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The Vedantaparibhasa of Dharmaraja Adhvarin (c. 17th century) is a well known manual on the psychology, ontology and epistemology of Advaita Vedanta. Its brevity, clarity, comprehensiveness and depth have all time attracted numerous scholars from different parts of India to write commentaries and sub-commentaries. Its popularity stands unrivalled down the centuries. No sincere student of Advaita Vedanta con afford to ignore this work. Hence, the Paribhasa has been published several times with various commentaries in Sanskrit and with different English and vernacular translations, by many serious scholars and publishing agencies all over India. The text of the Paribhasa with English translation by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, first published by the Adyar Library in 1942, reprinted in 1971, in now being reprinted a second time. Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri's reputation as an established, dependable translator of Sanskrit texts is vouched for by his exemplary translations of the Siddhanatalesasmgraha, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, Bhamati-catuhsutri, Sivadvaitanirnaya, Samkhya-karika, Bhedadhikkara, Manameyodaya, etc.
|1. release is the supreme human goal. 2. It can be secured only by Brahman-knowledge; hence the inquiry into Brahman, the pramana-s therefore, etc. 3. Definition of pramana. 4. Definition of prama. 5. Applicability of above to the succeeding instants of continuous stream of cognition (dhara-vahika-jnana). 6. The author's own view about the problem of dhara-vahika-jnana. 7. Objection to pot, etc. being contents of valid cognition. 8. Reply: pot, etc. sublated at release, not during samsara; hence relative validity of their cognition. 9. support for the above from Acarya Sundara Pandya. 10 enumeration of pramana-s.|
|1. Definition of pratyaksa as process. 2. Definition of pratyaksa as knowledge. 3. Objection: how can beginning less consciousness be caused by pratyksa? 4. Reply: the psychosis of the internal organ which manifests consciousness is caused; this is figuratively called knowledge. 5. Objection as to the incapability of the partless, internal organ being transformed into psychoses. 6. Reply: the internal organ is substance with a beginning, and, therefore, has parts. 7. Sruti support for cognition being a dharma of manas. 8. Objection: how are cognition, desire, etc. apprehended as dharma-s of the self? 9. Reply because of superimposition of identity with the internal organ. 10. Objection: manas, which is a sense-organ (indriya), cannot itself be perceived. 11. Reply: manas is not an indriya. 12. The Gita statement about manas as the fifth indriya explained in the light of parallel statements elsewhere. 13. Objection: if manas be not an indriya, how can there be immediate, direct, perception of sukha, etc.? 14. Reply : if sense-generation caused immediacy and the mind where a sense, inferential cognition too would be immediate: and so on. 15. Distinction of perceptuality from perceptibility. 16. Determinant of perceptuality. 17. Threefold distinction made in Consciousness. 18. Nature of urtti; its going out in perception. 19. But not in inference, etc. 20. Resultant non-difference of pramana from content, on the analogy of ether. 21. hence Perceptuality of cognitions like 'This is a pot.' 22. Also of cognitions like 'I am pleased', etc. 23. Objection: even recollection of pleasure, etc. would be perceptual. 24. Reply: simultaneity also needed where the defining adjuncts occupy the same locality. 25. Or else, present existence may be understood as a qualification of the content. 26. Objection: cognition of dharma and adharma would be perceptual, though known through sabda. 27. Reply: competency too is a qualification of the content of the cognition. 28. Competency, dependent on the nature of things, must be admitted even by the Naiyayika-s. 29. Objection: cognition generated by the statement 'You are happy' should be perceptual. 30. Reply: that is acceptable. 31. Cognitions like 'The hill has fire' are partially perceptual and partially inferential. 32. But not a cognition where no aspect is in sense-contact. 33. Visual perception of the sandal is perceptual only as to the colour, not as the fragrance, of the sandal. 34. Objection: such intermixture of characters in a single definition would prevent the recognition of perceptuality as a jati. 35. Reply: that is acceptable, as there is no evidence to justify the distinction of jati from upadhi. 36. Perception is not the evidence. 37. Nor inference. 38. And the constituents that make jati, namely inherence and eternality, are not admitted by us. 39. consciousness in such cognitions as 'The hill is fiery' can be both mediate and immediate, because of difference of defining psychoses. 40. restatement of the definition of perceptuality. 41.Definition of perceptibility. 42. Objection: the content is perceived not as one with the cognizer. 43. Reply: non-difference means not oneness but not possessing any reality other than that of the cognizer. 44. Explanation: the content has no reality other than that of the content defined consciousness: and this, , it has been shown, is one with cognizer-defined consciousness, in perception. 45. No over-pervasion of inference, since there is no going out of urtti and unification of cognizer-defined and content-defined consciousness. 46. Objection: dharma, adharam, etc. would be perceptible. 47. reply: the content must be competent as well. 48. Objection: when colour is perceived, size, etc. should also be perceptible in the same act. 49. Reply: the cognizer should be one who has, i.e. is qualified per accidens by, a psychosis with that form which is to be perceived. 50. Objection: no psychosis would be perceptible, since no psychosis is admitted with psychosis for content. 51. Reply: a psychosis may have itself for content. 52. The antahkarana, its dharma-s, etc. are perceptible, since there are psychoses with the respective forms. 53. The admission of such psychoses not inconsistent with their being cognized by the pure siskin. 54. What the latter requires is absence only of such instruments as sense-contact, probans, etc. 55. Support from the author of the Viuarana, Sarvajnatman, etc. 56. Restatement of definition of perceptibility. 57. Function of the modes of sense-contact. 58. Four forms of psychosis and of the antahkarana. 59. distinction of savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perception. 60. Objection to word-generated cognition being perceptual. 61. Reply in the light of the already stated definition of perceptuality. 62. Objection: how can cognition of a relation of word-senses be indeterminate? 63. Reply: purport alone is the determinant of sentence-sense. 64. Purport ascertained from the context is pure Brahman, not any relation. 65. This is impartite sense (akhandartha); support from Citsukha. 66. Distinction of jiva-saksin and isvara-saksin. 67. Difference between jiva and jiva-saksin. 71. Unity of isvara-saksin, because of the unity of the accidens, maya. 72. Unity of maya established. 73. isvara-saksin beginning-less. 74. Difference between Isvaratva and saksitva. 75. Intelligibility of denotation by various terms, like Brahma and Visnu. 76. Objection as to beginninglessness of Isvara and the sruti-declared futurity of his desire to create. 77. Reply: there are different transformations of maya consequent on the different karman-s of creatures: consciousness reflected in such transformations is said to have a beginning. 78. Restatement of perceptual nature of objects and cognitions. Perceptuality of cognition consists in its being consciousness. 79. Such difinitio9n applicable to delusion as well. 80. But the qualification 'unsublatedness' excludes delusive cognition. 81. Objection that the content of delusion is not phenomenal and produced ad hoc, but is what is real elsewhere. 82. Reply: such content is not immediate and is hence imperceptible; cognition is not itself a mode of contact, as then would vanish difference of inference, etc. from perception. 83. Objection as to impossibility of producing silver, in the absence of the causal complex. 84. Reply: absence of the normal complex constitutes the phenomenality of the silver, etc. which, together with their cognitions, are produced by a combination of nescience, defect (in the sense-organ or manas or both), and residual impression of former experience of silver, etc. 85. Distinction between transformation and transfiguration. 86. Location of the phenomenal in the this-aspect-defined consciousness. 87. Objection as to apposition of 'this with what is present in consciousness. 88. Reply: of the nescience which is the material cause in any particular delusion, the substrate is not pure consciousness, but consciousness as defined by the this-aspect; hence the apposition with 'this'. 89. Because of the non-difference manifested between such content-defined consciousness and the jiva-saksin there is said to be superimposition on the witness, cognizability by the witness and not-cognizability by any other. 90. Objection: if superimposition be on the witness, why is it not in the form 'I am silver', like 'I am happy'? 91. Reply: apposition with 'I' due not to superimposition on the witness. 92. The form of the residual impression as determined by the form of the original experience accounts for apposition with 'I' or 'This'. 93. Examples. 94. Silver in veridical experience is experienced as 'This' not as 'I' ; hence the superimposition is in the form 'This is silver'. 95. Objection as to the purpose of a psychosis of nescience in the form of a silver-cognition. 96. Reply: that psychosis is for establishing the immediacy of phenomenal silver. 97. Objection: admission of two psychoses, as ' this ' and ' silver ' with distinct contents would make this indistinguishable from the akhyati of Prabhakara. 98. Reply: though there are two urtti-s, there is a single consciousness reflected therein, which apprehends the identity of the real and the not-real; hence delusive cognition. 99. Objection: even the empirically real, being superimposed, cannot be distinguished from the illusory. 100. Reply: there is difference in the nature of things, similar to what the realists admit to explain the momentariness of some entities and the permanence of others. 101. Alternative reply: of the empirically real, nescience alone is the cause, while, in the case of the barely illusory there is an adventitious defect as well, like film in the eye, or like sleep (in the case of dream contents). 102. Objection: dream contents are but recollected, not illusorily created. 103. Reply: the experience is as immediate; and sruti declares the creation of chariots., etc. in dreams. 104. Objections: the dream-content should be superimposed on some locality, which cannot itself be superimposed, as then it should not be the substrate; nor can it be real, as then it would be remote and not perceptible. 105. Reply: the substrate of dream-superimposition is but consciousness, which is self-luminous; as for the locality, that too is superimposed; as also sense-cognizedness. 106. The contingence of the form 'I am elephant' is to be refuted, as before, on the basis of lack of samskara-s with that form. 107. Evolution of maya into dream-objects is said to be (a) direct, (b) through the antahkarana. 108. Objection: sublation is by cognition of the true nature of the substrate; but there is no cognition of pure consciousness on waking; how are dreams sublated? 109. Reply: distinction between sublation and removal. 110. Dreams are removed, not sublated. 111. Removal, not sublation, has to be admitted even of nacre-silver, etc. on the view that they are products of parimal nescience. 112. Objection: admission of phenomenal reality for nacre-silver, etc. militates against sublation in all three times. 113. Reply: negation in all three times is possible, since what is negated is the empirical reality of phenomenal silver, not its silver-ness. 114. Objection: when delusive silver is cognized, if empirical reality too is not cognized, there would be no apprehension of the counter-correlate as defined by that, and hence no cognition of non-existence; if cognized, it should have been originated; how can the silver apprehended contemporaneously with that be not real? 115. Reply: the reality presented is that of the substrate, nacre, etc.; the content of delusion is not in all cases something novel and originated, but only where ordinary sense-contact is not possible. 116. There is partial acceptance of anyathakhyati even elsewhere, in explaining the redness of the crystal, in the proximity of a China rose. 117. Objection: where the rose is not in sense-contact because of some interposition, creation of a novel redness should be admitted. 118. Reply: that is acceptable. 119. The general definition of perception is applicable to other delusions too. 120. Another distinction of perception into indriya-janya and anindriya-janya. 121. Perception of pleasure, etc. is anindriya-janya. 122. Enunciation and nature of indriya-s. 123.distinctive nature of sight and hearing. 124. Justification of the view that the sense of hearing goes forth to the locality of its contents. 125. Conclusion.||7-51|
|1. Definition of anumana. 2. Definition of inferential cognition. 3. Karana of inferential cognition, and its uyapara. 4. Linga-paramarsa not the karana. 5. Distinction of anumiti from smrti. 6. Though in anumiti there maybe recollection of pervasion, the cause is only residual impression, which is not destroyed by the recollection. Of pervasion, the cause is only residual impression, which in not destroyed by the recollection. 7. But the residual impression should have been stimulated or awakened (udhuddha). 8. This awakened samskara, supervening on cognition of probans in the subject, brings bout anumiti, without requiring recollection of uyapti or a paramarsa generated by that. 9. Inferential nature belongs only to the fire-aspect, etc. 10. Nature of pervasion. 11. Pervasion known through perception (repeated or unique) of concomitance, in the absence of cognition of inconstancy. 12. Inference is anuayin, but not kevalanvayin. 13. No kevalavyatirekin inference; it is but arthapatti. 14. No anvaya-vyatirekin inference. 15. Distinction of inference, for oneself and for another. 16. The three members of the syllogism. 17. Inference as to illusoriness of the universe, other than Brahman. 18. Objections of drstantasiddhi and aprayojakata refuted. 19. Definition of illusoriness stated and justified. 20. Alternative inference of illusoriness. 21. Objection: conflict of inferred illusoriness with perceived existence. 22. Reply: the reality perceptually apprehended is that of the substrate, Brahman.23. Objection: the colourless Brahman cannot be perceived by the eye, etc. 24. Reply: what does not possess colour may be perceived, e.g. colour itself. (Objection: Brahman, unlike colour, is not quality, but the substrate of qualities.) 25. Reply: even colourless substrate is not invisible, though a colourlsess substance may be; and Brahman is not substance. 26. Even a colourless substance may be visible, e.g. time. 27. Alternative reply to objection in para 21, through admitting three grades of reality. 28. The perceptuality apprehended is empirical reality and what is denied is absolute reality. 29. Consequent modification of the definition of illusoriness. |
|1. Definition of upamana. 2. Nature of upamiti; the cause and the fruit. 3. Such cognition not secured by paratyksa or anumana. 4. Statement of a special anumana. 5. Refutation: upamiti is established in experience even without the rise of such an inference; anuvyavasaya is of the form 'I compare' not 'I infer'.||62-64|
|1. Nature of valid verbal testimony. 2. Four causes of verbal cognition-expectancy, etc. 3. Definition of expectancy. 4. Justification of the definition. 5. exemplification of expectancy as determining relative strength of texts, in regard to the text about whey and the Visvedeva-s. 6. Objection to above interpretation of the text. 7. Reply: the definiens of expectancy includes absence of syntactical relation to what is of the same class. 8. Definition of competency. 9. Justification of the definition. 10. Definition of proximity. 11. Need for importation (adhyahara) of words exemplified in worldy usage and in sruti. 12., Sakti and Laksana. 13. Explanation of sakti. 14. Sakti as an independent category. 15. Sakti to be inferred from the effect. 16. Sakti in respect of the generic alone. 17. The generic is cognized in the same cognition as the particulars. 18. Alternative view accepting existence, not cognition, of sakti in respect of the particular. Even thus, the generic alone is uacya. 19. Another alternative: cognition of particulars is by Laksana. 20. Two varieties of laksana. 21. Explanation of kevala-laksana. 22. Explanation of laksita-laksana. 23. Another threefold division of laksana. 24. Tahallaksana. 25. Ajahallaksana. 26. Tahad-ajahallaksana. 27. Rejection of the stock examples. 28. Samkara's admission of laksana in 'Thou art That' is by way of concession. 29. Proper example of jhadajahal-laksana. 30. Determinate of laksana. 31. Laksana for sentences too. 32. Objection to above. 33. Reply. 34. Loksana for arthavada statements. 35. Syntactical unity as of a word. 36. Syntactical unity as of a sentence. 37. Asatti explained. 38. Tatparya-not utterance with the desire to cause a particular cognition. 39. But competency to generate that cognition. 40. Objection to above. 41. Reply: add non-utterance with the desire for a cognition of the not-that. 42. Competency determined by capacity (sakti) 43. Vivarana refutation of the causal efficiency of purport explained. 44. Alternative explanation. 45. Principles determining purport; novelty. 46. The word as pramana even in respect of the existent. 47. Nyaya view of the origination of the Veda-s. 48. The Puravamimamsa view. 49. The Advaita view. 50. Relative permanence of letters, words, sentences and the Veda-s. 51. Non-cognition of letters, etc. is due to their non-manifestation, not to their non-existence. 52. Cognition of originatedness of letters explained. 53. Objection that Veda-s are pauruseya. 54. Reply: Pauruseyatva explained. 55. Apauruseyatva justified for the Veda-s, in contract with the Bharata, etc.||65-88|
|1. Definition of arthapatti. 2. Explanation of the definition. 3. Two etymologies of arthpatti. 4. Two varieties. 5. Drastarthapatti explained. 6. Srutarthapatti explained. 7. Two varieties of the letter. 8. That due to unintelligibility of expression. 9. Objection to example given of the above. 10 Reply thereto. 11. That due to unintelligibility of the expressed. 12. Non-inclusion under anumana. 13. What is unintelligibility? 14. Reply. 15. Vyatirekin in not anumana, but arthapatti.|
|1. Definition of anupalabdhi. 2. Explanation of the definition. 3. Definition applies only to competent non-cognition, not inferential cognition of non-existence, as of demerit, etc. 4. Objection as to the ' competency ' of non-cognition. 5. Reply. 6. Definition of competency. 7. Explanation of competency. 8. Exemplification of competency. 9. Objection: the sense-organ is the karma. 10. Reply: non-cognition too is necessary; anvaya and vyatireka of the sense-organ other wise explained. 11. Objection: cognition of non-existence perceptual. 12. Reply: but the karma is distinct, namely anupalabdhi. 13. Objection based on non-difference of the resulting cognition. 14. Reply based on difference of psychosis. 15. Objection to the perceptual character of the cognition of non-existence. 16. Reply: delusion of non-existence is a case of anyathakhyati, not a cognition of the indeterminable. 17. Alternative reply admitting maya as the cause of a delusive non-existence: absolute similarity between cause and effect neither possible nor necessary. 18. Objection: Brahaman may then be the material cause of the world. 19. Reply: Brahman is the material cause of the world-figuration. 20. But not of transformation as the world, since Brahman is partless. 21. Four kinds of abhava. 22. Prior non-existence. 23. Annihilative non-existence; destroyed with the destruction of its own locus. 24. Objection: what if the locus be eternal? 25. Reply: nothing eternal except consciousness; and all annihilation stops short of consciousness. 26. Absolute nonexistence. 27. Reciprocal non-existence. 28. Two varieties of difference. 29. Example of adjunct-conditioned difference. 30. Example of non-adjunct-conditioned difference. 31. Brahman's posited difference from the world does not militate against non-dualism. 32. Justification of bhauatva and pragabhava-bhinnatva as qualifications of nescience. 33. Conclusion.||96-108|
|1. Validity as intrinsically generated. 2. No special positive excellence to generate validity in perceptual cognition. 3. Or in inference. 4. distinction from invalid cognition secured by absence of defect. 5. Validity as intrinsically cognized. 6. Doubt possible when defect exists. 7. Alternative explanation of intrinsic cognition of validity. 8. Invalidity is defect-determined. 9. And not apprehended by the witness. 10. But is the content of inferential cognition.||109-112|
|1 Pramana-s with empirical validity. 2. Pramana-s with absolute validity. 3. Need to understand senses of the words 'that' and ' thou '. 4. Two kinds of definition. 5. Definition by essence. 6. Objection to essence as definition. 7. Reply on the basis of an assumptive relation. 8. Definition per accidens. 9. Causality in respect of creation, etc. of the world, is definition per accidens. 10. Explanation of 'word' and 'causality'. 11. Explanation of 'agency'. 12. Pramana for Isvara's agency. 13. A Threefold definition, resulting in nine definitions. 14. Pramana for Brahman being the cause of the world's origination, etc. 15. Material causality of the universe as alternative definition. 16. Evidence for material causality. 17. Objection: contingence of superimposed misery too being desirable. 18. Reply: existence of a cause (super-imposition) does not necessitate existence of the particular effect (uyavahara as desirable.) 19. Empirical usage of name and form (unlike the uyavahara of reality, desirability and manifestation) is due to association with nescience-produced name and form. 20. Sequence of creation. 21. Isvara's samkalpa. 22. The unquituplicated elements and their qualities. 23. The guna-s as modifying the subtle elements. 24. The five jananen-driya-s. 25. The antahkarana. 26. The presiding deities of the above. 27. The karmendriya-s and their presiding deities. 28. The five vital airs. 29. The gross elements. 30. The process of quintuplication. 31. The lingasaira. 32. Two kinds of subtle body. 33. Te worlds and the gross bodies. 34. Various kinds gross bodies explained. 35. Paramesvara's direct agency in certain case. 36. His agency though Hiranyagarbha in other cases. 37. Nature of Hiranyagarbha. 38. Dissolution as fourfold. 39. Nitya dissolution. 40. Even respiration is suspended in nitya dissolution, there being only the appearance of it. 41. Distinction from death, in that the subtle body does not go elsewhere. 42. Or else, the cognitive aspect alone of the internal organ is dissolved, not the conative aspect. 43. Sruti evidence as to merger in deep sleep. 44. Parakrta dissolution. 45. Distinction from sublation. 46. Naimittika dissolution. 47. Authority of parkrta and naimittika dissolution. 48. Dissolution by Brahman-intuition. 49. Distinction. Of the last form the other three. 50. Sequence of dissolution, as country to that of creation. 51. Stages in the dissolution. 52. Objection: Brahman, as the cause of the world, would be saprapanca. 53. Reply: creation is not the purport of the texts, but non-doul Brahman. 54. Objection as to how creational texts can serve this purpose. 55. Reply: non-duality indirectly established through negation of what was established to be real, if at all, only in Brahman. 56. Saguna tests, in contexts enjoining meditation, are purportful in respect of superimposed, not real, qualities. 57. Those occurring in nirguna contests, have the object of making contingent what is negated. 58. Isvara as reflection in maya. 59. Difference between Isvara and jiva on this view. 60. Defects of this view. 61. Isvaras prototype, 62. Difference between Isvara, and the merits of this view. 63. Objection based on non-pervasiveness of the prototype, in respect of the locality of the reflection. 64. Reply: the objection applies only to a finite, not an infinite, prototype. 65. No rule that what has no colour can have no reflection. 66. As for non-reflection of colourless substance, Brahman is not a substance. 67. Inference of impossibility of the reflection of Brahman in sublated by sruti. 68. The sense of ' Thou '; the jiva as a reflection in nescience or in the antahkarana. 69. The three states. 70. Definition of waking through the psychosis, namely sense-generate cognition. 71. The function of psychosis as dispelling obscuration, a mode of nescience. 72. Its function as establishing relation. 73. Objection based on infinitude of the jive. 74. Reply: even the infinite may lack a particular variety of relation, namely that which consists in manifestation of the object. 75. Further explanation of the manifested of the object. 75. Further explanation of the manifested-manifested relation. 76. Another view of relation as the function, the jiva being finite; non-difference secured between jiva-consciousness and Brahman-consciousness, the substrate of all objects. 77. Objection: non-difference impossible because of the adjuncts. 78. Reply: because of the out-going the psychosis a common location is established for it, the internal organ, and the content. 79. Definition of dream-state. 80. Definition of sleep. 81. refutation of atomicity,. 84. Unity or plurality of jiva-s. 83. nature of experience. 85. Apposition of 'That' and 'Thou'. 86. Objection : conflict with sruti, smriti, anubhava, etc. 87. Reply: perception of difference sublated by sruti. 88. It applies to the qualification, not the substrate. 89. Inference too sublated by revelation. 90. Other sruti not purportful. 91. Location of confliction attributes may be adjunct-conditioned. 92. Objection: superimposition (of agency, etc.) depends on a residual impression from some valid experience (of the superimposed agency, etc.) 93. Reply: the former experience need not have been valid. 94. No first superimposition, as the succession has no beginning. 95. Impartite sense of 'Thou art That', etc. through identity of the implied sense. 96. Karya is not the sole purport of verbal testimony. 97. Conclusion: the purport of the Vedanta as identity of the jiva and the Supreme.||113-151|
|1. Definition of prayojana (fruit). 2. Principal and secondary fruit. 3. Two kinds of happiness. 5. Unsurpassable happiness. 6. Nature of release. 7. What release in not. 8. Dilemma whether release in the suddhanta has or has not a beginning. 9. Reply: appetence evoked by non-manifestation of the existent. 10. The attainment of the already attained and the removal of the already removed may constitute the fruit. 11. Knowledge as the sole means. 12. Sphere of this knowledge, identity of Brahman and self. 13. Such knowledge is immediate (aparoksa) and is directly accounted for by the sruti texts or by the purified internal organ. 14. Older view that the object, not the instrument, determines immediacy. 15. Hence verbal cognition too may be immediate, as in the sastra-drsti of the Pratardana section. 16. Other hold perceptuality to be conditioned by the instrument. 17. Immediacy of Brahman-intuition, not as word-generated, but as internal-sense-generate. 18. Objections answered as to Brahman not being knowable by manas and its being aupanisada. 19. Sastra-dristi, as knowledge resulting from contemplation of sastra. 20. Knowledge preceded by exhaustion of demerit secured by performance of nityakarman-s. 21. Sravana, manana and nididhyasana as causes. 22. Explanation of sravana; 23. of manana; and 24. of nididhyasana. 25. Nididhyasana as the karana of intuition. 26. Manana causes nididhyasana; and 27. sravana causes manana. 28. View that all three are euallly primary. 29. View that reflection and contemplation are auxiliaries. 30. Auxiliariness distinguished from subsidiariness (sesatva). 31. Lack of pramana for sesatva; no sruti, linga, vakya or prakarana. 32. Objections: prakarana possible, as in the case of the forescrifices. 33. Reply: even sravana and manana may thus 35. Distinction of the present case from that of the forescrifices. 36. Reply: even sravana and manana may thus become subsidiaries of dhyana. 34. No sthana or samakhya. 35. Distinction of the present case from that of the forescrifices. 36. Auxiliary causality like that of the potter's wheel, etc. 37. Support from the Vivarana. 38. The mumuksu as the adhikarin. 39. Mumuksutva secured by nityanitya-vasutu-viveka, etc. 40. Explanation of sama, dama, etc. 41. Different views as to the need for samnyasa. 42. Utility of saguna meditation. 43. The path of light, etc. 44. The path of the fathers. 45. The path of the evil-doer. 46. The condition of him who has intuited nirguna Brahman. 47. Objection: how can prarabdha persist? 48. Reply: jnana removes only samcita-karman. 49. Objection: but prarabdha too should have been removed along with primal nescience. 50. Reply: knowledge is hindered in its functioning by prarabdha. 51. Objection: contingence of universal release. 52. Reply: contingence is of the acceptable. 53. Plurality of nesciences, for a single nescience, the capacities being distinct for each jiva. 55. Tat there is not simultaneous release for all is supported by Dr. Su., III.3.32 and Vacaspati Misra. 56. Conclusion: release as the fruit secured by Brahman-knowledge.|
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