Vedanta Paribhasa of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra

Email

Whatsapp

Facebook

Pinterest

Twitter

Copy link

I congratulate most heartily Swami Madhavananda on his English translation of the Vedanta Paribhasa. I also appreciate the annotations that he has given. The Vedanta Paribhasa is an epistemological work on Samkara Vedanta as interpreted in the Vivarana school. The epistemological implications of the Panca-Padika of Padmapada as interpreted in the Vivarana, had already been collected and worked out by Rama-dvya in his Vedanta Kaumudi. The work has not yet been published. When we compare the contents of the Vedanta kaumudi with those of the Vedanta Paribhasa of Dharmarajadhvarindra, the indebtedness of the latter appears to be so colossal that its claim to originally vanishes. There are also here and there traces of confusion which his son vainly tried to justify or to explain away in his commentary on the Vedanta Paribhasa. On the whole, this epistemological compendium on account of its brevity and lucidity of exposition has commended itself to the readers of Samkara Vedanta. It is also interesting to notice that in accordance with the scheme of epistemology formulated in the Vivarana, the perceptual situation is taken in a realistic manner. Parts of it, however, are not fully developed, and important questions which could be raised regarding it have not been anticipated. This may be regarded as a hypercriticism but it cannot be denied that there is much scope for elaborating the views of the Vivarana school on epistemological matters.

This English translation of the Vedanta Paribhasa will introduce the epistemology of the Samkara Vedanta to such readers as are not adepts in philosophical Sanskrit. The public owe a deep debt of gratitude for this work to Swami Mãdhavãnanda. It is also very gratifying to see that the Rãmakrsna Mission that has become so famous in the country for social service has also turned its attention towards intellectual service in such a significant work as the present one and many other translations that the learned author has done.

The Vedanta-Paribhasa by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is a very important manual of the Vedanta philosophy and is the most widely read book of the subject next to Sadananda Yogindra’s Vedanta-Sara. The author, who seems to have flourished in the seventeenth century, was a reputed scholar of Southern India, as we know from the introductory verses by his son and commentator. And we have ample evidence from the body of the book that of the two main branches of the Sankara school of Advaita Vedanta, founded by Padmapadacarya and Acarya Vacaspati Misra respectively, our author belonged to the former. In his discussion he has adopted the method and phraseology of Navya-Nyaya, introduced by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the fourteenth century.

The first six chapters of the Paribhasa are devoted to establishing the means of valid knowledge from the Vedantic standpoint and as such often contain refutations of other systems of philosophy, particularly Nyaya-Vaisesika. Being to some extent of a polemical character, these chapters are rather abstruse for the beginner. But once he has ascended these rugged steps, he is ushered into the realm of Vedanta proper in the last two chapters of the book, where he will find a delightful compendium of the essential doctrine of the philosophy, embodying its subject matter and aim.

As the regards the means of knowledge there is great divergence among the different systems of philosophy. For instance the Carvakas who are out and out materialists, believe only in perception; the Buddhists and the Vaissikas in perception and inference ; the Sankhya and Yoga school in perception, inference and verbal testimony (sabda); the Naiyayikas add to these comparison as well; the Prabhakara school of Mimamsakas include presumption; while the Vedantists, along with the Bhatta school of Mimamsakas believe in six means of knowledge, viz perception, inference, comparison, verbal, testimony, presumption and non-apprehension. As against the Naiyayikas, the Vedantins argue that presumption cannot be classed under interference for it is based on negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka – vyapti), which Vedanta does not admit; while non apprehension cannot come under perception, for according to the logicians, it presupposes contact of the organ with the object, but non-existence cannot come in contact with the organ with the object, but not-existence cannot come in contact with the organ.

Again, with regard to the conception of knowledge, Nayaya holds that knowledge is a product of the contact of the mind with the self, while according to Vedanta it is eternal Pure Comsciousness (caitanya); only it is manifested through mental status (vrtti). The Vedantin’s theory of perception is in sharp contrast with the Naiyayika’s. Vedanta holds that Pure Consciousness has three forms as associated (that is, manifested as) the subject or knower or Consciousness limited by the mind as associated with the object, and as associated with the mental state, and perception of any external object (that is present and capable of being perceived) takes place when ° three occupy the same space, by the mental state issuing through the organ and spreading over the object so as to assume the same form—like the water of a tank reaching a field through a channel and being shaped like the field, The mental state serves to remove the veil of nescience (avidyã) from the Consciousness associated with the object, which is revealed by a reflection of the Consciousness associated with the subject (that is, of the self, which is of the nature of intelligence). Some Vedantists deny that the mind is an organ—which is a postulate of Nyaya—and according to them, the perception of internal objects like pleasure and pain is done by the witness—by which is meant that aspect of the self in which the mind, instead of being a qualifying attribute (visesana), is a limiting adjunct (upadhi)—directly, that is, without the help of the mental state, as in the case of external objects. On this point, however, our author differs. The distinction between a qualifying attribute and a limiting adjunct is this, that the former affects (of course, speaking from the phenomenal standpoint) the self, while the latter only distinguishes it without affecting it in any way.

In Nyãya a cognition like, “The hill has fire, because it has smoke,” is inferential, whereas in Vedanta it is a composite experience, being perceptual in respect of the hill and inferential in respect of the fire. In Nyãya the validity of knowledge arises from particular favourable conditions, and is ascertained through a separate inference, while in Vedãnta it arises spontaneously and is self-evident. Unlike Nyãya, Vedãnta holds that perceptual knowledge may arise even from verbal testimony, as, for example, from a sentence like, ‘This is that Devadatta,” or “Thou art That.” While, according to Nyãya, a word primarily signifies an individual possessed of a generic attribute, in Vedãnta it primarily signifies a generic attribute. In Nyaya, only words have implication (laksana), but in Vedãnta sentences also have it. Nyaya postulates eternal generic attributes (jãti), and inherence (samavaya), which is a special kind of intimate relation. Vedãnta denies both, and substitutes transitory common features for the former, and essential identity for the latter. In Nyãya all error is taking one thing for another (anyathãkhyati); in Vedãnta, according to some, it is so only when the thing for which something else is mistaken is close enough to the latter to be in contact with the organ, as when we see a crystal beside a ruby as red; in other cases we have a cognition of something which is logically indefinable (anirvacaniya-khyati)--—which is the general view. In inference, Nyãya, like Vedãnta, admits an intermediate cause (vyapara), but it is consideration (parãmar4a), or the knowledge that the reason, or ground from which we infer, is present in the thing in or about which something is inferred; but in Vedänta it is the latest impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the reason and the thing inferred. In Nyaya the effect is something quite different from the cause; in Vedãnta they are essentially the same, which accords with the Sankhya view also. The above list is by no means exhaustive. The reader will come across other differences as he goes through the book.

A glance at the table of contents will give an idea of the nature and variety of the topics discussed in. the book. We refrain from adverting to them here. It will be noticed that the author has bestowed a good deal of attention on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the definitions, inserting one qualifying epithet after another into them for this purpose—to which not a little of the stiffness of books of this kind is due. He has faithfully presented in a nutshell the traditional views on important questions relating to Vedãnta, and it is seldom that he has put forward any views of his own, as he has once done while discussing the perception of internal objects, and again under IMPUCATI0N (laksana). He has often referred to great authorities like Padmapãda, Prakasãtma-yati and Vãcaspati Misra in his book, and his debt to these masters is indubitable. As to how far the contributions of our author are original, or the question of his close indebtedness to any antecedent author, for example, Ramãdvaya, as Dr. Dasgupta asserts, can be decided only when the works in question have been published. We leave the issue open, and trust that future research scholars will be in a position to settle the matter conclusively. That he has eminently succeeded in producing a handy volume for the general reader, is a fact that will be evident to all who study the book.

Of all the systems of philosophy, PurvaMimamsa and Vedanta follow the Vedas as closely as possible, the latter relying on Sruti confirmed by reason and realisation. But there is this outstanding difference between the two that, while Pürva-Mimamsa is a staunch believer in the ceremonial portion of the Vedas (karmakanda), Vedanta lays the emphasis, and justly so, on the philosophical portion (jnana-kanda), consisting of the Upanisads. Another point of difference between the two systems is that Vedãnta believes in the Vedas having emanated from God, while Mimamsa holds that they are eternal and do not depend on any agent, either for emanation or for creation.

Although Vedanta has three main phases, viz., Dualism, Qualified Monism and Monism, represented by Madhvacarya, Ramãnujacarya and Sankarãcarya respectively, it is Monism or Advaita that is the culmination of the philosophy. Its theme, the essential identity of the individual self and Brahman and the unreality of the universe, has been ably dealt with in the Paribhäsã, and the steps to its realisation, viz., hearing, reflection and meditation, by the qualified aspirant have been clearly shown. Incidentally, the place of contemplation (upasana) and rites, as preparing the ground for the higher form of practice, has been indicated. No difficulty will be experienced in harmonising these apparently conflicting standpoints, if we remember that the scriptures provide different ways of approach to the highest Truth according to the temperament and capacity of the aspirant. Since the one indivisible Brahman appears, through the veil of maya or the cosmic illusion, as the manifold universe, the whole phantasm o with its attendant evils will disappear the moment a person realises his identity with Brahman—an identity that has never been lost, but only forgotten.

The popularity of the Vedanta-Paribhasa is testified by the number of commentaries written on it and available in print, beginning with the Vedanta-sikhamani by the author’s son, Rãmakrsna Adhvarin, which again has got a gloss named the Vedanta-maniprabha by Amaradãsa. Other published commentaries on the book are the Arthadipika by ivadatta, the Vedanta-paribhãsã-prakasika by Pedda Diksita, the Asubodhini by Pandita Krsnanatha Nyãyapancanana, the Paribhasa-prakasika by M. M. Anantakrsna Sasatri, as well as one by Pandita Jivananda Vidyasagara, BA. All these have been consulted with profit in preparing this translation.

The only English rendering so far made of the book was that by Principal Arthur Venis, v.A., of the Sanskrit College, Benares, which appeared, with notes, serially in The Pandit in 1882-1885, but never came out in book form. Accordingly the present book is, I think, imperative, which leaves little room for considering the fitness of its author. Advantage has been taken of the above edition as well as of the Bengali version of the book by Sri Saraccandra Ghosãla, M.A,, B.L.

I have also received considerable help from Pandita Upendracandra Tarkacarya Kavya-Vyakarana-Purana-Sankhya-Vedanta-Tarka-Saddarsana-tirtha of the Belur Math Catuspathi with whom I read the book. I am much indebted to Mahamahopadhyaya Yogendranatha Tarkatirtha, Professor of Vedanta and Mimamsa Sanskrit College Calcutta and to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.d., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Pali and Philosophy on the University of Calcutta, for valuable help during the revision. Last but not least, my thanks are due to Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, for his learned Foreword to the book.

The text has been prepared by comparing the above-named editions. An attempt has been made to make the translation faithful, and as literal as practicable. Notes have been added wherever they were deemed necessary, without however, making them lengthy. References have been given to the most of the quotations. The Sanskrit Glossary and the Index are other features that should prove useful. The book in its present form will, it is hoped, popularize the study of Vedanta among the English-knowing people in all parts of the world.

The first edition of the book having long run out, a second edition was urgently called for. In this edition the book has undergone substantial revision, for which I am deeply indebted to Pandita Dinesa Candra Sastri, Tarka-Vedanta-Tirtha, Adhyapaka at the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta. It is hoped that this revised edition will be equally acceptable to the English-Knowing students of Vedanta.

The third edition of this book having long been run out, we are now bringing out the fourth edition. We are sorry, it could not be printed earlier due to some unavoidable circumstances. We are however glad to place the book at the disposal of reading public.