Covering Jaina Philosophy from where Volume Ten left off toward the end of the tenth Century this Volume covers 355 woks of 99 Jain philosophers who lived between 1000 and 1300 A.D he of a number of a number of famous Jaina authors are covered in the list along with summaries of many of their works.
Piotr Balcerowicz on the Jaina theory viewpoints or perspective (Naya) which introduces this Volume shows how that theory. Set forth in the famous account of seven fold predication (Saptapadarthi) avoids skepticism contradiction or violation of the law of excluded middle while presenting a plausible if complex way of gauging reality.
Karl H. Potter
Karl H. Potter is Professor of philosophy and South Asian Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle and is the General Edition of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Series containing 28 Volume.
Piotr Balcerowicz nationally
Piotr Balcerowicz of no nationally of no nationally (which he emphasizes) Professor of philosophy and Indian studies currently based in Warsaw Poland specializes in the Indian Philosophical tradition with emphasis on epistemological thought and Jainism. He teacher Indian philosophy and Indian religion as well as intercultural relations conflict resolution and contemporary history of India South Asia Central Asia and the Middle East. He has published extensively on Indian Philosophy and religion especially Jainism but also on the Middle East and Central Asia and Afghanistan Since 2002 he has been involved in various development Cooperation projects in Afghanistan Pakistan Burkina Faso and Burma /Myanmar.
The most significant and intriguing Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical heritage is beyond doubt the theory of the multiple aspects of reality (Anekantavada) which is developed into a method of four standpoints (Niksepa, nyasa), of sevenfold modal description (saptabhangi syadvada), and the doctrine of viewpoints (naya), i.e., the sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications. At the same time no other Jaina concept has fanned so much controversy as the idea that one and the same sentence can be either true or false, which seems implied by the admission of the reality of these multiple aspects
An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiple aspects of reality in general and the doctrine of viewpoints in particular consists in a belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts of the real ranging from monism and eternalism (Advaita) to pluralism and momentariness tksanikavada), In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and interdependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various standpoints. The ontological framework is provided by the concept of substance (Dravya), which is characterized simultaneously by origination, continued existence and annihilation, insofar as it is endowed with qualities (gu1).a) and transient modes (Paryaya) as well as with directly experienced though verbally inexpressible momentary occurrences. Any truth-conducive analysis which is supposed to map the ontological structure onto an epistemological- conceptual framework should therefore take into account the individual ontological context and accompanying circumstances of any phenomenon or entity under examination.
This ontological assumption requires that truth should only be complete truth whereas incomplete truth would be but a misnomer for utter falsehood However limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from all its temporal spatial causal and other relations and emphasize but one aspect relevant to a given moment.
Due to the infinite manifoldness of interdependencies of aspects of the word, including various temporal and spatial perspectives as well as either as either universal or particular reference a vast ranges of Properties each of them being equally justified can be predicated of a given entity with equal right And that will lead eventually to seeming contradiction. The Jainas maintain that such contradictions that ensue from unconditional assertions standing in opposition to one another can be resolved when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration.
Given The Jains ontological assumption description of the epistemological level be complex each of such dichotomizing categories as big/ small Good /bad existent/ nonexistent true/ false etc. that are mutually related when dissociated from its opposite is false In other words each automatically entails its opposite but the model is not dialectical but rather assumes that there are multiple standpoints from which each category may be pertinent To correlate such individual partial standpoints is the task of the Jaina method of syadvada which systematizes possible arrangements of seemingly contradictory statements.
Interestingly enough, it is the model of perspectives (Naya) which the Jainas use to interpret and incorporate various philosophical theories or world views into a consistent holistic framework, instead of the doctrine of seven fold modal description (saptabhangi, syadvada). Numerous Jaina authors such as Akalanka, Siddhasena Divakara, Siddhasena Maharnati, and Mallisena correlated particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools only under the Naya scheme.
On the other hand, the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (saptabhangi) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of origination, continuation and decay, that of the relation between the. universal and the particular, and that of the relationship between a substance and its properties/modes. Essentially, all the examples of the application of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change
Due to multifaceted circumstances, any assertor sentence can only be relatively true Therefore all viewpoints with no exceptions are false views when strictly] related to their respective spheres (Paksa) however when understood] as mutually dependent, they become viewpoints conducive to truth Siddhasena, Divakara, Sanmatiprakarana 1.21 This relativity however, is not tantamount to professing skepticism and the Jainas are quite explicit about that The possibility of attaining truth is ensured jointly by the concept of comprehensive and consistence-based cognitive criteria (Pramana) and partial, aspect-qualified viewpoints as instrument of detailed examination. However, the existence of truth as such and the possibility that it can become the content (Visaya) of cognition is eventually warranted, according to Jaina belief, by omniscience (kevalajaana). The latter assumption led to such paradoxical contention as that ultimately truth consists of all false statements taken together (let there be ) prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false view that are conducive to immortality that are venerable and lead to the salvific happiness (Sanmatiprakarana )
This relativity of every predication and the impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about reality could theoretically lead to two more beside skepticism different approaches On the one hand it could be (taken as )a reason good enough to dispense with the soundness of discursive thinking altogether and in this way it would embrace the negative approach of Nagarjuna and be reflected in the structure of the tetra lemma ( catuskoti) The dependent character of every notion and conceptual representation the ineffable and complex structuring of reality (Prapanca) as it is reflected in the rational and dichotomizing mind inescapably involves real contradictions Virodha and antinomies (Prasanga) On the other hand the result could as well be an all inclusive positive approach Two contradictory conclusions derived one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis eg things arise from a cause and things do not arise from a cause do not have to unconditionally negate discourse about causality there is motion and there is no motion there is time there is part and a whole etc. such seemingly contradictory conclusion should make us only perceptive of the fact that they may and indeed do pertain to different contexts. This would be the Jaina approach.
Despite this the Jaina theory of anekantavada has frequently and undeservedly been blamed with disregarding the law of excluded middle or the law of non contradiction in a stronger or weaker sense. However one and the same sentence (P) when negated conditionally (i.e) with the particle Syat from a certain point of view) Yields not a contradictory statement (p) in the sense that when combined with the initial statement P is an application of the law of excluded middle (PV-P) but refers to a different context viz its points of reference of the two conjuncts is different.
Jaina realism has it that even images in a dream are not purely figments of our conceptualization but have some kind of objective basis and rational justification by the same token our statements pertaining to reality are claimed by the Jainas to possess some truth however the infinity of ontological correlations can in no way be reflected in our language due it inherent limitations (Avadharana) That is way a range of utterances articulated about one and the same object seemingly sanding in contradiction to each other may be consistent taking its varios contexts and ramifications into consideration.
The way we deal with cognized objects is reflected in the Jaina Scheme of Nayas and this takes Place on the conceptual (Svadhigama Jnanatmaka verbal (Paradhigama ) Vacanatmaka jnanatmaka (Paradhigaama Vacanatmaka ) and practical (Vyavahara) Level since all these three are interconnected. A set of conditionally valid viewpoints was not only considered an ancillary theoretical device subordinate to the theory multiplicity of reality and was supposed to corroborate the latter but from the very beginning of Jaina epistemology it coexisted with cognitive criteria (Pramana ) as an alternative epistemic instrument All states of al Substances that are comprehended by means of all cognitive criteria are (equally) capable of being predicated of by means of all (conditionally valid) viewpoints in a detailed manner (Uttaradhyanasutra 28-24)
Here we clearly find a conviction that given utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity. The viewpoints (Naya) organize the world of our practical dealings and within their sphere of practical application they help us determine the truth value of a proposition by way of its contextualization within a given universe of conceivable points of reference. They are not supposed to contribute anything new to our Knowledge as Akalanka declares (at Tattvarthikavarttika on 1.6) Application of viewpoints with regard to things cognized by means of cognitive criteria is the basis of every day practice Accordingly the Nayas only selectively (Vikaladesa) arrange comprehensive Data material already acquired acquired.
Thus Pramanas serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognitions and are expected to ensure the acquisition of truth whereas the viewpoints are an attempt to contextualize any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth.
The assumption of the manifold character of reality in which thing relate to each other by an infinite number of relations can be viewed from infinite an angles as well as reflected in our language infinity of interrelations corresponds to a theoretically infinite number of predications each retaining its validity only conditionally viz restricted to its particular perspective.
Usually but not always conditionally valid predication are divided into two major classes substantial (Dravyastikanaya ) or substance expressive (Dravyarthikanaya) and attributive ( Paryayastikanaya) or a expressive (Dravyarthikanaya) and attributive (Paryayastikanaya ) Whereas the format emphasizes continuity and essential identity of evolving thing the latter predominantly deals with the mutable character of phenomena and their transient manifestations and accentuates the attributive side of reality Most commonly theses two classes of conditionally valid viewpoints are further subdivided into the seven following types.
Children’s Books (38)
Brahma Sutras (85)
Send as free online greeting card
Email a Friend