Cognition Truth and Reality: Insights from Indian Philosophical Texts

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INDIA has a rich heritage of philosophical thoughts and it is highly desirable that Indian students of philosophy should have a considerable knowledge of the philosophy which originated in India. For realization of this goal, classical Indian philosophy was included in the curriculum at Jadavpur University since its inception. For the study of Indian philosophy many original philosophical texts in Sanskrit language are recommended and followed. But most of the students being deficient in Sanskrit, feel the need of some books which are based on original texts but are written in vernacular or in English. During my long teaching career at Jadavpur University, I was aware of the difficulty faced by the students, and cherished a plan to write for them. Finally, long after my retirement, I took the initiative, better late than never. I decided to prepare this volume containing a number of essays on various fundamental topics of Indian philosophy. Discussions in these essays are text based; but in most of them I have put in some of my ideas and interpretations in addition to the exposition of different philosophical positions. Nine essays in this volume were previously published in some anthologies and journals brought out by Jadavpur University and Rabindra Bharati University, details of which are given here. If the students and researchers find this book helpful in understanding some basic topics of Indian philosophy, that would be my reward.

I would like to express my gratitude to many persons who helped me in this effort. Being at a quite advanced age, I was somewhat hesitant to undertake this project, but I got inspiration from my former senior colleague at Jadavpur University, Dr Krishna Roy who is academically active even at the age of eighty. I thank her for the encouragement I received from her. I extend my heartfelt thanks to my former colleague Dr. Ratna Dutta Sharma. She was most enthusiastic about my plan for this book. She was the first reader of almost all the essays in this volume. Her constant encouragement was my inspiration. I am immensely indebted to Dr. Indrani Sanyal, who was also a former colleague of mine. She helped me in many ways, to mention specially, I received her valuable suggestions regarding the matter of publication. She introduced me to Shri Susheel Mittal of Suryodaya Books, in whose able hands I could confidently consign the task of publication of my work. I sincerely thank Dr. Gopa Gupta, retired Professor of Bethune College, Kolkata for her help in correcting the typescript. My lack of knowledge of digital technology was a hurdle for me in executing this project. I am indebted to some younger persons for their help in this matter. They are: Dr. Shreyasee Majumdar, Assistant Professor of Hooghly Mahasin College, West Bengal, Dr. Suvankar Ghosh Roy Chowdhury, Assistant Professor of English at Raidighi College, West Bengal and the last but not the least, my granddaughter Smt. Adwitiya Pal, a student of class X. My appreciation and blessings are for all of them. Dr. Gopinath Mondal, Assistant Professor at Jadavpur University and Shri Saheb Samanta, a Research Fellow at Jadavpur University helped me by procuring necessary books from libraries. My sincere thanks to them. I thank Sri Satyajit Das and Sri Subrata Mukherjee who prepared the typescript of this volume. Before concluding, 1 must also mention that my daughter Smt. Shreyasi and my son-in-law Shri Koushik Pal gave me constant support and helped in whatever way they could to make my effort successful. I bless them and wish for their well-being.

THIS book is a collection of essays on some basic concepts and issues discussed in Indian epistemology and metaphysics. First eleven essays deal with various epistemological topics. Chapter 1 is on samsaya (doubtful cognition). Doubt has an important position in philosophical enquiry. Specially the Nyaya school of philosophy, which is well known for its theory of logical debate (vicara), holds that logical debate starts with samsaya (doubt). So, in Nyaya texts, we find a detailed account of samsaya. This essay represents a comprehensive study of the Nyaya-Vaisesika position regarding samsaya. Definitions, causes and types of saisaya - all have been discussed here. It contains also a critical analysis of some important issues relating to samsaya and suggests some plausible answers to some relevant questions.

The second chapter is on the same topic, samsaya, but it concentrates on one single issue. It is about the nature of the kotis of samsaya. In a doubtful cognition, there is no uncertainty regarding the subject (dharmi) itself, doubt pertains only to the predicate part (dharma or koti), where alternative properties appear as possible predicates to the subject. There is difference of opinion between the old and new schools of Nyaya regarding the nature of the kotis, as to whether there can be more than two kotis and whether all kotis can be positive or whether should there be two kotis only, one of which must be positive and the other negative. These points are discussed in the essay, and the position held by the old school of Nyaya has been defended. According to it, there can be all positive kotis in a samsaya, therefore, it is not necessary that there should be a positive and a negative koti in all cases of doubt as maintained by the Navya-Naiyayikas.

The next chapter deals with two basic concepts of Indian epistemology, viz. prama and pramana. Besides clarifying these concepts from the Nyaya point of view, another problem has been addressed. The Naiyayikas face a dilemma as to whether the status of prama can be given to certain pieces of cognition which are true (yathartha) only by accident but are not derived through pramana (proper means). In Nyaya texts, some problematic cases are considered where the cognition, though not caused by pramana, turns out to be true (yathartha).

The fourth chapter is about the Nyaya theory of ascertaining the truth of a cognition, which is called paratah-pramanyavada-jnapti paksa. Regarding the truth of a cognition two questions are asked:

i. how does a piece of cognition becomes true? and

ii. how is a cognition known to be true?

The second question relates to pramanya-jnapti and the first question relates to pramanya-utpatti. The previous paper contains a brief account of the Nyaya theory of paratah-pramanya-utpatti-paksa. The present essay is about the Nyaya theory of paratah-pramanya-jnapti vis-à-vis the theory of svatahpramanya-jnapti as held by other philosophical schools like Advaita Vedanta and Mimamsa. An account of the Nyaya theory along with its criticism by the Svatahpramanyavadins and the way the Naiyayikas established their position is given in this essay. According to the Naiyayikas, truth or falsehood of a cognition can be ascertained by means of inference (anumana). The Svatahpramanyavadins' objection to this position is that this way of establishing the truth of a cognition would lead to infinite regress (anavastha). How the Naiyayikas overcome the charge of infinite regress has also been discussed in this essay.

Chapter five is on smrti (memory). Smrti and anubhava are two basic types of cognition accepted by Indian philosophers. Smrti is recollective awareness, which is caused by the previous experience of its object, through impression (samskara). According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, smrti cannot be regarded as prama (true cognition). This part of the topic has been discussed in the third essay of this collection. The present essay concentrates on two other questions. First, in the Nyaya epistemology smrti (recollective cognition) is considered to play a role in causing different types of cognition like pratyaksa, anumiti, upamiti and sabda-jnana; but if smrti is not prama (true), then how can the cognitions which are causally dependent on it be true? Second question is: what exactly is the object of smrti? Is it only a thing which was previously experienced? Or, does the thing along with the previous experience as well as the experiencer become the object of smrti (recollective awareness)? These questions and their answers from the Nyaya point of view have been elaborated in this chapter.

The sixth chapter deals with the question how or in what sense a perceptual cognition (pratyaksa-jnana) can be regarded as direct awareness as in saksat-jnana. This question arises because, excepting nirvikalpaka pratyaksa (indeterminate perception), all other types of perceptual cognition is meditated by some cognition or other. This essay contains an account of the problem and considers different possible interpretations of the concept of saksattva as the characteristics of perceptual cognition. The critical assessment of the Nyaya-Vaisesika concept of pratyaksa as done by Sriharsa, a renowned Advaita Vedanta philosopher in his book Khandanakhandakhadya, has also been discussed.