In recent years I have been observing that the interest to study Indian Logic, specially, the Navya Nyaya is growing very fast. ven the theoretical linguists and formal logicians have started showing keen interest in the study of Navya Nyaya. The reason is very clear. Hardly there is any other system of Indian philosophy which has presented a meticulous and rich analysis of the verbal epistemotogy and the relation between language and reality than the system of Navya Nyaya.
But the greatest hurdle on the way of entering into this system is its highly technical and abstruse language. In fact it is this unusual form of language which frightens even an intelligent student of Sanskrit.
With a mind to remove this fear and also being encouraged by my students' inquisitiveness I have decided to present in English the entire Tattvacintamani of Gangesa which is the basic elaborate work on the system of Navya-Nyaya Logic of the 13-14th Century A.D.
The present work is a free English rendring of the Vidhivada of the Sabdakhanda of the said Tattvacintamani of Gangesopadhyaya. The entire Sanskrit text is split into 366 passages for the sake of convenience of presentation and transparency of the arguments. A detailed Introduction is added to it in the form of the study of the Vidhivada. At the end, the Sanskrit text of Sasadhara's Vidhirada is appended for comparison.
The Vidhivada deals with the meaning of an injunctive suffix. Sasadhara too discussed this topic in his Nyayasiddhantadipa. In the introduction I have given a free rendering of that text also. The reader may compare the Vidhivada of Gangesa with that of Sasadhara. In my opinion Gangesa has elaborated over Sasadhara and has shown his originality on this topic.
The present work, the Philosophy of Injunctions, is first of its kind in the sense that it points out how it is absolutely necessary to analyse language in the context of the culture of which that language is an expression.
I have also pointed out here the principles underlying the analysis of Gangesa.
I have also tried to give the historical link to the reader about the origin and developement of the discussion on this topic.
In passing I may say that I have started with the Sabdakhanda of the Tattvacintamani because for last 100 years it has not seen the second print. And also because it is this part of Tattvacintamani which will attract more and more attention of the modern language philosophers and Semanticists of the world.
My success in this endeavour will depend upon the constructive criticism and suggestions from the readers. I would also like to say: "Aparitosad vidusam na sadhu manye prayogavijnanam".
First of all I express my gratefulness to my guru Pandit T. S. Srinivasa Sastri, a living Gautama and Gangesa of India today. Whatever I know, it is his blessing. I offer this flower on his feet.
I cannot forget to keep on record my thankfulness to Prof. S. D. Joshi, Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, who has all through encouraged me for learning and research by providing me with all necessary facilities.
My students have always provided me with all encouragement and assistance for writing this book Dr. Ujjwala Panse, Dr. Nirmala Ambiye, Dr. Shailaja Bapat, Mr. Brundaban Patra, and Mr. Suryanarayan deserve special thanks for pre-paring the press copy.
I have no words to express my indebtedness to Dr. Vachaspati Upadhyaya, Professor of Sanskrit, Delhi University, who has showered on me his love and affection as my elder brother. It is Prof. Vachaspati Upadhyaya who so kindly arranged to publish this work.
Finally, I thank the publisher Shri R. S. Shukla for bringing out this book in such a short period of time.
ROUGHLY, the activities of a living being can be classified into three categories (1) Positive endeavour, (Pravrtti), (2) Negative endeavour (nivetti) and (3) Indifference (audasinya). In other words, a person either acts forward or withdraws his activities backward or remains indifferent. Now the question arises: When does he go to act? When does he withdraw his activities? And when does he remain indifferent? Needless to say, all these three types of actions are preceded by consideration, either right or wrong. Thus, all these activities have some purpose behind them. Naturally, when a person acts forward, he has some motivation; he wants to achieve some-thing. Then he identifies the means to achieve that something and acts forward to accomplish that means. But before acting to accomplish the means of his desired goal, he confirms three things:
(a) Whether it is possible on his part to accomplish that means or not; ainion
(b) Whether that means is capable of producing his desired goal or not; and
(c) Whether the act of accomplishing the means involves a lot of exertion, more than necessary, or not.
And after he confirms that the means which he is going to adopt is the real instrument for his desired goal and that it is possible on his part to take up that means and that it does not involve any exertion more than necessary, he acts forward. In the absence of any of these three facto rs he does not act. To illustrate, if one wants to write on the black board, he goes to take the chalk in his hand since he has confirmed that the chalk is the means of writing on the black board, that it is easily possible for him to take up the chalk and write and that the taking up of the chalk and writing by it does not involve much exertion more than necessary.
On the other hand, one does not normally take up chair to write on the black-board since it is not the means of writing. Similarly, one does not go to bring the entire river for water when he is thirsty since it is not feasible. Likewise one does not eat food mixed with poison for satisfaction of hunger though it is feasible and although it can be the means of satisfaction of hunger, because its consequences are unwanted.
Thus, the Naiyayikas hold that these three are the factors which prompt inducement.
Now the question arises How are these factors known?
The answer is that they are known by the established Pramanas. One may know them either by Perception or by Inference or by Verbal testimony or by the three. In any case, the knowledge of these three factors, causes inducement and Sabda is one of the means for knowing them. Sabda means a sentence of a reliable speaker. The next question, now, is: Which part of the sentence caused the knowledge of these factors? (4)
The Naiyayikas hold that the optative suffix expresses all those factors since it is an injunctive sentence that causes inducement. When one utters ghatah asti. "The Pot exists', the listener of this sentence does not do anything. But if he hears ghatam anaya 'Bring the Pot', he goes to bring the pot. Thus it is the knowledge arising from the optative form which causes inducement and we have already seen that the know-ledge of the three factors, causes one to move and hence it is argued by the Naiyayikas that the optative suffix must express all those three factors.
The Bhattas and the Prabhakaras do not agree with the Naiyayikas in totality. According to Mandana Misra, the author of the VidhiViveka and the follower of the Bhatta School of Purva-Mimatisa, an optative suffix expresses istasadhanatva 'the state of being the means of desired goal' only and the other two factors are understood by implication. Similarly, according to the followers of the Prabhakara School of Purva Mimamsa, an optative suffix expresses karyatva i.e. krtisadhyatva i.e. 'the State of being feasible to be accomplished by one's effort' only and the other two factors are known by implication.
It should be noted that it is not true to hold that the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras do not require the knowledge of the three factors as the cause of inducement when the Bhattas say that the istasadhanatva is the meaning of vidhi or when the Prabhakara hold that karyatva is the meaning of vidhi, they simply want to say that all the three factors need not be taken as the expressed sense of the optative suffix when one can be taken as the expressed meaning and the other can be obtained by implication. Thus, the difference between the Naiyayikas and the Mimarisakas, lies only in accepting all the three factors as the meaning of vidhi and in not accepting all the three as the expressed sense of vidhi. The reality is not denied by the Mimarmsakas that the knowledge of all the three factors, is essential to explain the inducement of a living being.
The Naiyayikas want to insist that since there should be one-to-one correspondence between the sentence and the content of the knowledge arising from that sentence and since it is a fact that the knowledge arising from an optative form, causes the inducement and since it has been already agreed upon by all of us that the knowledge of all those three factors is the cause of inducement, one must accept that all those factors constituting the content of that knowledge arising from the optative form. And since those factors cannot be obtained as the expressed, meaning of any other constituent of that sentence, one has to accept that all the three are expressed by vidhi only.
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