with the text "All this, verily is Brahman", the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, must be non-different from Brahman in nature, which is impossible.
Thus, the non-difference is of the kind which is not in conflict with difference. 2 And difference means difference of nature. Thus, difference and non-difference (Bhedabheda) in this relation are equally real and compatible with each other. There is no contradiction between difference and non- difference.
|Part One||Introduction (M.M Agrawal)||13|
|Part Two||Summaries of Works||51|
|5||Kesava Kasmiri Bhatta (1200 or 1375)||172|
|14||Madhava Mukunda (1670) (S N Gosvami)||477|
|15||Purusottama Prasada Vaisnava (1684)||553|
|16||Vanamali Misra (1700)||555|
|18||Harivyasa Deva (1755)||584|
|19||Purusottama Prasada Vaisnava II (1785)||585|
|20||Amolakarama Sastri (1890)||622|
|22||Santadasa Vidyavidehi (1935)||623|
|24||Bhagiratha Maithili Jha (1935)||624|
This Volume deals with the philosophies of Purva Mimamsa, one of two schools of Mimamsa traditionally considered systems of Hindu philosophical thought. 'Mimamsa', as used classically, has among its meanings that of an "exploration" or "investigation" of something. In the context of early Vedic thought, it can mean specifically a theory governing the origins, basic values, and assumptions about man, in particular about the type of actions, a human should or should not perform, as suggested and sometimes spelled out in the Vedas.
The Vedas, the oldest extant literature of what is now considered Hinduism, generated a vast literature of their own. Some of this passed down to us in the form of brief pronouncements called sutras, which were presumably meant for memorization and were not always independently intelligible. These sutras in turn generated explanatory commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries. The basic sutras of what came to be the Purva Mimamsa system were known as the Mimamsa sutras or Purvamimamsasutras (Purva' since another set of literature expounding a different understanding of ultimate things came to be recognized also as Mimamsa, specifically "Uttara" or later Mimamsa.)
Initially the Purva Mimamsa had no special recognition of the subject matter of philosophy as understood in these volumes of our Encyclopedia, and would not warrant treatment as Indian philosophy. But as Indian philosophy in other systems developed ideas concerning the assumptions of rebirth, transmigration, and the possibility of attainment of final liberation, Purva Mimamsa also developed a philosophical system in response, beginning with further commentaries on their sutras and proceeding on to independent works, comprising a collection of texts which constitutes the 'philosophy being studied in the present Volume.
Volume Seventeen concludes the series of the Encyclopedia dealing with jain philosophy (Volumes 10, 14 and 17) bringing its development to the present day. In his Introduction, Piotr Balcerowicz provides a formalized classification of the basics of the Jain theory of seven-fold modal description (saptabhangi or syadvada), which, as he explains. "gives a complete account of all perspectives relevant in the verbal description of a thing."
A contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy which seems most stimulating, inspiring, debated and controversial, one which provoked the most opposition from other systems of India, is beyond doubt the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada). Indisputably it is also the most interesting Jaina contribution to Indian philosophy. The doctrine involved both a very particular realist' ontology as well as a corresponding epistemology that was structured in such a way as to most aptly handle certain ontological presuppositions.
The Jaina ontology entailed by the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) viewed the world structure as consisting of four interrelated aspects: substance (dravya), quality (guna), mode (paryaya) and ineffable, transient occurrence (vivarta, vartana, often overlooked in both Jaina expositions of the theory and in analyses carried out by modem researchers). However, the point to emphasise is that things, especially when conceived as substances, were believed to preserve their identity and in this aspect they were immutable and permanent. At the same time, however, when conceived as modes, they appeared to change and transform continuously. This seemed to have led to contradictions in ontology. Besides, in order to explain the process of change, Jaina ontology also distinguished three modes of existence that actually co-existed: origination (utpada, udaya), continued existence (sthiti, dhrauvya) and cessation, or disintegration (bhanga, vyaya, apavarga). These four closely corresponded to the Buddhist Sarvastivada's and Abhidhama's four (or three) conditioned factors, known as 'markers' (samskrtalaksana) - origination (utpada), continuity (sthiti), deterioration (jara, vyaya) and extinction (bhanga, nirodha) - or second-order elementary constituents of reality (dharma) that were believed to attach themselves to every other first-order elementary constituent of reality 'marked' (laksya) by them and thereby determined in its momentary existence (ksanika).
The emphasis (which gradually became more pronounced after the second and third centuries CE) of Jaina ontology on both permanence and imperishability of substances, worked out against the Buddhist theories of momentariness (Ksanikavada) and insubstantiality (nairatmya, nihsvabhavata), as well as constant mutability and change of substances in form and occurrence, developed in contrast to the theory of the immutable substance of the Vaisesika, seemed to lead to a contradiction: how to reconcile the idea of a permanent substance with its incessant mutability? Both the dual nature of things and a solution of the paradox was expressed by Umasvamin (c. 350-400) in Tattvarthasutra 5.29-31:
 The existent is furnished with origination, annihilation and permanence.  It is indestructible in its essentiality, i.e. permanent.  [The existent is both], because [it is] established as having emphasized [property] and not-emphasized [property].
The conviction that world substances, and their qualities, modes and transient occurrences cannot even be conceived to exist entirely independently as if separated from other elements, and that they all simultaneously originate, are endowed with continued existence and disintegrate in every moment again and again while at the same time preserving their integrity and self-identity, led further to a belief that the world is a complex network within which all the existents are related with all the remaining ones and that their essential character and nature is not only determined by what is in .things themselves but also by all the relations in which they enter vis-a-vis all other existents.
Originally ontological or metaphysical considerations eventually led to the exuberant development of a corresponding epistemology, which ultimately involved what came to be known as the theory of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada), that comprised three analytical methods: the method (historically the oldest) of the four standpoints (niksepavada, nyasavada), the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications, known as the doctrine of viewpoints (naya- vada) , and the method of the seven-fold modal description (saptabhagi, syadvada).
Madhva, the founding figure of the Dvaita system of philosophy, states the major tenets of his philosophical system in a nutshell in his Mahabharata-tatparyaniaya 1.70-71: "The flow of the world is real together with its five- fold difference:
(1) The difference between God and jivas (i.e., the individual selves);
(2) The mutual differences(s) among the jivas;
(3) The difference(s) between God and jada (i.e., inert) objects;
(4) The mutual differences(s) among the jada objects;
(5) The difference between the jada objects and the individual selves.
These differences are permanent and will continue forever. These differences will continue ever after liberation. The hierarchy of the jivas will also continue even after liberation.
"Madhva's is the first of those systems labeled "Vedanta" to espouse such a- sweeping set of distinct kinds of real entities. Notably, the Advaita system of Samkara denied any differences at all, labeling all such distinctions at best anirvacaniya, impossible to speak of consistently. Madhvas passage, quoted above, states his disagreement with such a position in as extreme terms as is possible. Besides forming an important school of thought in its own right, Madhva provided the backdrop to the "modern" period of Indian thought, in which even the importance of liberation and the basic assumptions concerning it came into question.
The basic work for this Volume has already been accomplished by the late B.N.K. Sharma in his mammoth History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature (Two volumes; Bombay 1960; revised and enlarged in one Volume, Delhi 1981) the 1981 version is referred to in what follows as BNKS. Sharma did not change the substance of his analyses in this later edition, and there has been a fairly sizable literature since then on the texts of the system. In what follows we have reprinted large portions of Sharma's summaries and information, with updated references to subsequently-printed literature.
In particular, the writings of K.T. Pandurangi on Dvaita Vedanta are of great importance, and we shall make full use of them wherever possible, especially where they provide authoritative scholarly summaries of materials dealt with more succinctly than in Sharma's work.
The General Editor wishes also to extend his sincere thanks and appreciation for the help rendered by B. Sarvothaman of Bangalore and Chennai.
In this series of lectures I am to devote myself to the Dvaita systems of Vedanta promulgated in all its energy and fulness of form by the great Acarya, Sri Madhva or Ananda Tirtha.
Before attempting an exposition of the school in some detail in all its significant aspects, I take it that a general indication of the fundamental orientation of the system may be of value.
(a) One of the important designations of the system is 'tattva-vada' and the term is adopted by Madhva himself in his Maya-vada-khandana. The term needs a little explanation to be understood in the right manner. It stands as an antithesis to maya-vada and the latter propounds the view that the world we encounter in our empirical consciousness is a phenomenal or even illusory construction lacking substantiality of being. In opposition to this, the Dvaita philosophy argues for the reality of the world. In other words, what is normally described as the external world, the world or objects and situations, which the human mind faces in its experience, is real and objective according to tattva-vada. This tendency in philosophical thought is characterized as realism in recent European terminology. The point, therefore, is that Dvaita champions the realistic standpoint in philosophy. The historical significance of the position is immense. In Indian philosophy, two systems of thought, the Mahayana Buddhism in its Madhyamika and Yogacara phases and Advaita Vedanta, [seek to] refute realism on solid metaphysical and epistemological grounds. Madhva's philosophy is opposed to this antirealist stand in all possible thoroughness.
Some general considerations utilized in this connection may be indicated. Madhva holds that realism taking the waking world as real has the backing of common sense and hence its proofs for the reality of the world may not seek any special strength in that direction. But a philosophy that repudiates the world is in need of the most rigorous argument in its support. Unfortunately, such support is not to be found in the idealistic schools in question. Realism is the natural bent of the human mind and it has been appropriated by all schools that speak of the intrinsic validity of human understanding in the notion of svatah. pramanya. As such, its refutation must be invulnerable. Realism with regard to the external world has an empirical basis. Our perceptual consciousness and all the super-structure of thought built on that basis present the world as real. Mere dialectic, epistemological or otherwise, cannot demolish the world. A perceptual error can be eliminated or corrected only by a perception or perceptions of a wider range and deeper level and never by mere ratiocination. Madhva works out this position through a close analysis of some perceptual errors and their correction. The implication of this position is that empirical errors can be transcended only in a larger and profounder empiricism. Hence a total repudiation of empiricism and its realistic affirmations is impossible in essence. One may recall a parallel pronouncement of Bosanquet that 'transcendence of immediacy is not transcendence of experience'. G. E. Moore in his famous essay on 'The Defence of Commonsense' rightly points out the self-contradiction involved in the rejection of common-sense about the world, without admitting the world which alone can make commonsense a possibility. One cannot administer a kick to the earth without placing himself on the earth.
(b) The next dominant constituent of Dvaita is its pluralism. It is this that is signified by the more common reference to the system as Dvaita. This term, like the other one, tattvavada, requires a historical elucidation. Advaita asserting the total oneness of the individual self and the absolute Self is naturally described as Advaita or non-dualism. As [our] school rejects categorically that identification of non-dualism, its description derived from that antagonism has given rise to its name, "Dvaita". This is not a dualism such as that of Jainism and Samkhya or even the initial position of Descartes. It stands just for the recognition of the distinction between the finite self and the Supreme Being. The extension of this principle is the assertion of a similar distinction between the finite self and nature on the one hand and that between nature and the Supreme Being on the other. Similarly the selves are to be distinguished among themselves, and objects constitutive of nature are to be considered a plurality. This five-fold difference named panca-bheda is a fundamental verity, and it is held to be the meaning of the term 'prapanca' signifying the universe as a whole. Inalienable uniqueness is a basic characteristic of all that exists in the realm of nature and the realm of spirits. This is the pluralism of Madhva. No wonder it is opposed to all forms of monism. How far the pluralism gets integrated into a coherent philosophy we will see in the sequel. In the meanwhile, its dialectical core has to be discerned.
Advaita, in the hands of Mandana Misra and all the other writers coming after him, has built up a powerful case against the very concept of 'difference' (bheda), and has thus endeavored to knock the bottom out of all types of pluralism. Madhva, therefore, enters into this polemics and seeks to demonstrate the [failure of] the refutation of difference. With that end accomplished, pluralism stands secure and established. Some idea of this argument and counter-argument is necessary for understanding the radical position of our system. Mandana has a two-fold attack, epistemological and ontological. Epistemologically, as pluralism rests on empiricism, it has to be pointed out how difference gets apprehended in perceptual cognition. All difference is of some entity or substance that differs from others. This entity must be apprehended prior to the apprehension of its difference from all that it differs from. This is a simple enough matter. The positive fundament has to furnish the ground for subsequent differentiation from the connected correlatives. But the initial apprehension is alone perceptual and the subsequent acts of thought are just retrospective constructions or imaginations. Thus perception in its purest initial step grasps what is difference-less, and all the difference read into the initial datum is non-perceptual and hence a falsifying addition. This is the epistemological aspect of the dialectic. In the ontological sphere, we have to decide whether difference is the substantive essence, dharmi-svarupa,or the entity or its dharma, property or quality. It cannot be the first, for the essence is non-relational and has, in fact, to supply the base for subsequent relational thought, while the difference is fundamentally a relational characteristic. It functions between entities; and independent of correlatives it has no meaning whatever. So dharmi-svarupa is not bheda. Can it be a dharma? This is an equally impossible alternative, for it requires the admission of a difference between the substantive and its properties, and thus leads to an infinite regress. For difference to be a property only, there must be a difference between the substance and this property of difference. The whole dialectic has to be repeated with regard to the newly admitted difference. There is no end to this process of positing differences to support differences. This is roughly the Advaitic polemics as initiated by Mandana Misra.
Confronted with a series of volumes called the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, one is likely to ask, What constitutes 'philosophy' in the relevant sense? Introductions to understood as investigation of the nature of and path (s) to liberation from rebirth (moksa; nirvana), a definition which seems to fit most Indian schools of thought as taught and practiced in the classical period (500 B.C.-l000 A.D.), whether lain, Buddhist or Hindu. These schools persists for the most part into the twenty-first century, though concern for liberation is in some cases overshadowed by the rise of a commitment to religious purposes, understood broadly as bhakti or devotion to God.
The system that is the subject of the present volume is one such devotional system. As this volume demonstrates, the concern of this system is two-fold: liberation is accepted, but down played in the face of the requirements of true devotion. The system is but one representative of devotional systems; other such systems, equally deserving of a volume devoted to them (such as Suddhadvaita), are regretably not planned for inclusion in this Encyclopedia.
"Epigraphic evidence of the worship of Visnu or Krsna in ancient Bengal is meager and often rendered complicated by contradictory interpretations. It is also quite difficult to identify any definite cult or sect in them.
"Vaisnavism in Bengal assumed a tangible form only during the century of the Sena dynasty (AD .1100-1206) which was of Kanarese origin. The pristine bhakti movement of the Deccan had already been set on a firm basis by Acarya Ramanuja. The influence of the Sri-Vaisnava doctrine might have percolated into Bengal at this time. In the twelfth century A.D. Jayadeva composed the Gitagovinda in which Sri-Vaisnava influence and that of the Brahmavaivartapurana (composed in the seventh century A.D.) maybe discernible. The songs of the Gitagovinda attach a greater importance to Radha than to Krsna. The extant modes of rendering the verses of this work into songs are of Kanarese origins. These facts may be regarded as an indication of the influence of the Deccanese bhakti movement. But the philosophical aspects of the Vaisnava faith of the time are not definitely identifiable. A synthesis of the ancient Vyuha and Avatara doctrines might have taken place. But yet the fact was that Jayadeva had put considerable emphasis on the erotic aspects of Radha-Krsna worship. Stray verses had been composed on this particular theme in the past. But what were the forces which led to the composition of a whole, ornate Kavya on this motif? According to Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, Jayadeva, who was probably not a Vaisnava, derived his theme from a pre-existent 'vernacular lyric drama. But the origins of erotic devotionalism may be found in the Krsna legends of the Padma, the Bhagavata, and the Brahmavaivarta Puranas. The sculptures on, the basement of the Paharour temple which depict the main events of the life of Krsna indicate the popularity of the Krsna cult in Bengal during the Pala period, from the middle of the eighth century to the beginning of the twelfth." It is quite reasonable to suppose that Jayadeva's motif was not unknown to contemporary Bengal. Poor pilgrims sang the songs of Radha and 'Madhava'. "The Bengali poet named Dimboka composed the following verse on this theme:
The pilgrims in the street have warded off the painful cold with their broad quilts sewn of a hundred rags; and now with voices clear and sweet they break the morning slumber of the city folk with the songs of the secret love of Madhava and Radha.
The earlier epigraphic records hardly mention the lives of Radha and Krsna. Suddenly, in the twelfth century Krsna appears in the ornate poetry of eastern India as a supernatural lover of the milk maids. Jayadeva might have set the pattern which was followed by the poets of the contemporary anthologies. Acarya Govardhana, a contemporary of Jayadeva, wrote a good number of verses on the loves and the supernatural achievements of Krsna. Both Aniruddha Bhatta and Halayudha, two eminent compilers and interpreters of the Dharmasastra wrote short but significant manuals on Vaisnava rituals. The importance of the Vaisnava religion is emphasized in the contemporary Brhaddharmapurana; Vaisnavism was used to bolster up non-vedic or puranic faiths. According to one authority some panditas of Mithila went to Assam (Kamarupa) and 'tried to aryanise the country by means of Vaisnavism.
"But the aspects of the Krsna cult of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries are not very distinct. The Krsna worshipers had to wage a long war against the Tantric Buddhists and the votaries of Siva-Sakri. Tantric Buddhism was decadent; its dying traditions were somehow kept up by a number of secret societies which practiced the worst forms of licentiousness. The main opponents of Vaisnavism were the devotees of Siva-Sakti. 15 According to D.D. Kosambi the Siva-Sakti cult was patronized by the rich landowners while Vaisnavism was popular among the peasantry.
The Paikpada-Vetka-Vasudeva image inscription of the time of Govindacandra and the Madanapada and Madhyapada Copper Plate inscriptions of Visvarupasena 'show that the merchant community as a whole (including betel-growers) showed their inclination to Vaisnavism'. But the social affiliations of these sects are not always definitely identifiable. The Vaisnavas had, however, clearly neutralized the Buddhists by accepting the Buddha as an incarnation of Visnu. The legend of the Vaisnava incarnations of the Buddha was current even in the fourteenth century. With the beginning of the powerful Caitanya movement the Buddha, at least in Bengal, was finally consigned to limbo. 19 The Vaisnava emphasis on the idea that Radha was Sakti par excellence of Krsna might have stemmed from the Sakti theory of Tantric Buddhism. The Vaisnavas also accepted the Sakti-Saiva idea in a modified form. But while the worshipers of Sakti believed in the predominance of the female Sakti over the male gods, the Vaisnavas regarded Sakti as the most essential attribute of Visnu-Krsna, the Supreme God.
"The growing strength of Vaisnavism in Tirhut-Mithila and Bengal is seen best in the development of vernacular Vaisnava poetry. Early in the fifteenth century, Vidyapati, the Court Poet of Mithila, wrote in Vajrabuli language a large number of excellent verses on the loves of Radha and Krsna. These verses provided the model of Vaisnava love poetry which was followed even by Rabindranath Tagore. Vidyapati, too, was a Smrata-pancopasaka, and riot a Vaisnava. He created different concepts of Radha as heroine of different moods and erotic situations. Perhaps the model for him was one of the adolescent and beautiful wives of a medieval harem. Vidyapati also composed a number of verses on Hara (Siva) and Parvati. At least in two verses of Vidyapati Radha describes Krsna as her Pati and Svamin (husband). Perhaps the idea that Radha was e parakiya (another man's wife) was not acceptable to him. Yet he was definitely influenced by the Krsna legend of the Brahmavaivarta-Purana and the Bhagavata-Purana.
Item Code: NAL124 Cover: Hardcover Publisher: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Language: English Size: 10.0 inch x 7.0 inch Pages: 13921 Other Details: Weight of the Book: 24.4 kg
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