EVEN since the philosophy of language emerged as an important branch of philosophy, different aspects of language and its use have attracted the attention of philosophers. It is not that philosophers have been unaware of the importance of language, in philosophical speculation, with the arrival of the philosophy of language, philosophers acquired some powerful logical tools to illuminate the understanding and use of language in its various aspects. It is perhaps a hackneyed claim that language is the most commonly used method of communication. This apparently innocent claim carries within it a whole lot of ideas that philosophers have been disseminating. Language expresses thought to others. This is the communicative aspect of language. But for some, language constitutes thought. To possess a thought is to possess a language.
Sibanwita Mukherjee's present book is a detailed study of this claim. One of the central philosophical issues in this debate concerns the critical assessment of the Language of Thought hypothesis proposed by Jerry Fodor. Sibanwita skillfully deciphers the consequences of the Fodorian thesis. She tries to conclude that it is possible to ascrible thought without there being linguistic ability. To defend this conclusion, Sibanwita engages herself in unearthing different components in what is called "thought". Associated with this debate is the idea of rationality, for it is generally held that the ascription of thought requires the ascription of rationality. But then, rationality is a multilayered concept that needs to be unpacked and Sibanwita has done that with great maneuver.
Since language, thought and the world form a triangle, an account of any one of these in the triangle would have serious repercussions on the other two. Many of these interesting ideas have been entertained by Sibanwita in the present book. I believe that the present work is an important milestone in the contemporary philosophy of language and mind. I hope that researchers in these areas will find enough food for their thought in the present book.
This book deals with the question whether the non-speaking being can think or not, or, more generally whether thought can exist without language. To express our thought correctly we normally use natural language and we cannot deny that natural language is one of the most effective, though not the only one, media of our successful communication. When we consider the preverbal children or infra human organism who do not use natural language, then the question arises as to how they communicate with others in their society. As I would like to defend the view that thought exists without language, it requires to be shown first that thought and language are independent of each other.
The basic purpose of the present research is to find out whether thought is linguistic or not, taking note of the instances of pre-linguistic and non-linguistic beings having thought. At the same time, we need to see that there may be a representational system that is non-linguistic. Recently, there has emerged an area where we see discussion centring round conceptual and non-conceptual thought. For example, the relationship between thought and perception is a subject of scrutiny. While this relationship is a fundamental one, its nature has been obscured by a number of confusions. In this perspective, we must review our understanding of rationality.
To reach this broad junction of different approaches to language, thought and rationality, we need to review language of thought (LoT) hypothesis. LoT will help us to be acquainted with the current debate regarding conceptual and non-conceptual content of experience as well as the issue concerning intentional and phenomenal state of mind.
Since I would like to defend the thesis that thought could be said to exist independent of language, significant consequences follow from this thesis. Once we accept independent existence of thought, we are one step closer to accepting non-conceptual content of our experience. This, in its turn, would raise the question about the nature of rationality: whether a philosophical account of rationality could be given independent of ascription of linguistic behaviour.
The very nature and content of human experience have been subject of constant study among the philosophers. My proposed conclusion, I believe, would have interesting repercussions in this area.
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