Indian Theories of Illusion

Email

Whatsapp

Facebook

Pinterest

Twitter

Copy link

The present book was originally planned as a small mono-graph in which I intended to give more or less detailed expositions of the major theories of illusion prevalent in classical India.

But soon after I started writing this book, I realized that authentic expositions of these ancient theories could not be given within the span of a small monograph. The main objective of this project was to present these theories entirely on the basis of original Sanskrit texts. Whenever I ascribed any view to a particular phi-losopher or to a particular system, I quoted the text on the basis of which such ascription was done. The interpretation and translation of the texts are, of course, mine, if not otherwise indicated. In this book I could discuss only five major theories of illusion.

I would like to publish a second volume of this book covering some other theories of illusion admitted by the various philosophical systems of ancient India.

I would not have been able to write a single line of this book unless my teacher Professor Ashoke Kumar Gangopadhyay taught me how to read original Sanskrit texts. I take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to him. I also express my indebtedness to my teachers Professor Prabal Kumar Sen, Former Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta and to Professor Amarnath Bhattacharya, Former Professor of Philosophy, the University of Burdwan, who went through the manuscript very carefully and enriched the work with their valuable suggestions. I also express my gratitude to my colleague Professor Madhumita Chattopadhyay, Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University and to my former colleague Dr. Kuntala Bhattacharya, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rabindra Bharati University, who helped me by providing some rare Buddhist texts. I would also like to thank Professor Proyash Sarkar, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Professor Maushumi Guha, Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University and Dr. Preetam Ghoshal, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University for offering many valuable suggestions.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Sushen Mondal, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Dinabandhu Maha-vidyalaya, Bongaon and Sri Swapan Kumar Dey for typing the manuscript of this book. I also thank my former student Sm. Laharee Bandyopadhyay, for correcting some portions of the first proof of this book. I express my sincere gratitude to Sri D.L.S. Jayawardana and Sri Jayadewa Jayawardana of Maha Bodhi Book Agency for publishing this book. I would also like to thank Sri Prabhas Kumar Banerjee and Sri Asok Kumar Bhattacharya of Image Press, Konnagar, who carried out the responsibility of composing this book. I would also like to thank Sagarika Press who printed this book.

Last but not the least I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my husband Sri Swapan Kumar Kar. I would not have been able to pursue my teaching and academic career without his constant inspiration and support.

Correction of false beliefs is as much an epistemologist's concern as is justification of true beliefs. Philosophers of classical India, too, were concerned with both justification and correction of beliefs. Their views on true beliefs and their justification have come down to us in the form of their theories of truth while their views on false beliefs and revision of false beliefs are embodied in their theories of error.

The classical Indian theories of error mostly deal with issues related to perceptual error. This, however, does not mean that erroneous cognitions arising out of other sources are never discussed by the Indian systems. In classical India, epistemology developed as the pramanasastra, that is, as the study of the various accredited sources of veridical cognition. Every system admits one or more such accredited sources of veridical cognition called the pramana-s and discusses separately the nature and mode of functioning of each of these pramana-s. All these accredited means of veridical cognition have invalid counterparts (pramanabhasa-s), too, and these invalid counterparts are usually discussed along with the valid ones. Thus discussions on perception as a means of knowledge are usually followed by discussions on perceptual illusion; whereas erroneous cognitions arising out of incorrect reasoning are analyzed under the head 'inference'. Although the Indian philosophers are very much aware of the possibility of erroneous beliefs arising out of non-perceptual causes, their theories of error are usually developed with reference to perceptual illusions. This, however, does not affect the general character of these theories, because these theories are easily extendable to erroneous cognitions of other types.

The present work is an attempt to review these ancient Indian theories of error. Although perceptual illusions and hallucinations will be my main concern, I shall refer to other varieties of error whenever it will be necessary to point out the difference between the perceptual and the non-perceptual varieties of erroneous cognition.

Both Indian and Western philosophers believe that a cognition or belief is not known as erroneous unless it is corrected (badhita) by some subsequent cognition. So before we proceed to introduce the major Indian theories of error, it is necessary to say a few words on correction (badha). Correction, like justification, is an epistemological function upon which the epistemic status of a belief depends. By 'justification' we mean all those procedures that confer epistemic status upon a belief, while 'correction' means those procedures that divest a belief of its epistemic status. The epistemological function of correction is not to be identified with any logical function or truth function, such as, negation. For, every truth-function yields a unique truth-value when applied to one or more component statements, and so, truth-functions can be expressed in the form of a single compound statement. The epistemological function of correction, on the other hand, cannot be expressed by less than two statements: 1. A subject S believes at time t, that the object o, has the property F. 2. The same subject S believes at a subsequent moment t, that the object o, does not have the property F. Thus, the epistemological function of correction cannot be expressed in terms of a unitary propositional content; because, correction always involves adopting two opposite propositional attitudes towards the same content or thought. Correction occurs only when the same subject believes a content at a particular point of time and disbelieves it later. The classical Indian philosophers were not unaware of the fact that correction involves two beliefs. In Indian terminology the first objective cognition is called 'bhramajnana' while the subsequent corrective cognition is called 'badhakajnana'. Almost all major Indian systems agree that any adequate theory of error must account for the occurrence of both these cognitions. Philosophers of the West, however, mostly concentrate upon the first cognition, which is the erroneous one.