Subsequent to Mahaparinirvana, Lord Buddha's teachings were propagated and promoted by the philosophers and preachers and Nagarjuna was undoubtedly the foremost among them. Following the Indian philosophical tradition of criticism and counter criticism, Nagarjuna authored the famous commentary Vaidalyaprakaranam', in which he denied the sixteen categories propounded by the Naiyayikas. The text is known by the other name Vaidalyasutra. It is a destructive refutation of the Nyayasutras. Nagarjuna refutes one after another all the sixteen tattvas and doing so he paves the path of Shunyata. It was actually the starting point of a long tradition of debate between Nyaya and Buddhist schools. The Nyaya and Buddhist, both philosophical schools got benefitted from this debate and many marvels were produced by the scholars of both the traditions during this process.
A study on this issue is a mark of a very sincere effort which no ordinary scholar can take. Dr. Raghunath Ghosh, the author of this book presents a critique of the Vaidalyaprakaranam. This book, authored by Dr. Ghosh is commendable one mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, Dr. Ghosh made an assessment of a famous Buddhist text by none other than Nagarjuna. In doing so, he highlighted the text itself and therefore this book is destined to add to the study of Buddhist and Nyaya philosophies in a great way. Secondly, in this book efforts have been made to analyse the arguments put forth by Nagarjuna, which is in pursuance to Indian Philosophical tradition. Therefore this study also promotes Indian philosophical tradition of criticism and counter-criticism.
Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR) awarded a Senior Fellowship to Dr. Raghunath Ghosh to work on this project from 2018 to 2020. I am happy to note that this book is the fruit of his sincere and dedicated efforts and of course ICPR assistance in the form of fellowship. The work, which is the result of meticulous and deep study by a scholar like Dr. Raghunath Ghosh is bound to prove to be another milestone in the study of Buddhist and Nyaya Philosophies and inspire similar such studies in future. I congratulate Prof Ghosh for this sincere effort.
I hope readers, students and scholars will get immensely benefitted from this book.
If the history of Indian Philosophical Systems is reviewed carefully, it would be found that the Naiyayikas like Gautama, Vatsyayana, Vacaspati Misra, Uddotakara, Udayana etc. have played the role of the proponents while the Buddhists like Dharmakirti, Nagarjuna etc. have played the role of opponents. In so far as the Neo-Naiyayikas are concerned, they are mainly opponent to the Prabhakara school of the Mimansakas and the old Naiyayikas. The five definitions of vyapti as found in the Vyaptipancaka of Gangesa's Tattvacintamani are the explanations of the term 'avybhicaritatva (non-deviatedness) as mentioned by the Prabhakaras in connection with vyapti. In the Vaidalyaprakarana of Nagarjuna he has mainly attacked the older school of Naiyayikas regarding their basic theory which is called padarthatattva (the theory of category). Nagarjuna, by virtue of being a Sunyavadin believes that an entity is basically essenceless (sunya). Keeping this view in mind, he has to prove that there is no evidence that an entity really exists. Among the sixteen categories pramana is the first and prameya is the second. If it can be proved that pramana itself is fallacious or defective, it cannot have any ability to prove an entity. An unproved or non-evidenced entity is taken to be essenceless. In this way, an effort has been made by Nagarjuna to tear off all the categorial foundation of the Naiyayikas and hence, the system is proved to be smashed (vidalita). Each and every system has got its own logic and presupposition which determines his philosophical world. As per Jainas we may endorse that the whole world is non-absolute (anekantam jagat sarvam). A philosopher observes the whole world according to his own vision and experience and hence, it is not of same type. That is why; Indian epistemology is based on metaphysical and ontological presuppositions leading to its biasness towards metaphysical foundation.
The foundational value of belief in framing a particular theory has to be accepted in Indian Epistemology. It is not the case that beliefs are based on blind faith. If it is based on blind faith, it can never be taken as having any foundational value. Belief, if firmed in a philosopher's mind, must have some sort of corresponding fact realized by some founder of the system, but unfortunately successors do not have such direct experience. For this reason, they start their philosophical activities with the belief and ultimately come to the realm of realization.
In this portion an effort is made to show that epistemology (pramanasastra) as available in Indian Philosophical systems is not unbiased, but is vitiated through various metaphysical or ontological beliefs, though it is claimed by them that through a pramana a prameya is substantiated. Gradually, we will see that this principle - 'manadhina meyasiddhih' is a myth. Because pramana itself is not untouched by the belief of prameya admitted by them. When a philosopher of a particular school is framing a definition of pramana, it is to some extent 'subjective belief, but not objective in the sense that he bears some presuppositions or beliefs. That the pramana is genuine is proved by the Naiyayikas with the help of its efficacy to successful inclination ('pravrtti-samarthya) after keeping belief on the theory of paratah-pramanya ('extrinsic validity of proof') in view. Whether something is a pramana or a pseudo-pramana (pramanabhasa') is dependent on its successful inclination, which leads to the supposition that the theory of pramana on which a meya ('provable object') is substantiated is not free from the influence of meya-related presuppositions or beliefs. The point will be clearer if I put forth some definitions of perception (pratyaksa) accepted by different systems as an instance. Gradually, it will be shown that Nagarjuna's philosophy is also not free from his own presupposition.
The Naiyayikas think that the perceptual knowledge is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense organ with an object, which cannot be described through language (avyapadesya), non-deviated (avyabhicari) and non-erroneous (vyavasayatmaka). To them an object or artha is a kind of category accepted by them and capable of being perceived (yogya). There does not arise any question of perceiving an absurd entity, as the categorical scheme believed by them does not permit us to do so. In other words, the absurd entities like sky-flower (akasakusuma), barren's son (vandhyaputra) etc. are not to be taken as the objects of perception on account of the fact that they can be included under sixteen categories admitted by Gautama.
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