There had been, in the recent past, considerable controversy over the problems regarding the nature of our sensory experience of the external world and the foundations of empirical knowledge. The controversy seems to have subsided now. It seems to be generally accepted that such issues are more or less solved by, or dissolved in, the contemporary linguistic approach, in the sense that there is no more need for the kind of discussions that once were being indulged in, because the very questions raised were not genuine. The genuine and important question is no longer, whether we perceive the external world directly or not, but what we talk and how we talk about our perception of the external world. This approach, it is agreed, illuminates the nature of the problem under discussion. I feel that, despite the truth of this statement, the problem has not been fully or finally answered by the con-temporary approach. After all is said, something still remains to be said (and this also applies to what I am going to say!). In this treatise I have made an attempt to say something which, I venture to think, still remained to be said.
This treatise, in its original form, was completed seven years ago, and I still retain its fundamental point of view. But seven years is a long time to retain the same style and treatment in handling any philosophical subject. Its subject, which is the nature of our sensory experience, has been dealt with internally, with a view to develop a sound and consistent theory of our sense-experience which could stand the criticisms made in modern times, most of which, I feel, can be handled now. If rewritten, its treatment and plan would have been perhaps very different. Now, it is to be taken as a defence and a consistent working out of the much criticized sense-data theory. It was a great temptation for me to drop the word "sense-data" altogether, owing to the widespread criticism of the name, the notion, the character and the status of sense-data. I think one can accept the theory without the name. In any case, I decided to retain it not only because this is the real topic of the book, but also because I owe a great debt of insight in the nature of the problem to the sense-data philosophers. Thus I fully acknowledge their debt, despite the many criticisms that the book contains.
There is one exception that should be mentioned. The treatise does not contain any reference to Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, because it was published later. But I believe that there is not much in Austin which would fundamentally clash with it, because most of the criticisms (and other modern criticisms) are based on the issue of the language of sense-data. I have argued that linguistic questions are only part of the story of sense-data; ultimately this is not a purely linguistic question but a factual one. So the admission of linguistic difficulties, or linguistic non-usage does not altogether destroy the theory.
Now, a word about what factual as against linguistic means. The main criticism (simplified here) is that there is no ordinary usage for the term and that it makes no difference to our life or experience whether we describe the experience in terms of sense-data or not. This way of describing creates more difficulties than it solves. At best, as for Ayer, it is to be taken as a question of linguistic preference for certain reasons. I have tried to argue that, by examining and manipulating the linguistic usages alone, one cannot hope to solve the controversy whether we perceive physical objects directly (what are the criteria for anything to be a physical object ?) or only sense-data. Nor can it be solved on the theory of verifiability.
Send as free online greeting card
Email a Friend
Manage Wishlist